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Foreword
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THE
YEAR.W E HAD

NO PRESIDENT
'
During
the weeks after President
Eisenhower was disabled by a heart attack, Vice President Nixon tells that "the
possibility of an attack on the United
States was always hanging over us." If it
came, nuclear retaliation might be a
requisite for survival. But-"Would the
President be well enough to make a decision? If not, who had the authority to
push the button?" The terrifying ahswer:
no one. Since there is no legal provision
for the delegation of presidential authority, no one, not even the Vice President,
can exercise the President's powers when
the Chief Executive is unable to do so.
As a consequence of this alarming gap
in our laws, the country has been without the services of its President for days,
weeks, even months at a time.
The historical and legal background
of presidential inability-the complex
interplay of events, politics, and personalities during the series of power vacuums that comprise "the year we had no
President" -is set forth in Part I of this
timely and engrossing study. The origin
of the precedent that the Vice President
succeeds on the President's death; temporary inability and related problems
d uring the administrations of Garfield,
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To Dwight D. Eisenhower
The first President to take positive
action on presidential disability

Foreword
The subject of this book is as important as the office ol
the United States Presidency itself. The constitutional uncertainties of presidential inability cause it to be one of the
few areas where there is general agreement among legislators, palitical scientists, and constitutional lawyers that there
is a need for corrective action by constitutional amendment.
Nevertheless, no proposed amendment has ever been
brought to a vote in either house of the Congress. Since the
illnesses of President Eisenhower, no session of Congress
has passed without the introduction of one or more propased amendments dealing with this problem. In 1958 and
again in 1959, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments favorably reported proposed
amendments but no further action was taken.
I do not believe that the failure of Congress to approve a constitutional amendment and present it to the
states for ratification is due to indifference or apathy. It is
due instead to disagreement and doubt as to the form which
a constitutional amendment should take. Any proposal is
necessarily a procedure which would divest a duly elected
President of the powers of that office. We wrestle with
delicate problems touching upon the fundamental principles of separation of powers and the coordinate independence of the separate branches of government. This is
all the more reason to continue and step up the quest for a
constitutional solution. The demands of the nuclear age
upon the office of President require that the discharge of
its duties never be in suspension or uncertainty.
As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments, I have observed increased interest in this
question, but there continues to be wide variation in the
approaches taken by those who work for a solution. The
Year We Had No President is a unique and valuable contribution to the literature of this subject and it should increase public awareness of the implications of this serious
vii

constitutional vacuum. The historical, political, and legal
analysis which Mr. Hansen has made will certainly be of
great assistance to those in government who seek to resolve
this issue.
ESTES KEFAUVER, Chairman
Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments
Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate
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The Year We Had No President

Chapter I

The Gap m the Constitution
Thirty-four men have held the office of President of the
United States. Pick up any American history, any standard
reference work, and you will see their names, starting with
George Washington in 1789 and ending with the present
incumbent, john Fitzgerald Kennedy, inaugurated on
January 20, 1961. The line of presidential succession is
consecutive and continuous for the 173 years of this republic's existence. When was the year we had no President?
The year we had no President is the sum total of the
periods-hours, days, weeks, even months-when the man
in the White House was too sick to be capable of exercising
the powers vested in him by the Constitution as Chief
Executive and Commander in Chief. These power vacuums
-during which for all practical purposes our country had
no President-have occurred in seven administrations. The
figures are as follows:
William Henry Harrison
Zachary Taylor
Jam es A. Garfield
William McKinley
Woodrow Wilson
Warren G. Harding
Dwight D. Eisenhower

Bedridden for 7 days before his
death
Bedridden for 5 days before his
death
Bedridden for 80 days before his
death
Bedridden for 8 days before his
death
280 days from his stroke until he
resumed cabinet meetings
Semi-invalid for 4 days before his
death
143 days from his heart attack
until his announced recovery

Confront the man in the street with this rundown• and
•This calendar does not take into account the nine hours and
twenty-seven minutes that Abraham Lincoln was unconscious before he
died; or the period of Grover Cleveland's incapacity during and after
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the chances are better than even that his reaction will be:
"So what? We've got a Vice President, haven't we?" Like
the majority of his fellow citizens, he subscribes to the comforting fallacy that when the President is disabled, the Vice
President can step in and act as a sort of substitute President. But can he? In 1955 President Eisenhower was stricken by coronary thrombosis. His Vice President, Richard M.
Nixon, has written of the ensuing weeks during which "the
possibility of an attack on the United States was always
hanging over us." If the attack came, nuclear retaliation
might be a requisite for survival. "Would the President be
well enough to make a decision? If not, who had the
authority to push the button?"l As the law now stands,
the answer is-no one:
The President stands alone as the supreme authority of the
Executive branch of government. The Cabinet and National
Security Council can advise him but cannot act for him.
They cannot become a collective commander-in-chief of
the armed forces, or sign legislation into law, or appoint
judges, or decide high policies of government. . . . Constitutionally, the Vice President is designated by the voters
to take over only "in case of the removal of the President
from office, or of his death, resignation or inability to
discharge the powers and duties of said office. . . ." The
Constitution does not make clear what it means by "inability to discharge the powers and duties of said office." It
does not say who shall decide when a President is disabled,
whether the Vice President assumes the "powers and duties"
of the presidency or the "office" itself, and just how a President who recovers his health can recover his office.... • 2
his secret operation for cancer of the jaw; or the two hours and fifteen
minutes that Franklin D. Roosevelt was comatose before his death; or
the two hours and five minutes that Dwight D. Eisenhower was under
anesthesia during an operation for intestinal blockage; or the period of
Eisenhower's incapacity following his stroke.
•No clear distinction has been made between the terms inability
and disability, and they appear to be used interchangeably by most of
the authorities who have written about presidential succession. In this
study unless otherwise specified both inability and disability refer to
any factor or situation, whatever its cause or duration, which renders
a President unable to exercise his powers at a time when there is any
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Since there is literally no one who can take the President's place, his serious illness can mean-and historically
has meant-paralysis to a greater or lesser degree in every
branch of the government. But the past damage resulting
from this gap in the Constitution is insignificant compared
to its potential for catastrophe in the age of the H-bomb
and rocket weaponry. Herbert H. Brownell, Jr., who as
Eisenhower's Attorney General attempted in vain to secure
legislation which would repair the alarming breach in our
laws, has summarized the present situation:
The realization has grown among thoughtful people that
our very survival in this age may rest on the capacity of
the nation's chief executive to make swift and unquestioned
decisions in an emergency. As a result, a major constitutional problem, previously glossed over, has been brought
to the fore. The problem is that posed by temporary presidential inability to discharge the powers and duties of the
presidency at a time when emergency action is required. It
has been emphasized during the Eisenhower administration
by the President's three periods of temporary physical incapacity, even though, fortunately, no crisis required presidential action during those periods. Now that the issue is
so forcefully upon us, with our future existence possibly
depending on the forethought that we exercise in resolving
it, failure to take proper steps to answer promptly the constitutional question would be the height of irresponsibility.a
That we are today unprotected from the consequences of
a lapse in executive power is at least in part a result of the
American public's misunderstanding-or even total unawareness-of this admittedly complex problem. At present
only specialized studies on presidential inability are in
print. It is hoped that this book, addressed to the general
reader, will serve to clarify the issues involved for a wider
audience than political scientists and students of constitutional law. An informed and aroused electorate is the best
possible guarantee that our representatives in Washington

public business requiring his penonal attention. See the discussion in
Ruth Silva, Presidential Succession (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press, 1951), pp. 88-100; also pp. 83-85.
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will enact legislation to insure the continuity of leadership
essential for the welfare of our nation and of the entire
free world.
The interplay of events, personalities, and partisan politics during the series of emergencies which comprise "the
year we had no President" is intricately woven into the
fabric of American history, and cannot be adequately understood outside that larger pattern. The next three chapters
of this book are, therefore, devoted to a chronological account of the "year" -the historical and legal background of
the situation in which we find ourselves today. Chapter V
considers the stopgap measures taken by Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy to provide for delegation of executive
powers in the event of temporary presidential inability;
Chapter VI reviews pertinent colonial and state legislation;
and Chapter VII proposes a basis for action which would
permanently resolve the question.
Although the problems of presidential inability have
their origin in the Constitutional Convention of 1787, the
first of the emergencies which focused attention on the gap
in the presidential succession law occurred in 1841, and the
following survey opens in that year.

Chapter II

A Violation of Grammar
I. TIPPECANOE AND TYLER, TOO

After fifty years of national existence our country was
a lusty and rapidly growing youngster, still a long way
from attaining the stature of a world power. We were
not much concerned either in or with foreign affairs: the
dispute with England over the Oregon border was about
our only real problem in the international sphere. 0£ the
twenty-six states in the Union, none lay west of the ninetyfifth parallel, but even though settling the mighty stretch
of land beyond the Missouri was still largely unfinished
business, migration westward already had begun on a
measurable scale.
The population was nearly eighteen million-mostly
farmers, many of whom were also pioneers with some record
of military service. This combination of factors had led to
the political ascendancy of President Andrew Jackson,
soldier and pioneer. For a time some of Jackson's popularity seemed to have rubbed off on his hand-picked successor, Martin Van Buren, who followed him into the White
House in 1837. But in the spring of that year a depression
hit the land: banks closed, credit was tight, there were crop
failures in many areas; and the citizenry, needing a scapegoat, turned on Van Buren. "Old Kinderhook," as he was
called, was accused of being an aristocrat-a no-account
fop who laced himself up in corsets, scented his whiskers
with cologne, and loved old silver and good wine more than
he did the common man.
Guided by this caricature-which amounted to a blueprint of the type of candidate most unlikely to be the people's choice in 1840-the Whig party bosses came up with a
nominee whose public image was the diametric opposite:
General William Henry Harrison, a military hero from the
West, who had defeated the Indians at the Battle of
Tippecanoe. Hoping to win over some opposition votes, the
Whigs chose as Harrison's running mate a renegade Demo5
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crat, John Tyler of Virginia. But the party was split on a
multitude of issues, and despite the widespread dislike of
Van Buren, the Whigs might well have lost the election had
it not been for the unwitting help of a Democratic editorial writer. His sarcastic suggestion, appearing in a Baltimore paper, that General Harrison "upon condition of his
receiving $2,000 and a barrel of cider ... would no doubt
consent to withdraw his pretensions and spend his days in
a log cabin on the banks of the Ohio" was political dynamite.1 Playing up the contrast between the wine-sipping
aristocrat in the White House ("Van, Van is a used up
man") and the sturdy, red-blooded son of the frontier, the
Whigs rolled out the cider barrel, built log-cabin floats,
donned coonskin caps, and went into action to the rollicking strains of "Tippecanoe and Tyler, Too."
The Log Cabin and Hard Cider Campaign has been
characterized as "an exhibition of abuse, evasion, and irrelevancies on a scale unparalleled in United States history
up to that time."2 But it enabled Harrison and Tyler to

carry nineteen of the twenty-six states-and incidentally enriched American political iconography with a flock of stillpotent symbols. That Harrison had never lived in a log
cabin and detested hard cider is probably quite beside the
point.
The sixty-eight-year-old President-elect arrived in Washington on a wet, cold February day. It was raining, with
the rain fast turning into snow, but he walked bareheaded
up Pennsylvania Avenue to his rooms. There he immediately began to work on his Inaugural Address. Running some
eight thousand words, this document is remarkable only
for being the longest and, without question, dullest Inaugural Address on record. Its delivery on March 4, 1841,
consumed an hour and a half, during which the President
stood in the rain, without a hat or topcoat.
The country was still deep in the financial slump, and
the people had been anxiously awaiting a statement of the
new administration's policies. Harrison's mammoth oration
did little to reassure or enlighten them. His only memorable campaign utterance had been the promise that if
elected he would never use the veto and would strive to
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diminish the influence of the executive branch. In his Inaugural Address he harped on this theme ("it is preposterous to suppose ... the President, placed at the capital, in
the center of the country could better understand the wishes
of the people than their own immediate representatives
who spend a part of every year among them . . . "), 3 outlining a program which would leave the initiative in government to the Congress and, more specifically, to his friend
Henry Clay, then senator from Kentucky.
It may be conjectured that one of the more restive listeners-at least, inwardly-was the new Vice President, John
Tyler. He had quite different views from Harrison on the
role of the Chief Executive in government; if it had been
left up to him, there would have been no talk of surrendering the presidential prerogatives to the legislative branch.
But in 1841 very little was left up to the Vice President.
The office was regarded as "a comfortable sinecure with
which to honor some of the country's more able politicians."4 On state occasions such as this one a good Vice
President was seen and not heard.
The one immediate result of the President's speech was
that he came down with a chest cold. Combined with an
already existing digestive weakness, probably duodenal
ulcers, the cold weakened the old soldier. But he refused to
favor himself-was he not, after all, a hardy son of the
frontier?-and would not allow any curtailment of his
crowded schedule of appointments.
During his first days as President he was pestered by
swarms of party workers clamoring for federal appointments. Although it was Andrew Jackson who first applied
on a national scale the maxim "To the victors belong the
spoils," the Whigs evidently felt that what had been good
enough for Old Hickory would be good enough for Old
Tippecanoe. At all hours of the day office seekers thronged
the White House, hounding the President until he was
bone-weary and sick.
One morning they jammed all the lower floor of the
White House. Harrison, coming back from a before-breakfast walk with the District marshal, found himself surrounded by a clamoring mob. He appealed to them to leave
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their recommendations and letters with his secretary.
The marshal tried vainly to clear the stairway to the second
floor so the aged President could go to his rooms. But the
crowd refused to budge until the Chief Executive agreed to
take all the letters and recommendations with him personally. With his pockets bulging, and his arms heavily
laden, the weary President mounted the stairs. 5
All during March, Harrison continued his early-morning
walks. They often took him to the downtown Washington
stores, where he indulged his domestic side by buying all
the White House supplies, including the groceries. In the
late evenings, though exhausted by the demands of his daily
schedule, he paid visits to the various governmental departments.
One morning on his way to market-as usual, wearing
neither cloak nor topcoat-the President was drenched by
a heavy rain. His wet clothes gave him a chill, the chill aggravated his cold, the cold developed into pneumonia, and
exactly one month after taking office President ·William
Henry Harrison was dead.
The President's illness had first been diagnosed as pneumonia in the lower right lobe of his lung, complicated by
congestion of the liver. Suction cups and stinging ointments were applied to his right side, the doctors apparently
theorizing that this would draw the infection out through
the skin. They also dosed him with laxatives-calomel and
castor oil, rhubarb and emetic ipecac-and the resultant
vomiting and diarrhea soon dissipated the patient's remaining strength. When his physicians finally realized that their
"treatments" had brought the President to the threshold
of death, they administered such antidotes as opium, camphor, and brandy. But it was too late: " ... profuse diarrhea
came on, under which he sank at thirty minutes to one
o'clock on the morning of the fourth ...." The President's
last words, obviously addressed to posterity, were as highftown and as innocuous as his Inaugural Address: "Sir, I
wish you to understand the true principles of Government.
I wish them carried out. I ask nothing more."6
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All the members of the Cabinet had been present when
the President passed away; Vice President Tyler, however,
was at his home in Williamsburg, Virginia. That same
night an official message notifying him of the President's
death was composed and signed by the Cabinet members,
and entrusted to Fletcher Webster, the son and assistant of
Secretary of State Daniel Webster. 7 He was on his way before dawn via stagecoach and chartered boat. The boat took
him as far as Yorktown; there he transferred to horseback
and galloped hell-for-leather the last ten miles to Williamsburg.
His arrival put an end to a happy, boisterous family
scene: the Vice President was hunkered down on a gravel
walk, shooting marbles with his two sons. In high good
humor, he was heckling the youngsters, who were losing to
him. That marble game was probably the last time John
Tyler enjoyed himself for four years.
There was a few hours' delay while Tyler, who was short
of funds, arranged to borrow several hundred dollars; then
the two men started back to Washington on the government-chartered boat. While young Webster slept, the Vice
President paced the deck in solitude. He was confronted
with one of the most momentous decisions in American history, and he was called upon to make it under circumstances
in which neither he nor any other man could be expected
to maintain an objective point of view.
The situation was without precedent. Never before had
a Chief Executive died in office. The country had, in effect,
been without a President for two days. What happened
next depended on the construction Tyler put on Article II,
Section 1, Clause 5 of the Constitution-the clause which
deals with the succession in the event of presidential inability.• The relevant passage reads as follows:
•There has been inconsistency in citing this provision of the Constitution. Some authorities refer to the passage as Clause 6, instead of
Clause 5, as it is designated in this book; others use "Paragraph" in
place of "Clause." The irregularity may be ascribed to the fact that in
the original document the part under number "2" of Article II, Section
l contained two paragraphs, the second of which was superseded by the
Twelfth Amendment. Regardless of the method of reference used in
Lhe sources the intention in every instance is unmistakable.
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In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or
of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice President. ...
At first glance this may seem clear enough, but there is an
ambiguity in the wording. Does "the Same" refer to the
"Powers and Duties" of the presidency, or to "the said
Office" itself?
If Tyler interpreted "the Same" as referring to "Powers
and Duties," he would remain the Vice President exercising
the powers and duties of the dead President. If he decided
that "the Same" referred to "the said Office," he would
become the tenth President of the United States.
On his arrival in Washington, Tyler was met at the dock
by the Cabinet and escorted to Brown's Indian Queen Hotel
on Pennsylvania Avenue. A note was sent to Judge William
Cranch, Chief Justice of the Circuit Court of the District
of Columbia, summoning him to the hotel. Cranch was
taken to Tyler's rooms, where in the presence of the Cabinet, of Fletcher Webster, the tavernkeeper Jesse Brown, and
some hotel guests, he administered the Presidential Oath
of Office.
Directly after the ceremony the seventy-two-year-old
jurist signed the following affidavit:
I, William Cranch, . . . certify that the above-named
John Tyler personally appeared before me this day, and
although he deems himself qualified to exercise the powers
and office of President on the death of William Henry
Harrison, late President of the United States, without any
other oath than that which he has taken as Vice President,
yet as doubts may arise, and for greater caution, took and
subscribed the foregoing [Presidential] oath before me. 8
Who decided that Tyler should become President instead of Acting President? Was it his decision alone or
reached in consort with the Cabinet? When was the decision made? These are questions to which we may never
have a clear answer. All that can be stated with certainty
is that the Cabinet publicly announced the President's
death, sent a notification addressed to "John Tyler, Vice
President of the United States,"9 and was present when he
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was sworn in on April 6, 1841. None of the published
papers of Tyler or of the five Cabinet members presentSecretary of State Daniel Webster, Secretary of the Treasury
Thomas Ewing, Secretary of \Var John Bell, Attorney
General John ]. Crittenden, Postmaster General Francis
Granger-sheds any light on the matter.•
There are three schools of thought: (1) Tyler himself
decided he would have presidential status, promptly claimed
it, and was unopposed by the Cabinet; (2) Daniel Webster
thought that Tyler's action violated the Constitution, but
did not make an issue of it because they belonged to the
same political party; and (3) Webster, far from opposing
Tyler's assumption of office, was the one who decided that
he should become President. According to this third version, only Webster among those in official circles thought
that President Harrison would die, or at best would be disabled for a long period; he discussed these contingencies
with the Cabinet, giving it as his opinion that in either
event Tyler would be President, and urged that he be sent
for. But no record of such a discussion can be found. After
Harrison's death, Webster had the Clerk of the Supreme
Court write to Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, who was in
Maryland, asking him to come and confer on the question
of whether or not Tyler should take the Presidential Oath.
Taney refused to do so without a formal invitation from
the Cabinet or from the Vice President, and further explained that he didn't want to appear to be intruding in
the business of a coordinate branch of the government. 10
Who, then, did decide that Tyler should take the oath
of office? On the face of it, the affidavit signed by Judge
Cranch would seem to indicate that Tyler thought the oath
was unnecessary-that he believed the office of President
automatically devolved on him when Harrison died.1 1 On
the other hand, if he thought that he had become "no more
than Acting President, the oath he had previously taken to
discharge the duties of the Vice President would cover the
whole ground, as one of the prescribed duties of that office
•The sixth member of the Cabinet, Secretary of the Navy George
Ticknor Curtis, was absent from Washington at this time.
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... is that of acting as President in the event of the President's death." 12 There is still a third possibility: if Tyler
was uncertain of his status-if he was not sure that he automatically succeeded to the Presidency-but wished to lay
claim to the office
it would appear from a plain reading of the Constitution
that he was legally enjoined to subscribe to the oath provided especially for the President. For Article Two, Section
One, provides that: "Before he enter on the Execution of
his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation.
. . ." The act of taking the oath marks the President's first
official act in office. The doubts that might arise, then,
would have been well founded, as Cranch said, if Tyler laid
claim to the presidential office without ever taking the
presidential oath. The "greater caution" appears to have
been the mark both of prudence and of necessity.13
In short, all that can be said without fear of successful
contradiction is that Tyler or somebody decided he should
be President; Tyler or somebody decided he should take
the oath of office; Tyler or somebody decided he should put
it on the record that he did not believe the oath was
necessary. However, since the Cabinet was present when he
took the oath and since no evidence to the contrary exists,
it can be asserted with some confidence that Webster and
the other Cabinet members did not regard Tyler as a
usurper.
Newspaper opinion was divided. Those holding that
Tyler's decision (as it will be referred to for convenience)
was right included the Boston Courier (Whig), the Washington Globe and the Pennsylvanian (both Democratic),
the Raleigh Register (Whig), and the principal Whig
paper, the National Intelligencer (Philadelphia and Washington). Among those holding that Tyler should remain
Vice President or Acting President were two other Boston
papers (one Whig, one Democratic), the New York Post
(Democratic), a Harrisburg paper (Whig), and the Richmond Enquirer (Democratic). None of the major newspapers suggested that a special election be called. 14
Other dissident parties included an elder statesman,
former President John Quincy Adams, and not unexpected-

A

VIOLATION OF GRAMMAR

13

ly, Henry Clay. On April 9, 1841, Tyler made an Inaugural
Address, and on April 14 he moved into the White House.
Two days later Adams wrote in his diary:
I paid a visit this morning to Mr. Tyler, who styles himself President . . . and not Vice-President acting as President .... But it is a construction in direct violation of both
the grammar and context of the Constitution ... a strict
constructionist would warrant more than a doubt whether
the Vice-President has the right to occupy the President's
house, or to claim his salary, without an Act of Congress.U•
Clay picked up Adams' argument that Tyler was Acting
President only and carried it a step farther, declaring that
he did not have all the powers of a regularly chosen Chief
Executive, 16 but by the time the matter came up in the
Senate (June), 1841), he either had changed his mind or had
decided it was no use to fight a fait accompli: at any rate,
he voted to give Tyler the presidential title. A somewhat
longer debate in the House the day before had ended with
the defeat of a resolution that Tyler be styled "Acting
President." This congressional action appeared to close the
succession issue, and by the end of June "even John Quincy
Adams referred to Tyler as 'the President.' "17
And yet Adams had been right. Tyler's accession to the
office of President was contrary to the Constitution.

2. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE TYLER
PRECEDENT
Memorable details are sometimes misleading. History
has recorded that John Tyler was playing marbles with his
two boys when he received word of President Harrison's
death. The picture evoked is that of an innocent bystander
caught up willy-nilly in the tide of great events-a man
upon whom (in the words of a later Vice President who
acceded to the Presidency) "a bull or a load of hay" has
suddenly fallen.is But Tyler was a long way from being an
innocent bystander, and there is evidence that he was not
unprepared for the news that Fletcher Webster brought
him. In a letter dated some six months after he took over
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the Presidency, he wrote to his friend and confidant Littleton W. Tazewell:
I well remember your prediction of Gen. Harrison's death,
and with what emphasis you enquired of me whether I had
thought of my own situation upon the happening of that
contingency. You declared in advance much of the difficulty
by which I have already been surrounded. 1 9
It is a good deal more than a reasonable supposition
that Tyler had given some thought to his "own situation":
it would be incredible if he had not. A Jeffersonian Democrat and an extreme state rights man, he had little in common with the Whigs except their announced opposition to
the consolidation of power in Washington. During his
thirty years in public office, he had served in both houses
of Congress and as governor of Virginia. The record showed
that he was independent, stubborn, outspoken, and courageous; he knew what he was against but not always what he
was for. Although he had stood with Jackson against a recharter of Nicholas Biddle's Bank of the United States,
Tyler felt that when the President removed the government's deposits from the bank he had (in the terms of the
resolution censuring Jackson) "assumed upon himself
authority and power not conferred by the Constitution";
and rather than vote to expunge this censure from the
record, Tyler resigned from the Senate in February, 1836.
Having thus cut himself off from his own party, he allied
himself with the newly formed Whig party, and in 1838 was
again a candidate for the Senate. This ran counter to the
plans of Henry Clay, who was conniving to obtain the
senatorship for William C. Rives. Tyler's friends "demanded
a showdown. At first, Clay pleaded 'not guilty' to the
charge of intrigue. But finally . . . the Kentuckian admitted his activities in behalf of Rives, and offered a compromise: Rives would be elected to the Senate, and Tyler
would be given the Whig vice-presidential nomination in
1840."20

Whether or not Clay actually intended to keep his end
of the bargain, when convention time came nothing could
stop the movement for Tyler. As consolation for Clay, there
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was the knowledge that Tyler would attract votes of the
Southern state rights faction, and that once he was "safely
embalmed" in the Vice Presidency, he would present little
threat to Clay's legislative program. With President Harrison already committed to a role of passive approval while
his friend Harry Clay did the wheeling and dealing, and
with four of the six Cabinet members "Clay pigeons," it
must have seemed to the crafty, craggy senator from Kentucky that he had the executive branch well under control.
While there is no way of knowing how much thought
Tyler gave to the presidential succession clause, the possibility that it might be evoked, as his letter to Tazewell
shows, was certainly not unforeseen, and his actions seem to
indicate that he was predisposed to take advantage of the
opportunity offered him by its ambiguous wording. For one
thing, as previously noted, the official message which interrupted his marble game was addressed to "John Tyler,
Vice-President of the United States"-an indication that the
Cabinet members did not consider he had automatically succeeded to the Presidency on Harrison's death. Nevertheless,
and with a minimum of delay, Tyler put himself on record
to the contrary-he deemed himself qualified to exercise the
powers and office of President "without any other oath than
that which he has taken as Vice-President, [but] as doubts
may arise and for greater caution" consolidated his position
by taking the Presidential Oath. Moreover, his "whole
course of conduct in the first few days after he arrived in
the capital demonstrated plainly that he acted with conscious deliberation to establish himself as President in his
own right and not as a mere caretaker for the departed
Harrison."21
Whether or not his decision had been weighed in advance of the contingency or was only reached after discussion with the Cabinet, it certainly appears, as one writer put
it, that Tyler did not enter into any abstract reasoning
about the Constitution.22 The wording of the succession
clause gave him an opening, and he took it. But assuming
that he had been determined to be guided by the intent of
the framers of the Constitution, what might he have done
to ascertain it?
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For one thing, he might have studied the records of the
Cons ti mtional Convention of 1787: Madison's N ates had
been published in 184.0. However, there is no evidence
that Tyler referred to them or that he even knew of their
existence.2 3 As a lawyer he would be aware that precedents would, at least to some degree, affect the thinking
of the delegates, but locating historical materials on the inability provisions of colonial and state charters would have
required months of research, for records were scattered and
libraries few. And he could not consult any of the men
who had drafted the Constitution; the youngest of the
signers, James Madison, had died six years before. Of course,
old John Quincy Adams was still alive. He had been
twenty when the Constitutional Convention was held, and
although he had not signed the Constitution, as the son of
the second President and himself a former President, he
must have heard the matter discussed. But Adams, though
a fellow Whig, had little use for Tyler-and Tyler knew it.
Adams' opinion of him is summed up in diary entry
made on the day of Harrison's death:
Tyler is a political sectarian of the slave-driving, Virginian,
Jeffersonian school, principled against all improvement,
with all the interests and passions and vices of slavery rooted
in his moral and political constitution-with talents not
above mediocrity, and a spirit incapable of expansion to
the dimensions of the station upon which he has been cast
by the hand of Providence .... This day was in every sense
gloomy. 24
Ironically enough, the one man who might have told Tyler
the intent of the framers of the Constitution was about the
last man he would have wished to consult.
The historical materials bearing on the presidential
succession clause were first put into focus by a brilliant
Washington lawyer, Henry E. Davis, in a monograph, Inability of the President, written in the summer of 1881
while President Garfield lay ill in the White House.• It
remained unprinted until 1918, at which time it appeared
in the Congressional Record. 25 Davis' monograph offers
proof, never rebutted, that the Vice President was never
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intended to be more than Acting President. In summary,
this is what Davis found:
The Constitutional Convention of 1789 was organized in
the same manner as conventions held today, with most of
the work parceled out to committees. Davis discovered
that two resolutions regarding presidential inability (or
disability: both words were used) were presented to the
Convention as a whole. Both resolutions provided that the
Vice President would act as President during the disability
of the Chief Executive. Both resolutions gave only the
right to exercise the powers and duties of the office to the
Acting President.
The general idea was approved by the entire Convention, and the two resolutions were referred to a five-man
committee "to revise the style and arrange the article
agreed to by the House."26 The sole function of this committee was to combine the resolutions, polish their language, and fit them harmoniously into the body of the
Constitution. It had no power to alter or amend any of the
sections sent to it. But in combining and condensing, the
committee changed the intended sense, as a comparison of
the two texts makes clear.
Articles Originally Agreed to by
the Convention

After Consolidation by the Committee on Style and Later Adopted

Article X, Section 2: . . . and in
case of his removal as aforesaid,
death, absence, resignation or in·
ability to discharge the powers or
duties of his office, the Vice Presi·
dent shall exercise those powers
and duties until another President
be chosen, or until the inability
of the President be removed.

Article II, Section I, Clause 5: In
case of the removal of the president from office, or of his death,
resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of
the said office, the same shall devolve on the vice-president,

Article X, Section I: The Legislature may declare by law what
officer of the United States shall
act as President, in case of the
death, resignation, or disability of
the President and Vice President;

and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal,
death, resignation or inability,
both of the president and vicepresident, declaring what officer
shall then act as president,

•The unabridged text of the monograph is given in Appendix I.
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and such Officer shall act accordingly, until such disability be removed, or a President shall be
elected.

No PRESIDENT

and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a president shall be
elected.

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy has analyzed the
changes as follows:
When we refer to the provlSlons before and after the
Committee on Style had combined them, it appears that
the Committee did several things: consolidated two provisions into one and introduced the words "the same shall
devolve on the Vice President"; omitted reference to "absence" as an occasion for operation of the succession rule;
used the adverbial clause "until the disability be removed,"
o·,1ly once instead of using it to modify each of the preceding clauses separately; substituted "inability" for "disability" in the clause referring to succession beyond the
Vice President, possibly as being more comprehensive and
covering both absence and temporary disability; and
changed the semicolon after "Vice President" to a comma
so that the limited beginning, "and such Officer" clause
would refer to both the Vice President and officer designated by Congress. Thus the evolution of this clause makes
clear that merely the powers and duties devolve on the
Vice President, not the office itself.27
The proceedings of the Federal Convention offer further proof that the delegates never intended the Vice President to become President during a temporary or permanent
inability of the President. James Wilson, Gouverneur
Morris, and James Madison objected strongly to a proposal
for election of the President by Congress because they feared
the Congress would purposely delay in filling any vacancy
in order that its own presiding officer could act as President during the interim. 2 s Charles Warren, in The Making
of the Constitution, stresses the delegates' repeated reference to the idea that "the Vice President would only perform the duties of President until a new election for President should be held; and that he would not ipso facto become President." 20 This interpretation was carried over
into the ratifying conventions of the states, at which the
delegates spoke of the "Vice President, when acting as President."30
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Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy has presented an
irrefutable argument in support of this general thesis by
looking at the Constitution in its entirety. If the Tyler interpretation is applied to both temporary and permanent
inability, certain other sections become inconsistent. For
example:
1. Article I, Section 3, Clause 5 says the Senate shall
choose a President pro tempore in the absence of the Vice
President or "when he shall exercise the Office of President
of the United States."
2. The twelfth amendment provides that if, in case of
a contested presidential election, the House of Representatives shall not choose a President before Inauguration Day,
"then the Vice President shall act as President in the case
of the death or other constitutional disability of the President."31 This wording assumes even greater importance
when it is recalled that the twelfth amendment was adopted
on September 25, 1804.
3. Section 3 of the twentieth amendment recognizes the
distinction between permanent and temporary inability by
providing that if, at the time fixed for beginning the term
of the President, the President-elect has died, then the Vice
President "shall become President." But the amendment
further provides that if a President has not been chosen by
the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President-elect fails to qualify, then the Vice President-elect
shall "act as President until the President qualifies...."a2

The records and history of the Constitutional Convention and consideration of other provisions in the Constitution establish indisputably that it was the intention of the
framers for the Vice President to be Acting President in the
event of presidential inability. He was not to succeed to
the Presidency on the death of the President; he could become President only by being elected to the office. As Edward S. Corwin puts it,
That Tyler was wrong in his reading of the original intention of the Constitution is certain.• It was clearly the
•"One may logically ask why doubt and controversy over the meaning of this clause has arisen in the past, if the framers' intent is so clear
and certain. The answer is simply that a great deal more is now known
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expectation of the Framers that the Vice-President remain
Vice-President, a stopgap, a locum tenens, whatever the
occasion of his succession.... 3s
The misinterpretation of the Constitution in 1841, in
the words of John Quincy Adams, placed "in the Executive
chair a man never thought of for it by anybody."3 4 During
the next twenty-five years two Presidents died in officeZachary Taylor on July 9, 1850, and Abraham Lincoln on
April 14, 1865. On both occasions the precedent set by
Tyler was followed and on both occasions John Quincy
Adams' remark applied: Vice Presidents Millard Fillmore
and Andrew Johnson took the oath of office and became,
respectively, the thirteenth and seventeenth Presidents of
the United States. Thus, in the twenty-eight-year period
between the inauguration of President Harrison in 184 l and
the inaguration of President Ulysses S. Grant in 1869, during more than a third of that time-ten years and five
months-presidential powers were exercised by men who
had received no popular mandate to do so.
However, "the more pernicious consequences of the precedent ... do not manifest themselves in cases of vacancy,
but appear in cases of inability." 35 The nature of these
consequences first became apparent in 1881 when the Tyler
precedent, which previously had been followed in cases of
the death of the President in office, was applied to a basically different situation-that of prolonged presidential inability.
about what went on at the Constitutional Convention of 1787 than was
known in the past, even in the years immediately after the Convention.
It was conducted in secrecy, and not until Madison's notes were published posthumously in 1840 was a fair picture available, although still
not a complete one. Farrand's work, Records of the Federal Convention
of 1787, the definitive source on the subject, did not appear until 1911.
Other important data have come to light subsequently through the
research of biographers and historians dealing with persons and actions
of the time. Understandably, it has taken years for scholars to bring
the information together. Furthermore, confusing precedents have been
established by officials who did not have access to this information"
(Brownell, "Presidential Disability," pp. 192-193).

Chapter Ill

Practical Politics
Practical politics consists in ignoring the facts.
-The Education of Henry Adams

1. THE GARFIELD INTERREGNUM
Unparalleled prosperity in the South and West-a national surplus of $145,000,000-a reduction in postal rates:
the jubilant tone of such headlines as these reflect the state
of the nation at the opening of the 1880's. Railroad construction had expedited the settling of the Trans-Missouri
West; telegraphic communications united the remote sections of the country; and the Atlantic cable linked us to the
Old World. There were thirty-eight states in the Union
now, and the population had risen to fifty million. Cities
were growing in size and influence. Farming was still the
leading occupation, but the tide was shifting from country
to city as factories and offices drew into their orbit not only
immigrants but thousands of native-born Americans from
small towns and villages.
The 1870's had been a period of federal and municipal
corruption, with the big city bosses muscling into control
of the Republican party. Graft and grabbing had reached a
climax during President Grant's second administration; but
reform was under way by the time his successor, Rutherford
B. Hayes, took office. At the Republican Convention of
1880, the reform element of the party, the "Halfbreeds,''
fought it out with the "Stalwarts," the faction of the bosses
and spoilsmen. The resulting ticket-James A. Garfield for
President; Chester A. Arthur for Vice President-obviously
represented a marriage of convenience.
When the convention opened, Garfield, then senatorelect from Ohio, and his fellow Halfbreeds supported James
G. Blaine, the senator from Maine and former speaker of
the House. Arthur was aligned with the Stalwarts, who
were backing former President Grant for a third term.
21
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When Grant and Blaine were deadlocked after twenty-eight
ballots, a swing toward Garfield began, climaxed by his
nomination on the thirty-sixth ballot. Since Garfield was
only forty-nine and in good health, the Halfbreeds saw no
risk in appeasing the Stalwarts with the vice presidential
nomination. So it came about that Garfield, a Civil War
hero and a man of notable integrity, was paired off with
"Chet" Arthur, whose name was associated with bossism
and machine politics.
Party unity endured only until the election campaign
had been won. Signs of a new split appeared when Garfield
appointed Blaine his Secretary of State. Blaine's bitterest
foe was the Stalwart boss, Senator Roscoe Conkling of New
York, and Conkling quarreled violently with the President
over the appointment. Unperturbed, Garfield continued
with his program for civil service reform, naming a Conkling opponent to be Collector of the Port of New York.
This was a patronage-rich job on which the Stalwarts had
depended for much of their strength in the state, and
Conkling and Platt-the junior New York senator-resigned
their offices in protest. They counted on being immediately
re-elected,• a demonstration of strength which they figured
would serve as a "Keep Off" sign if Garfield and Blaine
planned on any futuce meddling in New York State politics. It was a good idea, but it backfired: New Yorkers had
not forgotten the scandals of the Grant administration.
When it became apparent that the issue was in doubt, Vice
President Arthur-in direct opposition to the President's
wishes-came to the support of his old cronies. In spite of
his efforts, they were defeated, and now there could be no
concealing the hostility between the President and the Vice
President.
The defeat of Conkling and Platt on their home
grounds, combined with the paralyzing setbacks the President had handed the Stalwarts in Congress, measurably increased Garfield's stature as a politician as well as his
reputation for integrity. Seldom had a presidential administration opened more auspiciously; at this juncture, three
•senators were elected by the state legislature at this time.
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months after Garfield's inauguration, a disappointed office
seeker belonging to the Stalwart faction, a lawyer named
Charles Guiteau, changed the course of history with a
bullet.
At 9:20 on the morning of July 2, 1881, the President
arrived at the Baltimore & Potomac station en route to
commencement exercises at his alma mater, Williams College. He was accompanied by Secretary of State Blaine. Near
the door as the President's party came in was Guiteau,
armed with an English Bulldog 44-caliber revolver. Garfield
and Blaine started walking briskly through the waiting
room, and Guiteau rushed after them. Coming up behind
the President, he fired twice at his back before the crowd
closed in and seized him.
The President cried out, and then slumped to the floor.
He was placed on a mattress and carried to an office on the
second floor of the station. Within minutes several doctors
had gathered. According to the report of Dr. D. W. Bliss, a
well-known Washington surgeon who was later placed in
charge of the case, they found that the President exhibited
all the symptoms of shock and internal hemorrhage. The
second bullet had only grazed his right coat sleeve, but the
first had entered his back about four inches to the right of
the spinal column at the height of the eleventh rib. In an
attempt to locate the bullet, the wound was explored with a
probe, the probe being turned this way and that to find the
channel carved by the bullet. The instrument became stuck
in the shattered fragments of the rib, and was only withdrawn with great difficulty. The doctor then inserted his
little finger in the wound but still was unable to locate the
bullet, and concluded that it had probably entered the
liver. At 10:20 A.M. the President was taken by horse-drawn
ambulance to the White House.
Although he had not been expected to live through the
night, the President was much improved the next day. However, the exploration of the wound had been conducted
under far from sterile conditions and, not surprisingly, an
infection developed. From July 2, the date of the shooting,
to August IO, the President's condition varied: one day he
would feel fairly well, the next he would run a high tern-
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perature and have difficulty keeping his food down. On
August IO he felt strong enough to sign an extradition
paper, the first and last official act he performed during his
long illness. On August 18 "a swelling of the right parotid
gland [the salivary gland below the ear] was noted, accompanied by restlessness and wandering of the mind. These
were ominous signs, indicating that the septic bacteria had
broken into the blood stream, producing blood poisoning." 1
As the infection spread, abscesses formed in various parts of
his body and he was affiicted with facial paralysis. But he
rallied again, and at his insistence was taken to a cottage
by the sea at Elberon, New Jersey.
While the President lingered between life and death,
only routine business was transacted by the government.
The Cabinet had no authority to act on many of the matters that came up, and the President was too ill to he
consulted.
Although [Garfield's] mind was clear during the first weeks
of his invalidism, the daily bulletins of the physicians are
sufficient evidence that he was physically unable to discharge the duties of his office. During these eighty days a
great deal of urgent business demanded the President's immediate attention: there were postal frauds; officers did not
perform their duties because they had not been commissioned; the country's foreign relations were deteriorating.
. . . Nearly every day the newspapers mentioned some important matter which was ignored simply because it required the President's personal attention. At one time there
was a rumor that the Central Pacific Railway would bring
action for a writ of mandamus directing Vice President
Arthur to assume the President's powers and duties during
Garfield's illness [Boston Evening Transcript, August 25,
1881], but no action was taken. The Cabinet continued to
conduct the affairs of government as best it could without
an active Chief Executive.2
Public opinion, as reflected in the newspapers, indicated
that there were some who felt governmental business was
being handled satisfactorily, but "New York's two leading
papers, the Times and the Herald, objected editorially to
having the affairs of state managed by the Cabinet, a body
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unknown to the Constitution, [and] particularly disapproved of Secretary of State James G. Blaine's activitiesactivities which made him a kind of de facto President [New
York Times, August 11, 1881; New York Herald, September
5, 1881]."3
In the first days of September, the Cabinet called a
meeting to consider the possibility of asking Vice President
Arthur to act as President. At this time Garfield's condition
had taken a turn for the better, and it was believed that he
would recover. But in the physicians' opinion at least another two months would elapse before he would be back at
his desk, and already his long illness had paralyzed the
transaction of government business in every executive department. It was essential that the Cabinet take steps to
relieve the situation.
Except for Secretary of State Blaine and the young Secretary of ·war, Robert T. Lincoln (who was the lone Stalwart present at the meeting), the names of the Cabinet
members are forgotten by all save historians. But with the
President incapacitated, these men were, in effect, "running
the country," and a brief consideration of the composition
of the Garfield Cabinet may provide some insight into their
qualifications to do so.
The Garfield administration, so far as its Cabinet was
concerned, was completed during the last twenty-four hours
preceding the inauguration. There was great difficulty in
filling the post of Secretary of the Treasury.... [The President] made the first offer to Senator Allison of Iowa. He ...
finally declined, preferring to stay in the Senate.... Senator
Windom, whose term was about to expire, was offered the
place, and he accepted the night before inauguration. He
had been associated with Mr. Garfield in the Senate, was in
the confidence of Mr. Blaine, and was very intimate with
the latter in the Senate. . .. The entire Cabinet was made
up in accordance with the wishes of Mr. Blaine; not a single
element antagonistic to him was admitted....
Mr. Windom in the Treasury gave satisfaction as a good
business administrator. He was a safe, careful man, but he
was not original. He would have been incapable of outlining any determined or bold policy, but he was very faithful
and discreet in carrying out the orders of a superior mind.
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In the War Department, Mr. Lincoln, then a young lawyer
without the slightest experience in public affairs, began to
learn his duties. In the Navy Department was W. H. Hunt,
a former Judge of the Court of Claims. He was a wellequipped lawyer with a good knowledge of affairs, but he
was comparatively unknown to the public, and represented
no active element in political life, although he was put in
as the representative of the South. In the Interior Department was Mr. Kirkwood, a former Senator. He was an
amiable old gentleman, very slow and lethargic in his movements, possessing strong common sense and good abilities,
but having none of the executive qualities of an administrator necessary for a great department. . . . The Attorney
General was Wayne MacVeigh, of Pennsylvania, a corporation lawyer without any previous public experience. He
owed his election to the fact that he was a son-in-law of
Simon Cameron. He made no record for himself during the
brief period of his career, except as a disorganizing element.
. . . The Post-office Department was given to Thomas L.
James of New York City, another gentleman wholly unknown to public life, and whose experience had been entirely in commercial affairs.4

The account concludes with the observation that except
for Blaine the Cabinet was generally considered a weak one,
and it was said that the Secretary of State "had the administration so completely under his will that the President was
virtually his private secretary and the Cabinet a board of
recording scribes."
Three reasons are generally assigned for Arthur's not
being asked to take over the powers and duties of the President. First, there was Arthur's political position: he belonged to the wrong wing of the party; he had campaigned
for Blaine·s dearest enemy; he was identified with "Boss"
Conkling and the scandals of the Grant administration. In
the Cabinet's view, if Arthur once took over executive
power the President's civil service reform program would be
washed down the drain in a flood of patronage. (As later
events proved, Arthur was neither a "tool of the bosses" nor
a saboteur of reform; when he finally did become President
he showed himself to be an able and courageous administrator.) The other two reasons referred to the presidential
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inability clause. There was no agreement either on what inability meant or how it should be established; and it was
not certain that if the powers and duties of the President
devolved upon Arthur that they could be returned to Garfield when he recovered.
Leading journals and periodicals queried outstanding
legal figures on the constitutional problems involved.
The answers to the questions were conflicting and confusing. Many thought that mental inability was the only one
covered by the Constitution.... Other equally competent
legal authorities thought the word "inability" covered any
case in which a duty should be discharged but which the
President was unable to perform, whatever the reason. A
number of lawyers and legislators held that disability must
be permanent and must extend throughout the entire term
in order to be "inability" in the constitutional sense....
One cause for inaction was that no one knew exactly
how the existence of inability should be established. Legal
opinion on this question was just as conflicting as opinion
on the meaning of "inability." Although some thought that
the courts, the Congress, or the Cabinet should decide that
the President was disabled, or even that the irrational President (Garfield was then having hallucinations] should do
so, most informed opinion supported the position that the
Vice President should determine that the President was incapacitated....
Would Vice President Arthur become President for the
remainder of the term if called to act as such during the
period of Garfield's recuperation? Some respected lawyers
and jurists held that he would succeed to the presidential
office just as in the case of vacancy, and that, once the powers and duties devolved upon him, they could not be returned to the President when he recovered. Although most
lawyers thought that the President would resume his powers
and duties when he regained his health, the Cabinet was
impressed by arguments to the contrary.5
Newspapers on September 2, 1881, carried the story that
in the opinion of a majority of the Cabinet assigning the
exercise of presidential power to Arthur would amount to
ousting Garfield; and that they should not propose Arthur's
succession without first letting the President know of this
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possible consequence. But the President, they felt, was too
ill for such a matter to be brought before him; and if they
went ahead, they feared the shock might be fatal. Action
was postponed.
The President's death on September 19 resolved the
stalemate. During the last days of his illness, his disability
was mental as well as physical: on September 16 even the
Boston Evening Transcript, "which resisted any suggestion
that Arthur might act for Garfield," admitted that he was
having hallucinations. An autopsy showed that the doctors
in their several attempts to locate the bullet had succeeded
only in opening new cavities in the President's back and
abdomen, helping along the spread of the infection.
A wire from the Cabinet informed Vice President Arthur
of the President's death and advised him "to take the oath
of office as President of the United States without delay." 6
The oath was administered by a New York State judge early
in the morning of September 20, 1881, in New York; and
the ceremony was repeated in Washington the next day, this
time by the Chief Justice, so that it would appear in the
records of the Supreme Court. Then, at last, Arthur was free
to start clearing away the log jam resulting from eighty
days without a President.
In four successive State of the Union messages, President
Arthur urged the Congress to consider the "intendment of
the Constitution" in regard to presidential inability questions-"questions which concern the very existence of the
Government and the liberties of the people. . . ."7 After
that, nobody bothered Congress with the matter again for
thirty-five years.
The next interregnum was of relatively brief duration
beginning on September 6, 1901, when President William
McKinley was shot by the anarchist Leon Czolgosz, and ending on September 14 with McKinley's death and the accession of the Vice President, Theodore Roosevelt. But it was
followed by the most protracted instance of presidential
disability which has yet occurred in our history: the tragic
illness of President Woodrow Wilson, with its incalculable
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consequences not only for our country but for nations all
over the globe.

2. THE "MRS. WILSON REGENCY"
A conflict between a President and a Vice President can
have its amusing aspects-until the President falls ill. The
breach between Woodrow Wilson and Thomas Riley Marshall was unlike that between Garfield and Arthur in that
no overt or active hostility was involved. Marshall always
felt kindly toward the President, although he didn't like
some of his policies; Wilson superficially reciprocated Marshall's good will, but thought him "a small caliber man,"
more of a court jester than a potential successor.
The few accounts concerning the choice of Marshall as
Wilson's running mate in 1912 have one point in common:
they all agree that Marshall was second choice, the first being Oscar W. Underwood of Alabama, who declined. Albert
S. Burleson, one of Wilson's managers, relates that after
Wilson's nomination, he called him at his summer home in
Seagirt, New Jersey, to report that the convention was "leaning toward Marshall" for the Vice Presidency. "But he is a
very small-caliber man," Wilson said. According to William
G. McAdoo, later Wilson's son-in-law as well as his Secretary of the Treasury, it was he who suggested Marshall to
Wilson, and Wilson said that Marshall would "be acceptable." However, a third version-that of William F. McCombs, Wilson's floor manager at the convention-is given
as the correct one in a recent authoritative study of the Vice
Presidency.s According to this account, McCombs telephoned Wilson that the three top candidates were Governor
Burke of North Dakota, Mayor Preston of Baltimore, and
Governor Marshall of Indiana. Wilson left it up to Mccombs, who decided on Marshall. McCombs then convened
eleven leading Wilson supporters, including Burleson, McAdoo, and A. Mitchell Palmer, the future Attorney General.
Palmer's name was mentioned for the office, but he was a
Pennsylvanian and McCombs objected that he would not
draw needed votes from the Middle West and the Far West.
When he realized that the group would back Palmer anyway, McCombs quickly announced that it wouldn't be fit-
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ting for a mere eleven men to choose the Vice President. He
took the battle to the convention floor and Marshall was
unanimously nominated.
All three accounts make it clear that the selection of
Marshall was not welcomed with much enthusiasm by Wilson. But the Vice Presidency was the price of Marshall's
support,9 and Wilson's remarks while in office show that he
regarded Marshall as a necessary evil, harmless if humored.
When Wilson was up for his second term in 1916, a
"Dump Marshall" movement got under way. McAdoo and
Henry Morgenthau felt that the Vice President had not
made the most of his opportunities as Presiding Officer of
the Senate: in their opinion he should have used his power
to force passage of the administration's program. But Marshall was an experienced and skilful politician. Although
his omission of whip-cracking tactics in the Senate may have
displeased the more partisan Democrats, he nonetheless had
managed to maneuver the President into a position that
would have made it extremely embarrassing to drop him
from the ticket. "The pleasure of being associated with
you," Wilson wrote Marshall at the end of the 1914 session,
"grows as the months pass." And the "Dump Marshall"
movement notwithstanding, Wilson's pleasure was to have a
chance to grow some more. In the 1916 election Indiana was
a key state, and this insured Marshall's renomination.
When John Tyler made his decision to take over the
Presidency, the dispute with England over the Oregon border dominated our foreign policy. By the time Woodrow
Wilson had completed half of his second term in office, he,
as President of the United States, had played a major role
in determining the boundaries of nearly every European
nation. America was not only a world power but a world
leader. The forty-eight states had a population of more than
a hundred million; overseas we had become the guardians
of Filipinos, Samoans, Hawaiians, Nicaraguans, and Cubans.
The increase in presidential responsibility from Tyler's time
to Wilson's can be suggested, though very inadequately, by
comparing the office space used by each. Two or three rooms
on the second floor of the White House sufficed for Tyler;
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Wilson's executive offices occupied the entire West Wing,
which had been constructed during Theodore Roosevelt's
administration.
The natural corollary of increased responsibility was
increased strain on the incumbent. Wilson's health was
good during his first term: he paced himself well, having
his meals on time, taking short naps, and getting close to
eight h<;mrs of sleep at night. After the outbreak of the First
World War in August, 1914, the President gradually altered
his daily routine to allow more time on the job. As the
pressure mounted he became increasingly irritable, and by
December, 1918, when he sailed to Europe to attend the
peace conference, he was suffering from a recurrence of the
nervous stomach that had troubled him in law school.
In Europe the American President was treated like a
Messiah-his pathway from the English Channel to Charing
Cross was strewn with roses; in Italy candles were lighted
in front of his picture. He carried this burden of adoration,
this awareness that millions of people looked on him as
their champion, to the "Big Four" conference table, where
he was subjected to the wily diplomatic in-fighting and rabbit punches of Clemenceau, Lloyd George, and Orlando,
practical men who had little use for the starry-eyed idealism
of the man from the New World.
It was at the Paris Conference that the terrible pressures
and responsibilities overwhelmed the President. He collapsed completely, and was confined to his bed with what
was described as a severe case of influenza. That the strain
had told in other, more disturbing, ways was evident to
members of his entourage.
Even while lying in bed he manifested peculiarities, one of
which was to limit the use of all the automobiles to strictly
official purposes, when previously he had been so liberal in
his suggestions that his immediate party should have the
benefit of this possible diversion, in view of the long hours
we were working. When he got back on the job, his peculiar
ideas were even more pronounced. He now became more
obsessed with the idea that every French employee about
the place was a spy for the French Government. Nothing we
could say would disabuse his mind of this thought. He in-
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sisted they all understood English, when, as a matter of
fact, there was just one of them among the two dozen or
more who understood a single word of English. About this
time he also acquired the peculiar notion that he was personally responsible for all the property in the furnished
palace he was occupying. He raised quite a fuss on two occasions when he noticed articles of furniture had been removed. Upon investigation-for no one else noticed the
change-it was learned that the custodian of the property
for the French owner had seen fit to do a little re-arranging.
Coming from the President, whom we all knew so well,
these were very funny things, and we could but surmise that
something queer was happening in his mind. 10
Americans are often shocked at the idea that some of
our Presidents have exhibited the neurotic symptoms we
associate with unstable personality, or have suffered socalled nervous breakdowns. John Adams, for example, had
such a suspicious disposition that it would be diagnosed as
a persecution complex if he lived today. There is no doubt
that his inordinate distrust of people affected his judgment
at times, particularly in connection with this country's relations with England. Abraham Lincoln was in such an acute
depressive state after the death of Ann Rutledge that his
friends stayed constantly by his side lest he take his own life.
Later on, during his term of office, tension manifested itself
in migraine headaches of such severity that his eyeball on
the affected side would turn back into his head. In short,
we need to remember that our President, whoever he may
be, is a human being, and that the office does not carry with
it immunity from the ills, physical and mental, to which
mortals are subject.
President Wilson was still recuperating from the effects
of his illness in Paris when he returned home in July, 1919,
to face Senate opposition to American participation in the
League of Nations. Wilson was in no condition to do battle,
but he decided to make a trip out West to arouse public
sentiment in support of the League. According to Joseph P.
Tumulty, the President's private secretary:
Admiral Grayson, the President's physician and consistent friend, who knew his condition and the various physical
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crises through which he had passed here and on the other
side, from some of which he had not yet recovered, stood
firm in his resolve that the President should not go West,
even intimating to me that the President's life might pay
the forfeit if his advice were disregarded. Indeed, it needed
not the trained eye of a physician to see that the man whom
the senators were now advising to make a "swing around the
circle" was on the verge of a nervous breakdown. More than
once since his return from the Peace Conference I had urged
him to take needed rest; to get away from the turmoil of
Washington and recuperate; but he spurned this advice and
resolved to go through to the end.11
After a speech at Pueblo, Colorado, on September 25,
1919, the President again collapsed and was brought back
to Washington. The nature of his illness has been characterized variously as a "nervous collapse" and a "stroke."12
We have it on the authority of former President Herbert
Hoover that some of the facts of Wilson's illness were suppressed.18 At any rate, whatever the cause, the President was
incapacitated and was kept in seclusion at the White House.
On October 2, 1919, a cerebral thrombosis partially paralyzed Wilson's left side. Apparently on rising he had gone
into the bathroom and was stricken there. Mrs. Wilson
dragged him to his bed and called for Dr. Grayson. Ike
Hoover, Chief White House Usher, who was in and out of
the sickroom several times, has described his condition:
He just lay helpless. True, he had been taking nourish·
ment, but the work the doctors had been doing on him had
just about sapped his remaining vitality. All his natural
functions had to be artificially assisted and he appeared just
as helpless as one could possibly be and live.14
For almost a week the President's life hung in the balance. Then he began a slow recovery. When spring came,
he was taken for occasional rides in the country, but was
so debilitated that, as Ike Hoover notes, he had to sit in the
front seat of the car, where he could be propped up. If
placed in the back, "he would slide down and topple over
as the car rolled along."
As a result of the President's illness our country passed
through a period which has been called by some "The Mrs.
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Wilson Regency." Why it should be so described will be
apparent from the following account written by Edith
Bolling Wilson herself:
Once my husband was out of immediate danger, the burning question was how Mr. Wilson might best serve the
country, preserve his own life and if possible recover. Many
people, among them some I had counted as friends, have
written of my overwhelming ambition to act as President;
of my exclusion of all advice, and so forth. I am trying here
to write as though I had taken the oath to tell the truth, the
whole truth, and nothing but the truth-so help me God.
I asked the doctors to be frank with me; that I must
know what the outcome would probably be, so as to be
honest with the people. They all said that as the brain was
as clear as ever, with the progress made in the last few days,
there was every reason to think recovery possible.... But
recovery could not be hoped for, they said, unless the President were released from every disturbing problem during
these days of Nature's effort to repair the damage done.
"How can that be," I asked the doctors, "when everything that comes to an Executive is a problem? How can I
protect him from problems when the country looks to the
President as the leader?"
Dr. Dercum• leaned towards me and said: "Madam, it
is a grave situation, but I think you can solve it. Have every·
thing come to you; weigh the importance of each matter,
and see if it is possible by consultations with the respective
heads of the Departments to solve them without the guidance of your husband. In this way you can save him a great
deal. But always keep in mind that every time you take him
a new anxiety or problem to excite him, you are turning a
knife in an open wound. His nerves are crying out for rest,
and any excitement is torture to him."
"Then," I said, "had he better not resign, let Mr. Marshall succeed to the Presidency, and he himself get that complete rest that is so vital to his life?"
"No," the Doctor said, "not if you feel equal to what I
•Who's Who for 1910-11 lists Francis Xavier Dercum: "Neurologist
to Philadelphia Hospital since 1887; consulting physician Asylum for
the Chronic Insane, Wernersville, Pa., since 1895; instructor nervous
and mental diseases, Uni. of Pa., 1885-92; Editor, Textbook on Nervous
Diseases by various authors" (Author's note).
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suggested. For Mr. Wilson to resign would have a bad effect
on the country, and a serious effect on our patient. He has
staked his life and made his promise to the world to do all
in his power to get the Treaty ratified and make the League
of Nations complete. If he resigns, the greatest incentive to
recovery is gone; and as his mind is clear as crystal he can
still do more with even a maimed body than any one else.
He has the utmost confidence in you. Dr. Grayson tells me
he has always discussed public affairs with you; so you will
not come to them uninformed."
So began my stewardship. I studied every paper sent
from the different Secretaries or Senators, and tried to digest
and present in tabloid form the things that, despite my vigilance, had to go to the President. I, myself, never made a
single decision regarding the disposition of public affairs.
The only decision that was mine was what was important
and what was not, and the very important decision of when
to present matters to my husband....
These instructions from the medical men were far from
easy to carry out.... Upon all sides I was literally besieged
by those who "must" see the President. But I carried out
the directions of the doctors-and my heart was in it.
Woodrow Wilson was first my beloved husband whose life
I was trying to save, •.. after that he was the President of
the United States.iii
Or, to put it less winsomely: My husband first; what happened to the country was a secondary consideration.
Wilson's collapse on his Western trip was, of course,
widely reported, but there was a complete news blackout
after his return to the White House on Sunday, September
28. Vice President Marshall, close to tears, called in person
to inquire about the President's condition, but was told
nothing. David F. Houston, who served nearly eight years
in Wilson's Cabinet as Secretary of Agriculture and briefly,
in 1920, as Secretary of the Treasury, wrote that "there was
nothing to go on except rumors. There was no direct or
authoritative word even to members of Cabinet from the
White House or from the physicians.... We canvassed the
matter among ourselves but none of us could furnish any
light."
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On Saturday, October 4, Houston saw Wilson's private
secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, at the Shoreham.
He gave me the first direct word I had had concerning the
President. He said that the President was paralyzed in one
leg and one arm. He expressed grave alarm over the situation ....
Sunday I happened to lunch at the Shoreham. I saw the
Vice President and Mrs. Marshall sitting at one of the tables.... The Vice President was evidently much disturbed
and expressed regret that he was being kept in the dark
about the President's condition. He asked me if I could give
the real facts, which I was unable to do. I could not even
repeat what had been told me, because it had been said in
confidence. The Vice President expressed the view that he
ought to be immediately informed; that it would be a
tragedy for him to assume the duties of President, at best;
and that it would be equally a tragedy for the people; that
he knew many men who knew more about the government
than he did; and that it would be especially trying for him
if he had to assume the duties without warning... .1a
On Friday, October 3, Secretary of State Robert Lansing
called a Cabinet meeting for the following Monday. "The
summoning ... was the outgrowth of an apprehension, in
circles very close to the President, that unless there was evidence that the Executive was functioning, Congress might
insist upon investigating the President's condition and perhaps upon installing Vice President Marshall in his place.
The call for the meeting was issued only after Mr. Lansing
had conferred with Secretaries Baker [War] and Lane [Interior]."17
According to Houston:
When we met, Lansing said that it was necessary to decide
whether or not we should continue to carry on the government-that there was nothing to guide us as to who would
decide the question of the ability of the President to discharge the duties of his office.
After the Secretary of State had outlined the situation,
someone suggested that, if it was necessary to take the matter up at all, we should do so only after we had secured
direct information as to the President's condition and that
we should first consult the President's physician. It was de-
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cided to ask Doctor Grayson to meet us and to tell us everything he could. While we were waiting we talked informally
about the legal situation. There were no pressing matters
requiring the President's decision and signature, and, therefore, there was no need for haste. Garfield was incapacitated
from July 2d to September 19th, and no action was taken.
Doctor Grayson and Mr. Tumulty soon came into the
Cabinet room. Doctor Grayson stated that the President's
condition had improved over Sunday, but that he could not
say when he would be out of danger-that the scales might
tip either way. He added that they might tip the wrong way
especially if he was harassed by business matters, and that
he should be bothered as little as possible. He told us that
he was suffering from a nervous breakdown, from indigestion and a depleted nervous system....
The words "stroke," "apoplexy," or "cerebral hemorrhage" had not been spoken by Dr. Grayson, and he was
asked if he could tell the Cabinet more exactly what was
the trouble.
He replied that he could add nothing to what he had already said. He added with a sort of twinkle in his eye: "The
President asked me what the Cabinet wanted with me and
by what authority it was meeting in Washington without a
call from him." He said that the President showed no little
irritation when he heard that we were holding a Cabinet
meeting.
After some further discussion of the matter, the Secretary of State asked Doctor Grayson to tell the President that
we met primarily to express our interest in his condition, to
get information about him, to extend our sympathy, and to
consider such departmental matters as needed attention, as
there had been no Cabinet meeting for a month.
This seemed to me an inadequate statement. It looked as
if the Secretary of State for some reason had changed his
mind as to the purpose of the meeting since the members
had begun to gather. If he had called the meeting at a
regular time it might have been sufficient and reasonable
for him to say that we had held Cabinet meetings at the
request of the President during his absence, that we had
held no meeting for a month and that, since he was ill, it
seemed not inappropriate or in any way at variance with his
views that we should meet. Our meeting at the regular time
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would have been reassuring to the public, properly creating
the picture in their mind that the government was going
ahead. But the message the Secretary sent was hardly a satisfactory explanation for our meeting at an unusual time. 18
Lansing's failure to take a stand was not solely because
of the Cabinet's obvious reluctance to go into the inability
question, or because of Grayson's incomplete and toneddown report. Probably a more important factor was a private conversation between Lansing and Tumulty on the
preceding Friday-the day that Lansing had decided to call
the Cabinet meeting. There are two versions-Tumulty's
and Lansing's-about what passed between them. According
to Tumulty:
[Lansing] informed me that he had called diplomatically
to suggest that in view of the incapacity of the President, we
should arrange to call in the Vice-President to act in his
stead as soon as possible....
Lansing then read Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 of the
Constitution from a book which he had brought from the
State Department, and Tumulty
coldly turned and said: "Mr. Lansing, the Constitution is
not a dead letter in the White House. I have read the Constitution and do not find myself in need of any tutoring at
your hands on the provision you have just read. . . . You
may rest assured that while Woodrow Wilson is lying in the
White House on the broad of his back, I will not be a party
to ousting him."
At that point, according to Tumulty, Grayson came in and
"left no doubt in Mr. Lansing's mind that he would not do
as Mr. Lansing suggested." Tumulty added that if anyone
outside the White House circle attempted to certify to the
President's disability, Grayson and he would "stand together
and repudiate it."19
Lansing's version is given in Josephus Daniels' Life of
Woodrow Wilson:
[Tumulty] told me that on Wednesday, October I, the
President had become much wone. I asked him in what
way. He did not answer me in words, but significantly put
his right hand to his left shoulder and drew it along his left
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side. Of course, the implication was that the President had
suffered a stroke and that his left side was paralyzed.
Lansing confirms that Grayson came in, but
was extremely reticent as to the President's malady, giving
no indication of any trouble other than a nervous breakdown. We decided that the Cabinet ought to meet and
confer about the matter.20
It would be interesting to know where Tumulty got the
idea that to determine the President was disabled would
amount to ousting him. Was it from the Tyler precedent?
The decision of the Garfield Cabinet? He mentions neither
in his book. More likely the notion was Wilson's, not Tumulty's. The President was familiar with the history of the
succession. As early as 1885, four years after Garfield's death,
Wilson wrote that the importance of a Vice President came
from the fact that "he may cease to be" Vice President.2 1
It was a conviction that he reaffirmed as soon as he recovered: "When Lansing sought to oust me, I was upon my
back. I am on my feet now and I will not have disloyalty
about me." 22
On February 10, 1920, Lansing told the Cabinet that the
President had written to say he objected to Cabinet meetings being called except at his personal summons, and they
were not to meet again unless Wilson personally convened
them. Since October 6, 1919, they had met twenty-one times,
and had sent Wilson memoranda of important discussions
or decisions, but he had never indicated that he disapproved
of the meetings. The President also taxed Lansing with
having called the heads of executive departments into conference-and this, Wilson said, was an act none but the
President had constitutional authority to perform. Lansing
replied that he had met with department heads in regard to
matters which could not be postponed until the President's
recovery. He denied all thought of acting unconstitutionally
or of assuming powers which belonged only to the President. On February 11, the President wrote characterizing
Lansing's calling the Cabinet meetings as "an assumption
of Presidantial authority," and indicated that it was his
pleasure that the Secretary of State resign. Lansing did so
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"with a sense of profound relief." "Editorial comment and
interviews with members of Congress show that Congress
and the press supported Lansing almost unanimously." 24
Although the President had by now recovered some of
his power of decision and action, "he showed marked emotional instability, which made rational cooperation with his
staff and his Cabinet almost impossible. After awhile, one
after the other of his aides and Cabinet members could no
longer take their chief's emotional outbursts and deserted
him." 25
And what were the Vice President's feelings as week
after week went by with the country leaderless and uneasy
with rumors? We know from Marshall's Recollections that
Those were not pleasant months for me. The standing
joke of the country is that the only business of the vicepresident is to ring the '-\!bite House bell every morning
and ask what is the state of health of the president. If there
were a soul so lost to humanity as to have desired his death,
I was not that soul. I hoped that he might acquire his
wonted health. I was afraid to ask about it, for fear some
censorious soul would accuse me of a longing for his place.
I have never wanted his shoes. Peace, friendship and good
will have ever been more to me than place or pomp or
power. 2 <l
(To this catalog, the Vice President might fittingly have
added that "good five-cent cigar" he declared the country
was in need of-a remark which is likely to remain his sole
bulwark against oblivion.) The "censorious soul" Marshall
refers to could very well have been Tumulty, whose personal loyalty to the President obscured everything else.
Tumulty and others of the White House circle, instead of
looking to Marshall to lighten '"1ilson's burden, felt increasing antagonism toward him.27
So the government limped along, barely functioning for
a year and a half. When Wilson finally did meet with the
Cabinet, others took the initiative; his mind wandered and
Mrs. ·W ilson stood by to call a halt when the President
tired. 28 While the exact degree of Wilson's disability cannot
be positively stated,
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There can be no doubt concerning [his] inability to perform the duties of his office during much of the time after
his collapse on September 25, 1919.. . . During the special
session of the Sixty-sixth Congress twenty-eight acts of Congress became law because of the President's failure to pass
on them within the requisite ten days. He did veto the
Prohibition Enforcement Act on October 27, but from
October 28 to November 18 he passed on only one of sixteen acts presented to him. He did not meet his Cabinet for
eight months during his illness. The Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations was unable to get action or information
on the Shantung Settlement, a situation which caused Senator Albert B. Fall to suggest that if the President was too ill
to discharge these duties, the Senate ought to recess until
he was able to resume the responsibilities of his office. Although the Constitution says that the President shall receive
the representatives of foreign states, ... the British ambassador spent four months in Washington without seeing the
President even once....
Nearly every student of the period, whether scholar,
Cabinet member, or journalist agrees that public business

in general, and the Versailles Treaty in particular, was af.
fected by the President's illness. In November of 1919 Senator Gilbert M. Hitchcock, the Democratic leader in the
Senate, believed that he could get the Republicans to compromise on the treaty. But Wilson's physicians would not
allow him to see the President.... Many feel that Wilson's
isolation from public opinion, from his advisors, and from
congressional leaders was one of the principal causes for
defeat of the treaty.211
Mrs. Wilson. and Dr. Grayson effectively protected the
President from any problems which might cause anxiety; he
lived out his term and achieved some measure of recovery.
But there can be no doubt either that the national interest
suffered or that the President's wife and his physician "did
determine many questions of public policy ... by deciding
whom the President might and might not see, by deciding
how long he might converse with those whom he was permitted to see, and by deciding what papers should be presented to him and what should not:•ao
Wilson accepted the loss of prestige and the failure of
his dearest hopes with great dignity. His term of office ended
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on March 4, 1921, and he lived in retirement until his death
on March 3, 1924.
3. TEMPORARY INABILITY AND THE
TYLER PRECEDENT
The power vacuums during the illnesses of Garfield and
Wilson were not primarily caused by the Tyler precedent.
It was an element, certainly, in barring Arthur and Marshall from temporarily exercising the presidential powers
and duties, but more than that it was a convenient smoke
screen. After all, the Cabinet could scarcely be expected to
announce that such-and-such steps were taken (or not taken)
because the Vice President belonged to the wrong faction of
the party, or because the President thought the Vice President was an intellectual nonentity, or because the two men
disliked each other. And these were the true reasons for the
Cabinet decisions in both the Garfield and Wilson cases. In
both cases the governing conditions were the same: (1) a
supposed threat to the President's program and thus to the
political lives of the Cabinet members and (2) a conflict of
personalities between the President and the Vice President.
One condition resulted from the other; neither sprang fullfledged into being the instant the President was incapacitated. They had been latent for a long period of time, and
the President's illness only brought them out into the open.
Wilson was incapacitated much longer than Garfield,
and the question of presidential disability was considered
by all three branches of government. Political motives were
a deterrent to action by Congress. The Democrats, not wishing to publicize the President's illness any more than they
had to, took no steps to secure the installation of Marshall
as President; the Republicans saw the President's inability
as an embarrassment to the Democrats and hoped for some
scandalous disclosure-for example, that someone was forging Wilson's signature (which was rumored at one time). In
any case, it was uncertain if Congress had the constitutional
power to declare the President disabled.
There were other possible remedies. Vice President Marshall, upon whom presidential power devolved, might have
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undertaken to exercise this power and thereby have indirectly determined that Wilson was disabled. But Marshall
refused to act as President. Some thought a writ of mandamus directing him to act as President was the answer. Although [a story appeared] in the Christian Science Monitor
saying that the Supreme Court was ready and willing to
issue such a writ, it is difficult to believe that the Court ever
contemplated this. For the Supreme Court does not have
original jurisdiction in such cases; and it is at least doubtful
whether the question of inability is justiciable. The matter
of Wilson's inability was actually brought up in courts once,
but the courts did not take cognizance of it.Bl
Since the legislative branch, the judiciary, and the Vice
President either would not or could not pass on the President's inability, that left the first step up to the Cabinet or
the White House. The reasons for inaction already have
been discussed in detail. In summary, usage had established
the Tyler precedent, which transforms a Vice President into
a President when the powers and duties of the higher office
devolve upon him. But if the President were not dead but
temporarily disabled when the powers and duties passed to
the substitute President, then "either there must be two
Presidents at once or the elected incumbent must be displaced. Since it is agre«d that there cannot be another
President until an elected President dies, resigns, or is
removed, a disabled President's friends naturally have opposed any move to bring about the Vice President's succession."82
Henry E. Davis' discussion of this dilemma was written
during Garfield's illness: it appeared in the Congressional
Record while Wilson was incapacitated. Davis reviewed the
wording of the original resolutions of the 1787 Constitutional Convention and the final draft which the delegates
approved. In both cases, situations causing vacancy in office
-death, resignation, removal from office (following impeachment), and inability-are grouped together. The first
three are irreversible conditions: a President who is dead, or
who has resigned, or who has been removed by impeachment
obviously cannot resume office. Inability, on the other hand,
is not necessarily permanent: a sick President may recover.
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As the clause is worded, however, there is no apparent dis-

tinction between permanent and temporary inability. The
status of the Vice President would seem to be the same
whether the vacancy in the President's office is caused by
death, resignation, removal by impeachment, or illness.
As Davis points out, this leaves unresolved the following
questions:
What is inability in the sense of the provision; and what
is its effect as to the Executive and the executive duties?
Each of these questions includes another: Who shall decide
when the inability occurs, whether it is continuing at a
given date, when it has ceased? And, in case of inability of
the President, does the Vice President become President or
merely acting President for the time being? And at the
termination of the inability shall the President and the
Vice President resume their normal functions?SS
That these questions exist is no reflection on the work of
the framers of the Constitution. As Davis has demonstrated,
the delegates were justified in thinking the inability provision "self-explanatory, self-operative, and sufficient." 34 But
because it has repeatedly been construed on the basis of
language alone, and without regard to the intent of the
Constitutional Convention, there have been serious lapses
in executive power, and the Tyler precedent "must today
be regarded as having become the law of the land for those
instances in which the President, through death, resignation, removal, or other cause, has disappeared from the
scene."81!
One of the most fascinating tricks of time-abetted by
chauvinistic historians-is the way in which it magnifies the
qualities of a nation's founding fathers. This is shown in
the tendency to regard the men who drafted the Constitution as omniscient, and the Constitution itself as an inviolable body of sacred writings. But the delegates to the
Federal Convention were under no such illusions. They
knew that they were fallible human beings, not all-seeing
gods, and they worked hard to make the Constitution flexible. "Interstate and foreign commerce," for example, is a
concept broad enough to be applied to jet transportation
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as well as travel by barge and clipper. But it was impossible
to anticipate the radical changes the years would bring, and
the drafters of the Constitution looked to their descendants
to adapt the basic instrument to new situations and new
conditions. Had they intended otherwise, no means of
amendment would have been provided.
Veneration for the Constitution which blindly ignores
this fact, or which consists of worshiping the word and ignoring the intent, is at best a poor compliment to our forefathers; and it becomes the reverse of a virtue when it is
made the excuse for avoiding responsible action. When the
Garfield and Wilson Cabinets were confronted with the
problem of temporary presidential inability, they refused to
consider adapting the constitutional provision to meet an
emergency for which it supplied no specific directive. Lacking the moral stamina and the intellectual stature to withstand political pressure and to look beyond the exigencies
of the moment, they gratefully reverted to the Tyler precedent-a ready-made alibi for inaction.

Chapter

•v

Mr. President, How Is Your Health?
An aspect of presidential inability highlighted during
President Wilson's illness concerns the importance of trustworthy information about the Chief Executive's health.
The atmosphere of secrecy that enveloped the White House
during the "Mrs. Wilson Regency" was responsible for
swarms of dark rumors about the nature of the President's
illness. Radio, television, and the keyhole columnist had
not yet come into being, but even so the stories reached
every comer of the country. "The less the public knew, the
more gossip was invented. It was whispered that the President had a venereal disease, even that he was insane. The
rumor in medical circles was that Wilson's left knee had
been deformed by Charcot's disease, a consequence of locomotor ataxia."•1 At the very least, such stories are an embarrassment to the administration, impair national morale,
and lend aid and comfort to our enemies.
I. PRESIDENT CLEVELAND HAS A TOOTH OUT
In attempts to justify withholding information about
the President's health, it is customary to cite the case of
President Grover Cleveland. Soon after he was inaugurated
in 1893, the country was gripped by a major financial panic.
The gold reserve had dropped below a hundred million
dollars, national and state banks were failing, and on June
27 the bottom fell out of the stock market. It was thoughtand written-that "Mr. Cleveland is about all that stands
between this country and absolute disaster." On June 30,
as part of his major strategy in fighting inflation, the President summoned an extra session of Congress to convene on
August 7, at which time he would request the repeal of the
Sherman Silver Act.
•Locomotor ataxia is a chronic disease of the nervous system, which
often results from syphilis.
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At this moment, when the curtain was about to rise
upon a battle royal in Congress, there occurred one of the
dramatic minor episodes of American history. The whole
strength of the assault upon the Sherman silver-purchase
clauses lay, as everyone realized, in the grim determination
of Cleveland's purpose. His weight of character could force
enough members of his party into line, and nothing else
could. Even temporary incapacitation might be fatal to his
aims, while if any accident suddenly removed him from the
scene, all would be lost; for the Vice President, Adlai E.
Stevenson, would infallibly bring the nation to the silver
standard. [Stevenson had secured the vice presidential nomination as a sop to the silverites.] An unhappier time for the
development of a dangerous malady was hardly conceivable.
Yet on May 5 Cleveland discovered a rough spot on the roof
of his mouth. It gave him increasing discomfort, and on
June 18 he had it examined by the White House physician,
Dr. O'Reilly. The latter found a malignant growth as large
as a quarter of a dollar.... An immediate operation was
imperative. Yet it had to be kept a complete secret, for the
knowledge that Cleveland's life was in danger would have
precipitated a new and fat greater panic. The most urgent
work on the President's desk was hastily dispatched. Dr.
Uoseph D.] Bryant took complete charge of the case, writing [Secretary of War Daniel S.] Lamont that he could not
assume the responsibility for any delay until even August
lst if the growth progressed as it commonly did in such
cases.2
On the evening of June 30, the same day that he issued
his call to Congress, President Cleveland boarded Commodore E. C. Benedict's yacht Oneida, anchored in New York's
East River. The crew had been told that he was to have two
teeth extracted, and an operating room had been prepared
in the below-deck salon. Here, on July I, while the yacht
cruised slowly in Long Island Sound, the President underwent surgery to remove a cancerous growth from his jaw.
The entire operation was done from within the mouth, so
as to leave no external scar. All went well and on July 5 the
President went to his summer home to recuperate. But it
was feared that not all the cancerous tissue had been removed. A second operation was necessary; it took place on
July 17, also on board the Oneida. Equipped with an arti-
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ficial jaw, the President kept his date with Congress on
August 7. The story did not become public knowledge for
more than twenty years.a
It is hard to quarrel with success, yet even though the
gamble came off this is not to say that it was the wisest
course. If the President had failed to survive the operation,
his death in such melodramatic, cloak-and-daggerish circumstances-aboard the yacht of a plutacrat-would have been
far more demoralizing to the nation than if the public had
been kept informed. It should be noted, moreover, that
neither the Vice President nor any member of the Cabinet
except Lamont knew anything of the real situation, let
alone being provided with the briefing necessary to insure
the continuation of orderly processes of government.•
In fairness to Cleveland, however, it must be remembered that in 1893 news coverage of the President was not
nearly so intensive as it has since become. In our day Washington is teeming with people who are concerned, directly
or indirectly, with collecting and disseminating the news.
As well as accredited reporters for newspapers, magazines,
radio and television networks, and other communications
media, there is a whole host of subcategories-publicity men,
professional tipsters, lobbyists, and representatives of private business and of special interest groups. In addition,
there is the large segment of the capital's population (at a
rough estimate, just about everybody) who wish to appear
"in the know" for prestige reasons and who can repeat or
even invent a story without any fear that they will be held
to account for it.
The lives of people in high places always are a subject
of gossip and speculation, and usually the speed with which
•"I can't recall precisely any conversations bearing on ... the relations of Grandfather and Grover Cleveland at the time of the latter's
operation. . . . Relations with Cleveland and his family were always
very cordial and friendly, and, I had assumed, intimate .... But I can
recall nothing specific about any briefing at the time of Cleveland's
operation. Indeed, I was rather under the impression that no one knew
about it, including most of his cabinet" (Adlai E. Stevenson to Richard
H. Hansen, April 26, 1962. See also Nevins, Grover Cleveland, pp. 5!125!1!1, and Nevins [ed.], The Letters of Grover Cleveland, p. !170).
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rumors about them spread is in direct ratio to the sensational or scurrile character of their content. In respect to
the President's activities, and particularly his health, the
least suggestion of a mystery-any hint that not all the cards
are on the table, that news is being withheld-becomes a
cue for rumor-mongers to swing into action. The death of
President Wilson's successor, Warren G. Harding, is a case
in point.
2. "THE STRANGE DEATH OF
PRESIDENT HARDING"
By the summer of 1923, the third of President Harding's
administration, it was becoming uncomfortably apparent
that the highest office in the land had been bestowed on a
man wholly unqualified to hold it. The exposure of the
venality and corrupt practices of a cluster of Harding's freewheeling associates already had begun, and details of the
President's private life-his speculations on the stock market, his gambling and drinking, rumors of a mistress and an
illegitimate daughter-were openly circulated in many quarters. But it was not generally known that the President's
health had been poor for more than a year. Except when he
was flat on his back, the President was always represented
to the public as the picture of health. 4
In January of 1922, Harding had been seriously ill with
what was diagnosed as influenza, but probably was an unrecognized attack of coronary thrombosis. Dr. Emmanuel
Libmann, the famed heart specialist and diagnostician, met
the President at a dinner party in the fall of that year; he
subsequently told a friend that in his opinion the President
was "suffering from a disease of the coronary arteries of the
heart and would be dead in six months." Actually, it was
eight.
On June 20, 1923, the President and Mrs. Harding left
for a trip to Alaska. On July 28, while in Seattle on their
return trip to Washington, the President had a severe seizure which was diagnosed as cardiac by Commander Joel T.
Boone of the Navy Medical Corps, one of the three doctors
in the President's entourage. However, Dr. Boone was out-
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ranked by Brigadier General Charles T. Sawyer, Surgeon
General of the United States and a personal friend of the
President's. Sawyer diagnosed the illness as an "acute gastrointestinal attack," probably caused by "crabmeat-copper ptomaine poisoning," and this is what the official bulletin said,
although as it happened the President had not eaten any
crabmeat.
In view of this diagnosis, the President was permitted to
get up and no strict bed rest was enforced. Three days later
in San Francisco he had another seizure. Two more physicians were called in, and the diagnosis was now bronchopneumonia and circulatory collapse. At last, bed rest was
made mandatory.
On August 2, all perceptible symptoms of the sickness
seemed to have disappeared. The President was in better
spirits than he had been for a long time, and at 4:30 P.M.
the doctors gave out an optimistic bulletin. At 7:30 P.M.,
while Mrs. Harding was reading to the President, a "convulsive tremor" passed over his face, his body shuddered
and sagged, and he was dead.
The official bulletin, signed by the physicians in attendance, stated that "we all believe he died from apoplexy or
the rupture of a blood vessel in the axis of the brain near
the respiratory center." However, the medical evidence indicated coronary thrombosis as the probable cause of death,
although this cannot be stated with certainty, since Mrs.
Harding refused to permit an autopsy.
Suicide and venereal disease figured in the word-ofmouth "inside stories" that flooded the country immediately after the President's death. Mrs. Harding's refusal to
permit an autopsy and the bewildering variety of diagnoses
which figured in the official bulletins-hypertension, angina
pectoris, acute gastrointestinal attack, crabmeat-copper poisoning, gall bladder disease, pneumonia, circulatory collapse, apoplexy-undoubtedly encouraged speculation and
abetted the spread of rumors. Other contributing factors
were the suddenness of the President's death and the imagemakers' projection of him to the public as a man bursting
with health.
The most despicable of the stories about the President's
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death-that he had been poisoned by his wife-appeared in
The Strange Death of President Harding, by Gaston B.
Means, a former Department of Justice employee who had
been forced to resign his job because of his involvement in
some of the many government scandals of the ill-fated Harding administration.11 Eighteen years later a similar title was
employed for a no less scabrous and irresponsible attack on
Franklin D. Roosevelt, and again it was lack of reliable information about the President's health which provided the
author with an opening.
3. ROOSEVELT, THE PRESS, AND
THE PALACE GUARD
Because he had been crippled as a result of poliomyelitis,
President Roosevelt's health was a national issue even before he took office in 1932. The general and deep admiration for his triumph over a disability which would have
ended the career of most men made it infeasible for his political opponents to attempt making political capital of his
disability during Roosevelt's first two administrations. Nor
did the question of his fitness enter appreciably into the
1940 third-term campaign. However, in a book published
after the President's death, Secretary of the Interior Frances
Perkins quoted Roosevelt as saying to labor leader Daniel
Tobin that he couldn't run for a third term because "I am
tired. I really am.... This sinus trouble I've got, the Washington climate makes it dreadful. ... The doctors say I have
to go into the hospital for a month of steady treatment. But
I can't do that, you know. When a President does that, the
bottom drops out of the stock market, the Japs take advantage of what they think is serious illness, the Germans
start propaganda that I am dying and that the United States
is in a panic. No, I can't be President again. I have to get
over this sinus."6
After Pearl Harbor, wartime secrecy tended to isolate
the President from the press, and the result was the growth
of some fantastic stories about his last years in office and his
death. Following the Teheran Conference (November 28December 1, 1943), rumors of illness and of physical deteri-
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oration owing to the unprecedented length of Roosevelt's
term in office began to make noticeable headway, and these
stories appear to have had some factual basis. According to
Judge Samuel I. Rosenman, Roosevelt's friend and associate
from 1928 until his death:
The President developed some sort of bronchial affliction
at Teheran which gave him a racking cough.... The [doctors] found no unusual condition for a man of his age except his cough and his sinuses. While Teheran was a high
point in the President's career as Commander-in-Chief of
our armed forces and as our leader in foreign affairs, it
seemed to me also the turning point of his physical career.
I think that his physical decline can be dated from Teheran, although at the time we did not see it.7
From early in January, 1944, until his death on April 12,
1945, the President's health seems to have been a source of
continuing anxiety to the White House circle, and rumors
proliferated all during this period. Immediately after the
President's death, John Gunther has recorded, stories began
to circulate
some of which are still heard today-that FDR had shot
himself, that he had been shot, that he had fallen off a cliff,
and even that he didn't die, but had been packed off to a
sanitarium as a mental cripple....
Mainly the attempt to make a mystery out of Roosevelt's
death is of political derivation. Critics strive to prove (a)
that he was much sicker than he ever was; (b) that he should
not have been allowed to run for a fourth term, considering
his condition; (c) that members of a White House camarilla
concealed the true facts from the public, and foisted a dying
Roosevelt on the country out of their own ambition and
greed for power.
Among the ailments the President was variously supposed to have been suffering from were "coronary thrombosis, a brain hemorrhage, a nervous breakdown, an aneurism
of the aorta, and a cancerous prostate.'' Also "reports" were
repeatedly heard that he had been spirited off to the Mayo
Clinic for an operation for a malignant tumor of the liver
or rectum....
Admiral [Ross T.) Mcintire, who had been Roosevelt's
doctor for many years, vigorously refutes these charges. The
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President, he insists, was in good enough health for the
proper discharge of all his duties to the end. Mcintire takes
full note of the frequent sinus attacks, the debilitating bout
of bronchitis and intestinal influenza in 1944, and the pallor, fatigue, and loss of weight, but he denies strenuously
that any of this had any critical importance....
Questions about the President's health became so widespread, particularly during the fourth-term campaign, that
Mcintire issued several statements denying rumors and attesting to his good health. On October 12, 1944, for instance,
he stated flatly, "The President's health is perfectly OK.
There are absolutely no organic difficulties at all." ...s
As Robert E. Sherwood, among others, has noted, the
one serious issue in the 1944 campaign was the President's
health.
There was a good deal of extremely ugly whispering....
When he made his acceptance speech before his departure
for the Pacific tour in July, a photograph had been taken in
which he appeared haggard, glassy eyed and querulous-and
this photograph had been given a very wide advertisement
in the press and in the pamphlets with which the Republicans were flooding the country. On his return from the
Pacific trip, Roosevelt had made a nation-wide broadcast
from the Bremerton Navy Yard at Seattle; when he delivered this speech he wore his leg braces for, I believe, the
first time since he had returned from Cairo and Teheran
and he was in such pain that he had to support himself by
holding on to the lectern ... which made it extremely difficult for him to tum the pages of his reading copy and made
the speech sound faltering and uncertain.... It was significant that, after this speech, the public opinion polls indicated a sudden and ominous slump for Roosevelt and a
consequent rise in Dewey's stock.
Sherwood also notes that, although he had heard Roosevelt had lost a lot of weight, "I was unprepared for the
almost ravaged appearance of his face. He had his coat off
and his shirt collar seemed several sizes too large for his
emaciated neck. But I soon began to suspect that the fears
expressed by Hopkins, Watson and the others were groundless. He seemed to be more full of good humor and of fight
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than ever." Again, referring to the "innumerable baseless
and incredibly malicious rumors," Sherwood says,
but there was some visible support for them-for [the President] was now truly crippled. The frail muscles in his legs
and hips had become flabby through long disuse in the
months between Teheran and the Bremerton speech, during which time he had made no public appearances at which
he would have to stand up-and he never wore the painful
braces except on such necessary public occasions. It was now
felt that he would probably never again be able to stand up
and walk.... Actually, during the weeks of this campaign,
he did manage to regain the use of his legs sufficiently to be
able to stand up and speak from the back platform of his
train for as long as half an hour....9
Because of the secrecy sometimes surrounding the President's whereabouts-a necessary security measure in wartime
-rumors that he had been hospitalized were lent a certain
plausibility, and in the spring of 1944 on one occasion even
members of the White House press corps were taken in.
The story is related by Mike Reilly, then head of the White
House Secret Service detail:
The Boss's so-called illness and heart attacks were a
source of great unhappiness to him. He thought the stories
had been printed for political purposes and were outrageous
lies, which worried his family and weakened his position in
dealing with some of the rugged characters with whom he
had to dicker at home and abroad. Right now-and FDR
needs no help today from anyone, particularly the likes of
me-I will swear on everything I love or believe that the
Boss never had a heart attack and that he never was seriously ill in the ten years that I worked at his side until the
day of his death.
Knowing how the Boss felt about these stories and realizing that there were three honest reporters who really believed he was in a hospital somewhere, I decided to forestall
any newspaper junk that would upset FDR on this desperately needed vacation [at Bernard Baruch's plantation in
South Carolina]. So I said to the reporters, "Will you believe he's here if you see him yourselves?"
"Sure."
"Will your bosses believe it and keep quiet if you tell
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them these wires they are shooting down here are sheer
bunk?"
"Okay," I said, "be ready at ten tomorrow and you'll
see him.''
They were picked up at ten and taken to the estate. 1
knew the President would pass a certain spot at eleven, so
I parked the cars under some trees at the side of the road
and waited. Sure enough, he went by on time and the reporters saw him.
"He looks tired," one said.
"He is. That's why I brought you guys out here. He's
tired all right, but he's not in any Boston or Chicago hospital. Tell that to your bosses:•10
However, although Elliott Roosevelt has declared categorically that "there is no evidence of any kind, either in
[President Roosevelt's] medical history or in the knowledge
of any member of his family or those who were close to him
throughout his years in the White House, to support any
theory that he had suffered from heart attacks or cerebral
hemorrhages at any time before his death,"11 this statement
is apparently contradicted by two incidents recounted by
James Roosevelt in his book Affectionately, F.D.R. The first
incident occurred in the fall of 1944:
I was temporarily stationed at Camp Pendleton, near
San Diego, California, as intelligence officer.... Father paid
us a visit to review a landing exercise being staged by the
Fifth Marine Division as a dress rehearsal for its next Pacific
operation.
Just before we were to leave for the exercise, Father
turned suddenly white, his face took on an agonized look,
and he said to me: "Jimmy, I don't know if I can make it1 have horrible pains." It was a struggle for him to get the
words out.
I was so scared I did not know what to think or do. I
gripped his hand and felt his forehead. We considered calling the doctor, then decided against it. Both of us thought
he was suffering from some digestive upset-Father himself
was positive it had nothing to do with his heart. We talked
some more, and I told him that, if he possibly could summon the strength, he should try not to cancel his appearance at the exercise, as it would create much alarm.
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" Yes," Pa said, almost sighing, "it would be very bad.
But help me out of my berth and let me stretch out flat on
the deck awhile-that may help."
So for perhaps ten minutes, while I kept as quiet as
possible, Father lay on the floor of the railroad car, his eyes
closed, his face drawn, his powerful torso occasionally convulsed as the waves of pain stabbed him. Never in my life
had I felt so alone with him-and so helpless.
Then he opened his eyes, exhaled deeply, and said:
"Help me up now, Jimmy." I did so. I helped him to get
ready and the Commander-in-Chief went out to review the
exercises.
The second attack took place after Roosevelt's fourth
inaugural, January 20, 1945:
The first moment I saw Father I realized something was
terribly wrong. He looked awful and regardless of what the
doctors said, I knew in my heart that his days were numbered. Just before he proceeded to the reception in the State
Dining Room Father and I were alone for a few minutes in
the Green Room. He was thoroughly chilled, and the same
type of pain, though somewhat less acute, that had bothered
him in San Diego, was stabbing him again. He gripped my
arm hard and said: "Jim.my, I can't take this unless you get
me a stiff drink." I said I would and as I started out he
called to me: "You'd better make it straight." I brought him
a tumbler full of whisky which he drank as if it were medicine. In all my life I had never seen Father take a drink in
that manner. Then he went on to the reception and no one
there-no one but me-knew how he felt.12
But even though "no one ... knew how he felt"-and
the above account implies that the President never informed Dr. Mcintire of his symptoms-nonetheless, a number of people seem to have noticed that the President was
failing. His secretary, Grace Tully, writing of the fourthterm inauguration, said:
Several close acquaintances of the President have since said
or written that they were distressed by his appearance on
that inauguration day. I am sure that those who did not see
him daily would he more aware of the change over a period
of time. . . . I had been disturbed by the signs of fatigue
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shown by the Boss but to me the greatest and most serious
bits of evidence did not appear until his return from Yalta.18
Vice President Truman, meeting Roosevelt on his return
from Yalta, was disturbed by his appearance, but "after the
first shock of seeing [him], I tried to dismiss from my mind
the ominous thoughts of a possible breakdown, counting on
his ability to bounce back from the stresses and strains of
office."H Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., in his
book about the Yalta conference, says that it seemed to him
"some kind of deterioration had taken place in the President's health between the middle of December and the inauguration on January 20," though he is careful to state
that at Yalta (February 1-3), Roosevelt's mind "functioned
with clarity and conciseness, furnishing excellent proof that
he was alert and in full command of his faculties." 111 As
John Gunther points out, the President's condition "varied
sharply from day to day; he always picked up and bounced
back quickly" and this as much as anything accounts for the
discrepancies and varying views expressed in the many accounts of the President's last months.
. . . his inner vitality, even though weakened, was so radiant
that ... he could make almost any visitor completely forget
that he seemed ill.... Many people who knew him well, including those wlu> tried to build a kind of protective screen
around him, had come to think in a peculiar way that he
was indestructible. Life was inconceivable without Roosevelt as President: ... it was just not possible that he could
be sick enough to die.16
When death did come it was with such swiftness that the
problem of keeping the Vice President notified of the President's condition did not arise; Stephen Early, the Presidential Press Secretary, did not try to reach him until the
President was dead. Truman, who consulted frequently with
Roosevelt about the legislative program, was aware of his
physical decline-"! saw what the long years in the presidency had done to him."lT But still the news was so unexpected, he felt as if "the whole weight of the moon and
stars" had fallen on him. The Vice President, no more than
the White House inner circle, seems to have apprehended
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that the President might actually die. They preferred to
believe the reassuring medical reports rather than their
own eyes.•
James Roosevelt's account of his father's attacks of "indigestion" underlines the necessity for keeping the President's physicians informed of his condition. When the
President of the United States has pains of the severity described, while it may be an act of stoical courage to bear
them in silence it is also a shocking failure of responsibility
to the government not to speak out. If Dr. Mcintire had
known the facts at the time, he would have insisted on an
immediate examination; there would have been an opportunity for diagnosis and treatment. But a doctor cannot
diagnose something the patient is silent about. In fairness
to the Vice President also, the President should be frank
about his condition. But Harry Truman wrote that
the only indication I had ever had that [President Roosevelt] knew he was none too well was when he talked to me
just before I set out on my campaign trip for the vice-presidency in 1944. He asked me how I was going to travel, and
I told him I intended to cover the country by airplane.
"Don't do that, please," he told me. "Go by train. It is necessary that you take care of yourself."
The sources cited thus far have been taken from the
writings of men and women who deeply admired the President and in most cases, were closely associated with him.
Representative of the "hearsay type" of account is one by
Karl C. Wold, M.D., which appeared in Look. Titled "The
Truth about F.D.R.'s Health," it included the statement:
•A. Merriman Smith, dean of the White House press corps, who saw
the President daily, wrote of the press conferences, "We saw Franklin
D. Roosevelt die over a period of about a year." Quoted in Edgar
Eugene Robinson, The Roosevelt Leadership, 1933-1945 (Philadelphia
and New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1955), p. ll27 n.
As this book is being revised for the printer, a UPI stoiry datelined
Washington reports that according to a new biography of Harry S.
Truman, The Man from Missouri, by Alfred Steinberg, "Democratic
party members were convinced as early as January 1944 that Roosevelt
was showing unmistakable signs of failing health. • .. Steinberg quotes
Truman as saying the thought of succeeding Roosevelt in office 'scares
the hell out of me'" (Lincoln Evening Journal, April 17, 1962, ll:l-2).
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In the later summer of 1938, while Roosevelt was visiting a son, James, at the Mayo Clinic, in Rochester, Minn.,
the first of a series of strokes occurred. The attack was light
and the hemorrhage evidently small because recovery was
quick and complete.
Under the subheads "Second Stroke" and "Third Stroke,"
the article further implied that the President had suffered
a stroke following his trip to Teheran in December, 1943,
and another on March 25, 1945.18
A reply to this article, "They're Lying about F.D.R.'s
Health," by Elliott Roosevelt, appeared in Liberty. After
citing good and sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the
Wold article was "completely false in every respect," Roosevelt reported a telephone conversation with Dr. Wold shortly after the Look article appeared. Dr. Wold said that his
article had been "highly sensationalized by the magazine
and much of the material that appears in my book [Mr.
President-How ls Your Health1, the medical histories of
the Presidents] has been omitted, giving rise to a completely
false impression as to the intent of my writings." As to the
sources of his information, about the three alleged strokes,
he said that he had a hazy recollection that he had received
much of the information in a letter from Walter Trohan
a Washington correspondent who had been with the President on those occasions.... [Elliott Roosevelt pointed out
that] Mr. Trohan is the Washington correspondent of the
Chicago Tribune, the most anti-Roosevelt paper in the
United States. Mr. Trohan collaborated with James A. Farley in Mr. Farley's book attacking Franklin D. Roosevelt
and his policies.... Needless to say, he was at no time a
White House confidant and wasn't regarded as an intimate
of the President.... •19
•Dr. Wold is now dead, but it has been alleged by a businessman
friend of his that Mrs. Roosevelt and one of her sons were so incensed
by Wold's book that they went out to St. Paul, Minnesota, to sue Wold
and his publisher, but changed their minds after they had talked with
Dr. Wold and seen his evidence. Queried about this story, Mrs. Roosevelt replied that she had never seen Dr. Wold and had never gone to
St. Paul for the purpose of suing him and his publisher (Mrs. Franklin
D. Roosevelt to Richard H. Hansen, December 19, 1961).
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The Strange Death of Franklin D. Roosevelt: A History
of the Roosevelt-Delano Dynasty, America's Royal Family
has as its theme that the President was the stooge of an aristocratic, imperialistic dynasty.20 At Teheran, so the author
tells us, the waiter assigned to the President and to Prime
Minister Churchill was actually "a physician who specialized in the science of poisoning, toxicology... . Shortly after
their departure Winston Churchill became extremely ill.
He was hurried to Egypt where ... his death was expected
momentarily. But his life was saved by a protege of his, Sir
Arthur Fleming, the discoverer of penicillin . . . Roosevelt
also was extremely ill on his return. He was unable to walk
or stand unassisted, and never recovered his strength. His
disability bore a striking resemblance to poisoning with a
form of curare, an Indian arrow poison that had engaged
the interest of Russian scientists. He wasted steadily thereafter." The author lists eight other possible causes of the
President's death, including cancer.
It goes without saying that this vicious and absurd mishmash is wholly undocumented. Like the Wold article, it is
mentioned here only as an example of the type of material
bred by secrecy or incomplete information about the President's health.
The most recent case of prolonged presidential inability
occurred during the administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower, and for the first time in American history the public
was kept well informed of the President's condition. Eisenhower had been a young Army captain during Wilson's long
ordeal; he had heard the ugly rumors which flooded the
country at that time and had seen the nation floundering
leaderless through the crucial treaty-making period after
World War I. He had been a General of the Army when
President Roosevelt's health was the subject of anxious
speculation in capitals and headquarters all over the European Theater of Operations; with millions of others, he had
felt the shock, experienced the same moment of stunned
disbelief, when news of the Commander in Chief's death
was flashed around the world. A decade later, as President
of the United States, Eisenhower was struck down by illness.
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Mindful of the Wilson and Roosevelt episodes, he did everything he could to make certain that the facts about his condition were immediately communicated to the public and
to insure that the power and duties of the Presidency were
exercised without interruption.
4. THE THREE EISENHOWER CRISES
\Vhen President Eisenhower's seizure of September 24,
1955, was diagnosed as a heart attack, the whole world
shook with the vibrations of the needle on the electrocardiograph. The United States, by virtue of its regional alliances
as well as its membership in the United Nations, had ties in
every quarter of the globe. More than that, it was the leader
and mainstay of free peoples everywhere; what happened
here would have a direct bearing on their destiny.
The domestic reaction to the President's illness was reflected by the stock market: on September 26, the first trading day after the news broke, prices lost over twelve hillion
dollars in values. Despite the assurance of the "assistant
president," Sherman Adams, that there was no government
business requiring immediate presidential attention, the
New York Times reported on September 27 that "top-level
decisions were pending on disarmament policy, budgetary
problems, military force levels, certain politico-strategic
questions, withdrawal of troops from Korea, future military
policy toward Formosa and reduction of forces in Japan."21
The attack occurred when the President was in Denver,
a guest at his mother-in-law's home. About 2:30 A.M. on September 24, he awakened in severe pain. Mrs. Eisenhower
called Major General Howard Snyder, the President's physician, who arrived about 3:00 A.M. and administered emergency treatment, including drugs to relieve the pain. At
7:00 A.M. he called Murray Snyder, the Assistant Presidential Press Secretary, who was also in Denver, and left word
that the President had indigestion and to cancel his appointments. When the President awoke at 12: 30 P.M., Dr.
Snyder called Fitzsimmons Army Hospital and asked that
an electrocardiograph be brought around. The cardiogram,
which showed a lesion on the anterior wall of the heart,
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confirmed Dr. Snyder's original diagnosis of coronary thrombosis. Murray Snyder was then informed, and after the
President had been taken to Fitzsimmons Hospital the news
was released to the press.
In a subsequent report to the White House, Dr. Snyder
had this to say about the eleven-hour delay in communicating the news:
It was difficult for me to assume the responsibility of refraining from making public immediately the diagnosis of
coronary thrombosis. I postponed public announcement because I wished the President to benefit from the rest and
quiet induced by the sedation incident to combating the
initial manifestations. This decision also spared him, his
wife and mother-in-law emotional upset upon too precipitate announcement of such serious import. This action, I
believe, limited the heart damage to a minimum and enabled us to confirm the diagnosis by cardiogram and make
an unhurried transference from home to hospitai.22
The decision to release the facts was made by James E.
Hagerty, the President's Press Secretary, who was in Washington but flew at once to Denver and took charge at the
Summer White House. As soon as the doctors would allow
it, Hagerty saw the President, who approved his action in
releasing the news and told him to "give 'em the facts." 23
In Washington, Vice President Richard Nixon conferred
with the Acting Attorney General, William P. Rogers (Attorney General Herbert Brownell was out of the country),
and later with Secretary of State Foster Dulles and other
members of the Cabinet. They were told that Colonel
Thomas M. Mattingly, Chief of Cardiology at Walter Reed
Army Hospital, was on his way to Denver with a plane-load
of doctors. Although they "had nothing against military
doctors ... [they] could not overlook that many people in
the country might have more confidence, however unwarranted, in a civilian heart specialist of national reputation."
Dr. Paul Dudley White, a pioneer in cardiology, was suggested by several people, among them Secretary of the
Treasury George Humphrey, and General Wilton B. Persons, the Deputy Assistant to the President, was given the
"delicate and difficult task" of convincing Dr. Snyder that

MR. PRESIDENT, How Is YouR HEALTH?

63

no slight was intended by calling in Dr. White on consultation. Once this matter of professional etiquette had been
satisfactorily resolved, the Vice President and the Cabinet
could give some thought to the problem of "how to carry on
in [the President's] absence without allowing the government to drift dangerously in foreign or domestic affairs.
There is an old political axiom that where a vacuum exists,
it will be filled by the nearest or strongest power. That had
to be avoided at all costs."24
On Sunday, September 25, the Vice President was told
Dr. White's prognosis that barring complications the President would be well enough to take on limited duties within
two weeks and to resume normal activities within two
months.
Fortunately, this was vacation time in the government
when there was a lull in the usual rush of activities. Several
long-range projects were under way, like preparation of
the budget and the State of the Union message, but there
seemed to be no pressing item that required presidential
action. Congress was in adjournment; there was no pending
legislation. The cold war seemed frozen for the moment....
We were fairly certain by this time that there was nothing requiring the President's signature or attention which
could not be delayed for two weeks. The significance of this
was that it became apparent this early that we would not
have to solve the thorny problem of a delegation of the
President's constitutional powers.211
The President's right-hand man, Sherman Adams, was in
Scotland at the time of the attack, but was back in Washington by Monday, September 26. No Cabinet meeting was
called, as was done in the Wilson case. Vice President Nixon
came to a luncheon meeting with the senior staff personnel
of the White House and afterward conferred with Adams.
That night there was a meeting at the home of Acting Attorney General Rogers, attended by the Vice President,
Adams, General Persons, Leonard Hall (the Republican National Chairman), and Hall's press aide, Lou Guylay. The
meeting was devoted chiefly to the political questions which
would inevitably result fro.m the President's illness-for ex-
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ample, would he or would he not be able to run for a second term?
In view of Dr. White's encouraging report and since
there was no government business requiring immediate
presidential attention, Nixon, Adams, and the other members of the administrative team aimed to carry on in a
"business as usual" atmosphere. On Thursday, September
29, the National Security Council held its regular meeting,
presided over by the Vice President; he had previously presided at council meetings when the President was away from
Washington. Twenty-three ranking members of the administration
... spent considerable time putting somewhat of an official
stamp of approval on the course of action for the interim
government. It was officially decided, for instance, that
Sherman Adams should go to Denver to serve as liaison and
administrative assistant to the President, while Jerry Persons would handle the paper work at the President's White
House office, routing the documents which the President
should see through Adams.26
When he arrived in Denver, "Adams made it clear to the
attending physicians that he would defer to their judgment
on bringing matters to Eisenhower's attention during the
crucial seven days ahead."27 Adams already had made up
his mind that his course of action with the President-what
he was consulted on, or told-would depend to a great extent on Dr. White's advice, and had so informed the members of the Cabinet before his plane trip to Colorado.
During the remainder of the period during which it was
possible for complications to arise, Adams and Hagerty met
daily with Dr. White and his associates to discuss what work
was to be placed before the President.28
For the next two months the government was managed
by a six-man committee made up of Vice President Nixon,
Secretary of State Dulles, Attorney General Brownell, Secretary of the Treasury Humphrey, General Persons, and
Adams. Nixon, according to Adams, "leaned over backward
to avoid any appearance of assuming presidential authority," but though things went fairly smoothly, Adams and all
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the members of the committee knew that at any moment a
global crisis or national emergency could make this "government by community understanding" woefully inadequate.29 As Vice President Nixon later wrote:
Although it was hardly mentioned, I am certain that many
of us realized our team-government would be inadequate to
handle an international crisis, such as a brush-fire war or an
internal uprising in a friendly country or a crisis of an ally.
The ever-present possibility of an attack on the United
States was always hanging over us. Would the President be
well enough to make the decision? If not, who had the authority to push the button?so
It was only at the end of the two-week period, during which
the scar tissue in the President's heart had formed, that the
tension in Washington slackened.
After his recovery from the heart attack, President Eisenhower continued in good health until early in June, 1956,
when he had an attack of ileitis, a blockage of the lower part
of the small intestine. Shortly after midnight on June 8, his
condition became acute and the team of doctors at Walter
Reed Hospital decided on immediate surgery. From 2:~0 to
4:35 A.M., Adams, Hagerty, and Andrew Goodpaster, the
President's staff secretary, kept vigil outside the operating
room. The surgeons found no sign of malignancy; the President's recovery was quick and uneventful. However,
the surgery focused the President's attention on the legal
problems of the disability of a Chief Executive... . On several occasions afterwards, he pointed out to Vice President
Nixon that for the two hours he was under anesthesia the
country was without a Chief Executive, the armed forces
without a Commander-in-Chief. In the event of a national
emergency during those two hours, who would have had the
authority to act for a completely disabled President? ... He
told some of those around him that if illness ever struck
again and he felt he could not physically carry on the burdens of office, he would resign.st
Seventeen months later, on the afternoon of November
27, 1957, Ann Whitman, the President's personal secretary,
went to Sherman Adams "on the verge of tears." She was
upset over an incident which had just occurred in the Presi-
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dent's office-"He tried to tell me something but he couldn't
express himself. Something seemed to have happened to him
all of a sudden." When Mrs. Whitman called Dr. Snyder,
the President refused to leave his desk. "Go away from me,"
he tried to say. Goodpaster finally persuaded him to leave
his office and walk back to the living quarters.s2
Dr. Snyder persuaded the President to go to bed; it was
his opinion that the President had suffered a stroke and a
neurologist was called to the White House. There was a
state dinner scheduled for King Mohammed V of Morocco,
and while Adams was discussing this complication with
Mrs. Eisenhower the President got out of bed, and insisted
that he intended to go to the dinner. But he still had a
noticeable speech impediment, and Adams and Dr. Snyder
managed to dissuade him. Despite his insistence to the contrary, according to Adams, the President knew something
was wrong with himself: "He became upset and impatient
with his difficulty in seizing the word that he wanted to say,
sometimes coming out with a word or syllable that had no
relation to the word he had in his mind."33
Adams called Vice President Nixon to the White House
and related what had happened. He told Nixon: "This is a
terribly, terribly difficult thing to handle. You may be
President in the next twenty-four hours." It was decided to
withhold any announcement that the President had suffered
a stroke until Dr. Snyder's original diagnosis had been confirmed. A bulletin was issued stating that the President had
suffered a chill. Although Mrs. Eisenhower was greatly distressed, she realized that canceling the state dinner would
alarm the nation and it was held as scheduled.84
On the next morning-Tuesday-a meeting was held at
the White House. At that time, says Sherman Adams, "the
doctors could not tell us how seriously the shock of the previous day had affected the President's nervous system or
whether it might be the first in a series of more damaging
strokes."311 Nixon also agrees that the tension
seemed even greater than at the time of the heart attack. In
contrast to that period in 1955, this was the worst time possible for the President to be incapacitated. It was a time of
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international tensions. Only a month before the Soviet
Union had put its first Sputnik in orbit, and the whole
structure of America's military might and scientific technology was under suspicion here and abroad. The most immediate problem was a scheduled meeting of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization only three weeks away.... On
the domestic front, the first signs of the 1958 economic recession were becoming obvious.... We were having serious
budget problems.... the government had borrowed up to
its legal debt limit, and we had to prepare the fiscal 1959
budget with still higher defense spending. The Administration also had to complete its legislative program, the State
of the Union message, the budget and economic messages
for the opening days of Congress in January.as
The medical report passed along to the press-that the
President had suffered a "mild" stroke which affected only
his ability to speak, and that his mind and reasoning powers
were not involved-got a quite different reaction from the
public than the news about the heart attack. "During the
heart attack, the nation worried if the President would live
or die but not about his ability to carry on if he recovered.
This was not the case during the stroke. The public seemed
to say okay, he may get well, but will he ever be the same
again?" 8T Fortunately for the nation, the President recovered quickly and completely.
The question of public information about the President's health continues to be a touchy one. A few months
after his accession to office in 1961, President John F. Kennedy suffered a recurrence of a wartime back injury during
a tree-planting ceremony in Ottawa, Canada. He was treated
by his personal physician, Dr. Janet Travell, but the injury
gave him trouble during his state visit to Europe. News of
the President's difficulty was withheld from the public until
his return to the United States-an error in judgment which
provoked mud~ criticism and gave rise to rumors that the
injury might be more serious than the press had been led to
believe. Subsequently the President came down with a virus
infection, but this time there was no delay in announcing
the news and lines of communication were ostentatiously
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kept open. Reporters were able to interview Dr. Travell,
whom previously they had not been allowed to question.
The whole episode angered many of the White House
press corps who had served under other Presidents. Merriman Smith, a UPI correspondent since Roosevelt's time,
expressed himself on the subject during an interview by the
author in Washington on July l, 1961.
I think we were spoiled by the way in which Eisenhower
handled the press during his illnesses. All of us around here
got our degrees as doctors during that period. We read
everything we could on heart trouble and when we questioned Dr. White we knew what he was talking about when
he answered in medical terms. So we were irritated when
we weren't informed about Kennedy's illness until a week
after it had happened. Dr. Travell had her interview with
us only after repeated requests and even then she wasn't
altogether responsive.
Smith said that he had checked to see if it could be medically determined whether or not there was a connection
between the back ailment and the virus infection, and had
found that the only way was by means of a spinal tap and
certain blood tests. He asked if such tests had been made
and if so, what the results showed. According to Smith, Dr.
Travell would state only that there was no connection between the two illnesses; she declined to be more specific.
There is no ground for believing that President Kennedy's ailment was anything other than it was represented
to be, but the incident reminds us that what the public is
told of a Chief Executive's health is still entirely up to the
President himself or to the members of the palace guard.

Chapter

V

The Stopgap
I. THE EISENHOWER-NIXON AGREEMENT

The efforts of the Eisenhower administration to secure
action on the question of delegating authority during a
President's temporary disability have been described by former Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., in an article
which appeared in the Yale Law /ournal.1
The battle began in January, 1956, when the President
returned from Denver after recovering from his heart attack.
At this time he directed Attorney General Brownell to "institute a full legal study of the problems raised by temporary
presidential inability. His purpose was to draft a plan to
protect the country fully if a President were to become
disabled at a time when immediate executive action was
needed" (p. 196). Brownell found that several authors had
discussed the problem, but only one, Ruth Silva, had devoted an entire book to the subject. Her doctoral disserta·
tion, Presidential Succession, presented at the University of
Michigan in 1951, brought together many forgotten or obscure facts on presidential illnesses and laid the groundwork
for future studies. So it was natural that the Attorney General should enlist her aid.
Practical political considerations, however, caused a postponement of the project. Nineteen fifty-six was an election
year, and "it was decided not to formulate such a plan dur·
ing the presidential campaign, lest it become entangled in
partisan politics" (p. 196). But after his re-election, the
President again went ahead with his campaign for the adoption of a practical law.
Early in January 1957, [he] reviewed several alternative
plans and authorized the Attorney General to consult sev·
eral persons outside the Government to obtain their views
and criticisms. The opinion of members of the Cabinet were
sought at a Cabinet meeting. Finally, a definitive plan
which proposed a constitutional amendment was approved
by i:.he President. It was to be sent to the Congress with a
69
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special message from the President urging its adoption (p.
196).
But again, practical politics intervened. When the plan
was presented at a meeting of congressional leaders of both
parties, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the
late Sam Rayburn,
raised the point that if the President should send a special
message to Congress urging the adoption of the proposed
constitutional amendment, the people of the country, in the
mistaken belief that some unannounced development in the
President's condition had occurred, might become alarmed.
Accordingly, the forthcoming special message was cancelled,
and public announcement of the plan took the form of
testimony by the Attorney General before a subcommittee
of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives
(p. 196).
Brownell was given the fullest opportunity to explain
the program, which was embodied in a proposed constitutional amendment. The operative clauses of the proposed
amendment were as follows:

Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall
become President for the unexpired portion of the then
current term.
Section 2. If the President shall declare in writing that he
is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice
President as Acting President.
Section 3. If the President does not so declare, the Vice
President, if satisfied of the President's inability, and upon
approval in writing of a majority of the heads of executive
departments who are members of the President's Cabinet,
shall discharge the powers and duties of Acting President.
Section 4. Whenever the President declares in writing that
his inability is terminated, the President shall forthwith
discharge the powers and duties of his office (p. 197).
At the time Brownell testified before the committee, several proposals already had been submitted, reflecting a variety of opinions. Congressman Peter J. Frelinghuysen (New
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Jersey) thought the Supreme Court should decide a President's inability; Joseph C. O'Mahoney (Wyoming) contended that it should be determined by Congress; and
Kenneth Keating (New York) was convinced that the whole
matter should be adjudicated by a commission made up of
congressional leaders, the Justices of the Supreme Court,
and selected Cabinet members.
In ruling out these ideas, the Attorney General used a
fundamental doctrine of constitutional law-the concept of
separation of powers, which has developed in our law since
the adoption of the Constitution. It states as a basic principle of our form of government that the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches must be kept separate from one
another and free from the intrusions of the others into their
respective domains. The President has invoked this doctrine
to keep the files of the executive out of the hands of Congress; and the courts have used it to keep the lawmaking
power of the President at a minimum. 2 In the present instance, it was the basis for Brownell's contention that the
determination of presidential inability should be made
within the executive branch; the President should not be
subject to control and possible domination by either the
Supreme Court or Congress. In this connection, the Attorney General read into the record a letter that Chief Justice
Earl Warren had written to Representative Keating:
During the time the subject of inability of a President
to discharge the duties of his office has been under discussion, the members of the Court have discussed generally ...
the proposal that a member or members of the Court be
included in the membership of a Commission to determine
the fact of Presidential inability to act.
It has been the belief of all of us that because of the
separation of powers in our Government, the nature of the
judicial process, the possibility of a controversy of this character coming to Court, and the danger of disqualification
which might result in lack of a quorum, it would be inadvisable for any member of the Court to serve on such a commission .
. . . I do believe that the reasons above mentioned for
non participation of the Court are insurmountable.3
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Brownell used a similar argument in repudiating the
idea that Congress should decide the question.
With the participation of congressional officials a presidential inability commission would be bound to assume a political appearance. Individual members of Congress, though
elected by the people, are elected by the people of a particular small district or state, and are not necessarily representative of the nation as a whole; only the President and the
Vice President are elected by the entire populace.'
Before Brownell finished his testimony, the chairman of
the committee, Representative Emanuel Geller of New York,
and Representative William McCulloch of Ohio called attention to a serious gap in the administration's proposal.
What happened, they wanted to know, if a President refused to give up his office, or if a President prematurely declared his recovery? They had in mind the case of a mentally
disturbed Chief Executive who might develop an irrational
hostility or a mistaken belief in his own fitness, or who was
just plain stubborn and would not relinquish the post.•
The Attorney General's answer was that a mentally ill or
stubborn President could be impeached. But he was not
entirely satisfied with this solution. As he later wrote:
... in the presentation of President Eisenhower's original
proposal for a constitutional amendment in 1957, it was
stated that any dispute between the President and the Vice
•"Suppose some President shall become insane immediately after his
inauguration and shall remain so for two or three years. Will it then
become the duty of the Vice-President to perform the functions of the
Presidential office? Clearly it will. Then, while the insanity continues,
will the Vice-President be President or still only Vice-President? Surely
the latter, for the President is still alive, and is, consequently, still the
holder of the office. His title to it can only end by his removal, death
or resignation. He cannot be removed pending his insanity except on
conviction of treason, bribery or other high crimes and misdemeanors.
He has not resigned, and an attempted resignation would be a nullity.
If the Vice-President remains Vice-President under these conditions,
how can he be else in case of the death of the President? The office or
its powers and duties 'devolve' on him as fully in one case as in the
other" (Lewis R. Works, "The Succession of the Vice-President under
the Constitution-An Interrogation," American Law Review, XXXVIII

[1904), 501).
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President regarding termination of the President's disability
could be resolved by Congress's taking impeachment proceedings against whichever official was wrongfully attempting to exercise the powers of the presidency. In subsequent
public discussion of the proposal, however, it was pointed
out that impeachment and trial are complicated and lengthy
processes, that the Congress is not always in session, and that
nothing in the Constitution now empowers the Vice President to call Congress into special session. Furthermore, conviction would remove the President permanently, and the
odium attached to the impeachment might very well cause
many Congressmen to hesitate to take such action-especially against an ill man.G
Representatives Celler and McCulloch also questioned
the wisdom of the Vice President's consulting with the Cabi.net before assuming office as acting President: the Cabinet,
after all, is composed of political appointees who owe their
political lives to the incumbent President. In countering
this argument, Brownell cited the Tyler precedent as the
reason the Garfield and Wilson Cabinets did not call in the
Vice President. Thus, he reflected Silva's view that it was
the fear the Vice President would oust the President that
kept Arthur and Marshall from becoming acting Presidents.• And this was only half true.
At the conclusion of the hearings, the Attorney General's
proposal went by the board. No legislator pretended to have
the answers to the problems of presidential disability, but
there was a feeling that something basic was lacking in all
the legislation considered, and the subcommittee refused to
•The Attorney General's testimony indicates that he was placing
heavy reliance on Silva's research. See Hearings, Special Subcommittee
on Presidential Disability of the Judiciary Committee, House, 85th
Cong., lst Sess., p. 14. Other congressional hearings were held in 1956
and 1958. (Hearings, Special Committee to Study Presidential Inability,
Committee on the Judiciary, House, 84th Cong., 2nd Sess., April ll, 12,
1956; Hearings, Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments, Committee on the Judiciary, Senate, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., January 24,
February ll, 14, 18 and 28, 1958). The House Committee of the 84th
Congress prepared and sent out a questionnaire which was published
with the replies as a Committee Print, January lll, 1956; an analysis
was published March 26, 1957.
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recommend any one approach. Sherman Adams notes that
at the very beginning of the venture Senator Knowland
voiced the opposition to the Cabinet's being involved in
questions of determining inability. Knowland also brought
up the problem of a mentally ill President who would not
give up the office, or who would try to resume it before he
was fully recovered. At this early stage, no attempt had been
made to compromise, and, as Adams writes: "There being
no unanimity and little enthusiasm among the Republican
leaders and strong opposition from Rayburn, it was appar·
ent that the proposal would not get far ...."6
The criticism of the impeachment process as a method
of resolving a dispute between the President and the Vice
President over the former's recovery continued after Congress had adjourned. In response to these criticisms the new
Attorney General, William P. Rogers, on February 18, 1958,
presented a revised Section 4 for the proposed amendment:
Whenever the President declares in writing that his inability has terminated, the President shall forthwith discharge
the powers and duties of his office: Provided, however, that
if the Vice President and a majority of the heads of executive departments who are members of the President's Cabinet shall signify in writing that the President's inability has
not been terminated thereupon:
(a) The Congress shall forthwith consider the issue of
the President's inability in accordance with procedures
provided for impeachment, and if the Congress is not in
session, shall forthwith convene for this purpose;
(b) If the House of Representatives shall on record vote
charge that the President's inability has not terminated,
and the Senate so finds by the concurrence of two thirds
of the members present, the powers and duties of the
office of President shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President for the remainder of the term,
or until Congress by a majority vote of the members of
both Houses determines that the President's inability
has terminated.1
This proposal also failed for lack of support, as did a similar bill backed by a bipartisan group led by Senators Kefauver of Tennessee and Hruska of Nebraska.
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lt was against this background of congressional inaction
that President Eisenhower, on March 3, 1958, entered into
a private agreement with Vice President Richard Nixon
which would enable Nixon to act as President if circumstances required. Eisenhower had discussed the problem
with Nixon a number of times since his heart attack. In
these discussions, according to Nixon, the President

had mentioned several alternatives, but kept coming back
to the idea of a letter which would give the Vice President
alone the authority to decide when the President was unable to carry on-that is, when the President himself was
unable to make the decision.
In early February, the President called Rogers and me
into his office, commented that he thought he had licked
the problem, and handed each of us a copy of a letter....
We made some minor suggestions and he incorporated them
into the letter and then sent it on to his secretary, Ann
Whitman, for final typing. Marked PERSONAL AND SECRET,
one copy went to me, one to Bill Rogers as Attorney General, and one to John Foster Dulles, as Secretary of State
and ranking member of the Cabinet.
With the exception of our very minor suggestions, the
letter was wholly Eisenhower's in concept and drafting, and
it was a masterpiece. Leaving the White House, Bill Rogers
remarked that Eisenhower would have made an outstanding
lawyer, for the letter handled the contingencies of a very
complex problem from every angle and was as good a drafting job as any constitutional expert could have done. 8
The terms of this letter, which reduced to a memorandum the President's and Vice President's understanding of
the constitutional role of the Vice President as Acting President, were made public on March 3, 1958. They are as
follows:
The President and the Vice President have agreed that
the following procedures are in accord with the purposes
and provisions of Article 2, Section l, of the Constitution,
dealing with Presidential inability. They believe that these
procedures, which are intended to apply to themselves only,
are in no sense outside or contrary to the Constitution but
are consistent with its present provisions and implement its
clear intent.
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1. In the event of inability the President would-if possible-so inform the Vice President, and the Vice President
would serve as Acting President, exercising the powers and
duties of the office until the inability had ended.
2. In the event of an inability which would prevent the
President from so communicating with the Vice President,
the Vice President, after such consultation as seems to him
appropriate under the circumstances, would decide upon
the devolution of the powers and duties of the Office and
would serve as Acting President until the inability had
ended.
3. The President, in either event, would determine when
the inability had ended and at that time would resume the
full exercise of the powers and duties of the Office.9

Commenting on this memorandum in his Yale Law
Journal article (which appeared some eight months after
the historic agreement was made public), Herbert Brownell
wrote that it
represents the Eisenhower Administration's interpretation
of the Constitution as it now stands. The only addition to
present Constitutional requirements is that the Vice President take action "after such consultation as seems to him
appropriate under the circumstances." Although the Constitution does not require the Vice President to consult anyone, it was felt that, as a matter of good judgment, the Vice
President would want to consult members of the Cabinet,
congressional leaders of both parties, and perhaps other
prominent citizens before presuming to exercise the powers
and duties of the presidency. The Eisenhower-Nixon understanding, in effect, gives the Vice President the comfort of
being directed to seek opinion from other persons and thus
strengthen his position if he should be obliged to take these
steps. Appropriately, in view of constitutional silence on the
matter, the persons with whom the Vice President is to consult are not mentioned. Presumably, the Vice President's
choice would depend on the circumstances of the moment;
in time of international crisis the opportunity for consultation might be very brief.lo
Thus, Eisenhower became the first President in our history to take cognizance of and act upon a serious defect in
our Constitution. But the agreement was a purely personal
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one between Eisenhower and Nixon, and could not, therefore, apply to their successors. President John F. Kennedy,
when he succeeded to office, did enter into a similar agreement with Vice President Lyndon Johnson, but, as former
Vice President Nixon points out,
. . . the agreement President Eisenhower set forth in his
letter to me, and the one President Kennedy has entered
into with Vice President Johnson, are only as good as the
will of the parties to keep them. Presidents and Vice Presidents have not always had the mutual trust and cordial
relations President Eisenhower had with me or that President Kennedy has had with Vice President Johnson up to
this time. Jealousies and rivalries can develop within an
Administration which could completely destroy such an
agreement.
Only a constitutional amendment can solve the problem
on a permanent basis. President Eisenhower's agreement
with me was personal and had the force of authority only
during his term of office. President Kennedy's agreement is
similarly limited. These agreements, which are mere expressions of a President's desires, do not have the force of law.
Even a law passed by Congress might be subject to constitutional challenge. However, such a law would express the
will of Congress and should be passed while the incumbent
President is in good health and before a presidential election year drags politics into an already complex problem.
The experiences of Garfield, Wilson, and Eisenhower should
have taught us a lesson. Surely the time has come for a truly
bipartisan program to draw up a constitutional amendment
which would define the rights and duties of a Vice President
during any period when the President of the United States
is incapacitated.
The urgent need for such an amendment becomes crystal clear when a President is disabled, but that is precisely
the time when politics bar any reasonable agreement on the
wording of such an amendment... . It is hardly necessary
to point out that these perilous times in which we live will
continue, and more than ever before our nation will need
an able and healthy Chief Executive or acting Chief Executive at all times. ...
The heart attack, the ileitis operation, and the stroke
were .. . potential constitutional crises of the greatest magnitude for the nation. If such a crisis should arise in the
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future its outcome should not be dependent upon the personal whims of whoever happens to hold the offices of President and Vice President, but on the law of the land, as
approved by the Congress or set forth in the Constitution.11
2. THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON AGREEMENT
In December, 1960, President-elect Kennedy and Vice
President-elect Johnson made a tentative informal agreement, similar to that which had existed between Eisenhower
and Nixon, on the procedures to be followed should Kennedy become disabled. Soon after the new administration
took office, the President asked Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy for an opinion on the construction to be given the
presidential inability clause of the Constitution. Specifically,
President Kennedy wanted to know:
first, whether when presidential inability occurs, the Vice
President ... succeeds to the "Office," i.e., becomes President and remains in the office even if the inability should
cease; second, who determines whether the inability exists
and who determines whether the inability has ended; and
third, whether the memorandum of March 3, 1958, between
former President Eisenhower and former Vice President
Nixon ... is a desirable precedent for this administration
to follow. 12
Assistant Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach,
Robert Kennedy's legal adviser, was assigned to review the
problem and subsequently drafted the opinion which was
delivered to the President on August 2, 1961. In summarizing his conclusions, the Attorney General stated:
In my judgment, there is no question that the Vice
President acts as President in the event of the President's
inability and acts in that capacity "until the disability be
removed." ...
I believe also that there is no substantial question that
it is the Vice President, if the President is unable to do so,
who determines the President's inability and that it is the
President who asserts when the inability has ceased. These
conclusions are supported by the great majority of reputable
scholars who have examined the problem, as well as by my
predecessors....
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I am of the opinion that the understanding between the
President and the Vice President ... is clearly constitutional
and as close to spelling out a practical solution to the problem as is possible.is
In the discussion preceding this summary, the Attorney
General had noted that since the Eisenhower-Nixon understanding
may prove to be a persuasive precedent of what the Constitution means until it is amended or other action is taken, I
would favor that the Administration follow it. Cumulative
precedents of this kind may be valuable in the future.14
On August 10, 1961, President Kennedy announced
adoption of the Eisenhower precedent, and a summary of
the provisions of the agreement, identical with that of the
Eisenhower-Nixon understanding, was made public in a
press release the same day.
There already are two schools of legal thought concerning this memorandum: one group (which does not include
Eisenhower or Kennedy) regards it as a perfect solution to
the problem and sees no need for further action; at the
other extreme are those who hold that it is unconstitutional.
Not only because of this divergence of opinion but because
an examination of the specific provisions may help to bring
into focus the real problems of disability, a closer scrutiny
of the agreement is indicated.
Without congressional action, a memorandum is the
only way a President can set up a formal procedure to cover
inability. But a memorandum is discretionary with each
new administration, and this, of course, is one of the chief
drawbacks of the inability agreement. A President who
wishes to ignore the memorandum may do so. He may also
adopt a completely different formula for making the determination. In either case the net result would be even greater
uncertainty than now exists.
Section I states that a disabled President would, if possible, inform the Vice President of his condition, in which
case the Vice President would take over as Acting President
until the inability is ended. Because it allows a President to
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step down temporarily, this provision-in the view of Attorneys General Brownell and Kennedy-serves to negate the
Tyler precedent; and-so they reason-if the Tyler precedent is nullified, a disabled President will not hesitate to
give up his job. He is assured of resuming it upon his recovery. The provision is based on Silva's assumption that
Garfield's and Wilson's refusal to step aside derived from
the Tyler precedent. But such an assumption is a gross oversimplification of a complex problem. John Tyler's decision
offered a comfortable and plausible excuse for the failure
to call in Arthur and Marshall; in neither case did it motivate the refusal.
General Eisenhower, in discussing the memorandum
with the author, particularly stressed that its strength depends entirely upon the good will existing between the
President and the Vice President.Hi He must have had in
mind the historical evidence that there was no good will
between Garfield and Arthur and only a semblance of it between Wilson and Marshall. The point is that we have not
changed our system of choosing the President and Vice
President; political expediency can still determine a ticket;
and politics makes strange bedfellows. The possibility of a
rift between the incumbents should neither be overlooked
nor minimized, and there is no protection against such an
eventuality in the present memorandum.
While it is certainly wise to allow a President who wishes
to do so to step aside, the question history poses is not
should he? or can he? but will he? Whether we like it or
not, no President, if we are to judge by past performances,
is likely to give up his office-to relinquish it voluntarily to
a subordinate.
When President Eisenhower announced that he would
run for a second term, he promised the American people
that he would resign from the Presidency if his health
should fail.• The resignation of the President would have
•"I have said unless I felt absolutely up to the performance of the
duties of the President, the second that I didn't, I would no longer be
there in the job or I wouldn't be available for the job."-President
Eisenhower in a press conference, March 7, 1956. Quoted in Nixon, Six
Crises, p. 176.
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been unprecedented in the nation's history. The only remotely analogous situation occurred in 1832 when John C.
Calhoun resigned the Vice Presidency, and his action was
in no way connected with his health. He split with President Andrew Jackson over the issue of state rights. The
agricultural states of the South were burdened with what
they called the "Tariff of Abominations," a protective levy
which, so the Southerners said, favored the manufacturers of
the North at the expense of the plantation owners. Calhoun,
a South Carolinian, wrote a stirring essay setting forth the
doctrine that no state could be bound by a federal law
which it regarded as unconstitutional. Since President Jackson stood for a strong central government, a deep rift developed between him and the Vice President, and Calhoun
ultimately resigned to enter the Senate, where he became
the leading proponent of state rights. Although Presidents
and Vice Presidents have had differences approaching feuds,
none except Calhoun has ever resigned for any cause.
Reluctance to surrender power is a very human characteristic, and the man who is President of the United States
is the most powerful man in the modern world. Moreover,
there is no position more calculated to build a man's ego.
Edward R. Murrow describes the White House as being "a
kind of alchemist. There little men have grown great, and
great men have become giants." 16 To complete the picture
he should have added-"and all but a very few have become
indispensable to the nation-in their own minds."
Until 1940, the two-term tradition initiated by George
Washington was unwritten law. Except for those Presidents
who died during their first term or were not renominated,
how many between Washington and Franklin D. Roosevelt
gave up the office after only one term? James K. Polk took
office in 1845 with "the settled purpose of not being a candidate for re-election"; Rutherford B. Hayes made it known
early in 1876 that he would not run again "under any circumstances." That makes two, and Calvin Coolidge might
be counted as a third, depending on whether one puts the
emphasis on I or choose in his statement "I do not choose
to run." Four Presidents-William Henry Harrison, Zachary
Taylor, Garfield, and Harding-died during their first term.

82

THE YEAR WE HAD

No PRESIDENT

Five-Tyler, Pierce, Buchanan, Johnson, and Arthur-were
not renominated. Excluding Washington, who founded the
tradition, and the nine Presidents who died or were not renominated, only three out of the remaining twenty vacated
the White House before tradition compelled them to do so.
The force of the White House as an ego-builder can also
be seen in more recent history. The circumstances surrounding Franklin D. Roosevelt's decision to run for a third term
have been described fully by James A. Farley, Judge Samuel
Rosenman, and others. The President had given Farley and
Secretary of State Hull reason to believe that he would support them to head the Democratic ticket in 1940. But with
the war crisis coming on-and even though the Republican
nominee, Wendell Willkie, was no isolationist and, in fact,
helped to create the bipartisan foreign policy of World War
II-Roosevelt decided that his experience was indispensable
to the proper handling of the situation. This indispensable
man was the same F.D.R. who said in 1932, "The genius of
America is greater than any candidate or any party." And it
was the same F.D.R. for whom Rosenman helped prepare
the speech given at Shibe Park in Philadelphia on October
27, 1944. Rosenman says about that address:
Roosevelt wanted to talk about the strenuous and exacting
role a President has to carry as Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy in the conduct of a war. The political point
was obvious even though unspoken: That the man who
since 1937 had been preparing the country physically and
mentally for what was coming, who had been conducting a
successful global war for almost four years, should be continued in office to finish the job; that it would be inadvisable to tum it over to inexperienced hands.17
Josephus Daniels, Secretary of the Navy under Woodrow
Wilson, has set down some pungent comments on the prevailing desire of our Chief Executives to prolong their
White House tenancy, though not all of them were as insistent as Roosevelt upon their indispensability.
Why do I think Wilson, even though partially paralyzed,
would have felt constrained to have accepted if nominated?
Because he would have regarded it as a command with a
vital principle as the issue, and his views were so well known
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that personal campaigning would not be necessary. There
is another reason based upon some acquaintance with Presidents and some knowledge of politics and history. It is my
deliberate judgment that, since Andrew Jackson returned to
the Hermitage after having hand-picked Martin Van Buren
as his successor and paved the way for Polk, his political
protege, to carry on his policies-since Old Hickory's day,
no President has willingly left the White House. There is
something about the office and place that makes all afterlife lack that something which only the White House gives.
If Wilson had been a well man, he would, in my opinion,
have been willing to break the old three-term jinx in devotion to the League. It is well known that Theodore Roosevelt expected to resume residence after one term for Taft,
and that he never lost the animus revertandi, even bolting
the Republican Party in 1912 and organizing a new party
which he thought would lead to the White House. Most
people believe if he had lived he would have been given the
Republican nomination in 1920. When Cleveland's term
expired in 1889, he declared that he was happy to be relieved of the duties and retire to private life. But he was
fooling himself and the public, he did not fool his wife. As
she was leaving the White House she told a faithful Negro
who had long been there, "Keep everything as it is now so
that we will find no change when we return in 1893."
Taft felt that Teddy had "done him wrong" when he
sought to oust him in 1912 but was somewhat consoled when
he was made Chief Justice. He wanted a second term and
felt he was entitled to such an encore when Wilson won.
When Coolidge said "I do not choose to run," he thought
that delphic utterance would cause the people to break the
third-term tradition for him without his initiating it. No
man was ever more disappointed when his statement was
construed to mean that he did not desire the nomination.
Hoover has never really found himself since his ejection
from the White House. No President ever worked harder
than Hoover, or, in his own peculiar way, enjoyed being
President more than Hoover. It was not his fault that the
depression came to make his reelection impossible.
Franklin Roosevelt loved the great office to which he
added distinction. He did not need great persuasion to accept nominations that gave him the unprecedented honor of
being elected four times.is
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After four years at the head of the mightiest nation in
the world a man is bound to feel indispensable. It is a natural reaction to the adulation the President receives from
the public, and to the customs which have attached to the
presidency. From the minute he occupies the national shrine
called the White House a President is constantly reminded
of his importance. "Ladies first" does not apply at the
White House-protocol demands that the President get into
the car first; when the President enters a room, everyone
stands; no one leaves a room before he does; the President
is served first at all meals; wherever he appears he is the
center of interest, attention, solicitude-"Hail to the Chief!"
blare all the bands. No law can change the deeply rooted
tendency toward presidential deification. Since prehistoric
times human beings have stood in awe of power, and a
President is a symbol of power. Homage to the President is
often justified on the grounds that it is paid to the office,
not the officeholder, but it cannot fail to affect him: a man
who has experienced the pomp and circumstance of the
presidency can never again be as other men.
George Washington, who observed the weaknesses of
men in times of triumph as well as of trial, wisely set the
two-term tradition. When that precedent was finally broken
by Franklin Roosevelt, the American people, much as they
revered F.D.R., amended the Constitution to make it certain that no President ever again would hold office longer
than eight years. But the people, by their adulation of the
President, share the responsibility for the "indispensable
President" concept, whether it is in connection with the
two-term tradition or with presidential inability. It was fitting that we should limit the term of office; it is equally
appropriate for us to stifle the misguided ambition of a sick
executive and insist that he surrender his powers until he
is well. Therefore, while the Kennedy-Johnson memorandum wisely allows a President to step aside temporarily, the
history of the Presidency and human nature, not the Tyler
precedent, make it highly unlikely that he will do so.
Section 2 of the presidential memorandum provides for
a situation in which the President is unable to communicate
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with the Vice President. If such a situation should arise the
Vice President may take action "after such consultation as
seems to him appropriate under the circumstances."
All those who have undertaken studies of any depth
agree that, under the present Constitution, the Vice President determines disability. It is inconceivable that the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, with their practical
approach to these matters, intended the Vice President to
make the decision without ascertaining the facts of the
President's illness. To do this adequately, he would first
have to consult with the President's doctors, then the Cabinet. If time allowed, he might also wish to discuss the matter with the President's family. So, when the memorandum
allows the Vice President such "consultation as seems to
him appropriate under the circumstances," it is merely reflecting the present state of the Constitution. Of course, if
consultation were required with specific people, this would
amount to amending the Constitution by memorandum.
Such a result would follow any understanding that a certain
person, say the Attorney General, were to be consulted.
This section, as it presently stands, may be good constitutional law, but here again the law is far removed from
practicality. Was Thomas R. Marshall kept informed of
Wilson's condition? Well enough informed to make a decision on disability? Was Arthur carefully advised of Garfield's progress during the eighty days the President was
disabled? The basic problem is one of keeping the Vice
President and the public informed. The public announcements during the Eisenhower illnesses were as novel as they
were appropriate, and it must not be forgotten that they
were entirely discretionary on the part of the President and
his official family. There is no assurance that future Presidents will follow the Eisenhower precedent rather than the
practices of Garfield and Wilson. There is no law in 1962
which even requires the President to have a physical examination, let alone make the results public; any President
may refuse to tell anyone anything about the state of his
health. "Why not?" say some people. "It's a private matter."
Such reasoning gives inordinate emphasis to the right of
privacy, a right which any man who enters public life relin-
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quishes in part. The health of the President of the United
States in the twentieth century is not only every American's
business, it is also of vital importance to millions of foreign
peoples.
Section 3 of the agreement states that whether the President or the Vice President has declared the inability, the
President may determine when it is over, and forthwith
resume the full exercise of the powers and duties of the
office. Since it was this proviso in the original Eisenhower
program which drew fire from Congress, and which was
amended in the subsequent proposal to provide for the removal of an unwilling President without impeachment, it
is surprising to find Attorney General Robert Kennedy's
opinion ignoring this aspect of the situation. While he cites
Rogers and Brownell in support of the idea that the President should determine his own recovery, he omits any reference to the fact that Eisenhower, Brownell, and Rogers all
subsequently agreed on the necessity for changing their proposed constitutional amendment. The Attorney General
cites no other authorities in this regard, and ends the argument by quoting the remarks made by Senator Cole in 1881
that the remedy should be by impeachment.
The opinion and the memorandum are subject to valid
criticism on another point. Attorney General Kennedy
stresses throughout his opinion that it is the Vice President
who determines disability. But this power carries with it the
implication that the Vice President also determines when
there is no disability, in other words, when he should not
act as President. Thus, the Attorney General's reasoning is
illogical, for if the Vice President does not determine when
the President is well, how is he supposed to determine when
he is ailing? Before the Attorney General's reasoning in this
respect is accepted, he will have to produce considerably
more authority to make absolutely certain that a shift in
vested constitutional powers is not being accomplished by
a private memorandum.
There are several drawbacks to the alternate procedure
of having the Congress determine the President's recovery
if there is a dispute. First of all, such a procedure is illogical.
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Although its proponents, Rogers and Brownell, did not
favor letting Congress determine disability when the President first takes ill, when a dispute arises between a President
and the Vice President later on, they suggest that the matter be resolved by a two-thirds vote of both Houses. Why is
it a violation of the separation of powers doctrine in one
instance and not in the other? The same reasons which militate against Congress deciding the problem in the first place
are even more applicable when the two executives differ. A
prompt decision would be required and congressional determination would take months-and how many congressmen could resist the opportunity to make political capital
out of the situation?
The imperfections and potential trouble spots in the
memorandum should be apparent. Both Eisenhower and
Kennedy recognize the need for Congressional action. It will
take much more than a private understanding to insure
perpetuation of the wise precedent established by President
Eisenhower.
This was amply proven by the fact that Congress has
made no provision for the publication or even the preservation of the originals of the Eisenhower-Nixon and Kennedy} ohnson agreements. There is no provision for depositing
the original Eisenhower memorandum with the Secretary of
State or publishing it in the Federal Register. According to
Ann Whitman, it was necessary for the Eisenhower-Nixon
agreement to be "very tightly held and to my certain knowledge less than a handful of people in Washington have ever
seen the documents." 19 The same situation prevails with
regard to the Kennedy-Johnson agreement. It is only by the
grace of the two Presidents that these private understandings were made public. Almost any type of arrangement
could be made on this crucial subject, and there exists no
legal requirement that it be made public. It is a strange
situation when the law requires publication of presidential
proclamations on matters involving the administration of
Palmyra Island, National Forest Products Week, and delegation of authority with respect to foreign assistance,20 but
an agreement determining succession to the presidency must
be "tightly held"!

Chapter VI

Colonial Precedents and State Laws
Every attempt to find a solution to the problems of presidential inability must begin with the Constitution itselfwith a study not only of the succession clause and of other
provisions, but of the records and history of the Constitutional Convention, the debates in the Convention and the
ratifying conventions, and also such contemporary writings
as Madison's Notes and Hamilton's Federalist papers.
All previous scholars, however, have confined themselves
to the proceedings of the Federal Convention, and the degree to which the presidential inability clause is based on
similar clauses in colonial charters and state constitutions
has never been thoroughly considered.• Yet since precedent
and personal experience are great opinion-molders, these
documents surely merit examination. As Attorney General
Robert F. Kennedy has written:
In attempting to ascertain the intention of the framers
of the Constitution, it is helpful to know what the practice
was in the thirteen States when the Constitution was
adopted. We would expect that the provisions of those State
Constitutions dealing with succession in event of a governor's inability definitely influenced and shaped the thinking of the framers of the Constitution in determining what
provisions should be made in event of presidential inability.
Accordingly we may consider those State constitutional provisions as a guide in interpreting the corresponding succession clause in the Constitution of the United States.1
l. COLONIAL PRECEDENTS
The pre-Federal period (1604-1789) affords many examples of a "deputie governour" tempararily performing the
governor's duties. The conditions of frontier life made such
•The notable exception is Irving Williams, The Rise of the J'ice
Presidency (New York: Public Affairs Press, 1956), where colonial experience is considered with reference to secondary sources (p. 16).
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forehanded arrangements essential if there were not to be
lapses in executive power. Traveling involved months, not
hours. Common disasters were not atomic in nature, but
common disasters there were. Danger to the community as
a whole was always imminent-from the Indians, from epidemic disease. A measure of the colonists' chances for survival is tellingly expressed in a single statistic: during this
period the average life span for males was twenty-seven
years.
The uncertainties of existence in the New World were
certainly borne in mind by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Many of the delegates were lawyers and
thoroughly conversant with the provisions in colonial charters framed for the specific purpose of preventing voids in
the exercise of power. Colonial practice in this respect remained virtually the same from founding of the first colony,
Jamestown, until the adoption of the Constitution.
A deputy governor for Jamestown was named as early as
1617, three years after the colony was founded. Moreover,
due to the chief executive's inability to depart for his post,
the deputy governor was obliged to assume office. 2
William Penn received the grant of Pennsylvania from
King Charles II in 1681; he was resident in the colony from
1682 to 1684, and then returned to England. The King's
grant refers to the "governor, or his Deputy," but says nothing about the procedure required for the deputy to assume
office. In 1689 it was necessary for Penn, then Governor of
Pennsylvania, to report to the King on the status of the
colony. He wrote to the Pennsylvania Assembly:
And if you Desire a Deputy Governor rather, name
three, or five, and I shall name one of them, so as you Consider of a Comfortable substance, that ye Government may
not go a begging.a
Penn thereafter appointed a man as deputy and lieutenant
to act in his name.
Seventeen of the colonial charters and constitutions in
effect at various times before the adoption of the Federal
Constitution provide for a lieutenant governor or his equivalent. Fifteen of the seventeen gave him status as "acting
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governor"; and of the fifteen, four provide for the governor's
powers to be exercised during his absence, ten for the inability or "sickness" of the governor. Colonial precedent is
clear. Only the constitutions of South Carolina of 1776 and
1777 state that the lieutenant governor succeeds to the office
of governor, and these provisions were later amended. In
April, 1961, the constitutions of eleven of the original thirteen states adhered to colonial practice. Only Rhode Island
and Virginia follow the "Tyler trend." 4
The very early charters of the colonies gave the governing power to the owners or their descendants. If an owner
was absent, his son could assume his powers and there
would be no delay in the execution of the laws. The same
rule applied when a governor died. In cases of inability, the
governor "deputized" the lieutenant governor, otherwise
the latter automatically made the determination. This custom of automatic transfer of power developed at the same
time as the rule of descent. In line with the latter concept,
some of the charters provided for a regency if the owner's
descendant was a minor.• But as democracy evolved in the
colonies, deputization replaced succession by descent as the
general practice, and this custom continued after the Declaration of Independence.
Alexander Hamilton refers to state disability provisions
in The Federalist. After discussing the Federal Convention's
reasons for electing a Vice President and making him presiding officer of the Senate, Hamilton says:
... The other consideration is, that as the Vice President
may occasionally become a substitute for the President, in
the supreme executive magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of election prescribed for the one, apply
with great if not with equal force to the manner of appointing the other. It is remarkable that in this, as in most other
instances, the objection which is made would lie against
the constitution of this state [New York]. We have a Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for
•The disability provisions of all the colonial charters and early state
constitutions may be found in Appendix II.

COLONIAL PRECEDENTS AND STATE LAWS

91

the Governor, in casualties similar to those which would
authorize the Vice-President to exercise and discharge the
duties of the President.11
Thus, the spirit and the letter of the law of the preFederal period substantiates the interpretation placed on
the inability clause of the Federal Constitution by Henry E.
Davis at the time of President Garfield's illness, and by a
majority of scholars since that date, including Eisenhower's
and Kennedy's Attorneys General.
2. EXPERIENCE IN THE STATES SINCE 1789
Obviously the interpretation given a state constitution
cannot be applied to the federal document, except by comparison. But we have had four or five times as many governors as Presidents, and there is a correspondingly greater
amount of experience from which to draw in appraising
laws of succession.
Disability clauses in state constitutions, as in the Federal

Constitution, are part of a general section dealing with succession. Disability is grouped with other contingencies, like
impeachment or death. In order to understand the interpretation given to the disability clause of the succession section, it is necessary to examine the cases dealing with the
other contingencies.

Death
The question of succession in the states most frequently
follows the death of the chief executive. It becomes a court
matter, as a rule, when the man who has to fill the governor's shoes wants to know if he will receive the governor's
salary.
The first interpretation of a succession clause dates back
to the death of Governor DeWitt Clinton of New York, who
died on February 11, 1828. Nathaniel Pritcher, Lieutenant
Governor, raised the question of whether he was entitled to
the salary of governor or lieutenant governor. William M.
Marcy, comptroller of New York, said Pritcher was acting
governor, and entitled by law to the salary given the governor.
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The state courts have followed Marcy's ruling in "succession by death" cases, right up to the most recent one in
Florida in 1953. 6 The only exceptions have been in Oregon
and Wyoming.7 In Wyoming, for example, the second man
in line is the secretary of state, a common line of succession
in smaller states which find eliminating a paycheck for lieutenant governor a convenient method of economizing. But
the Wyoming court seemed not to be thinking of economy
when it ruled that the secretary of state, when he acts as
governor, is entitled to both salaries. This is an odd decision
for any state to make and certainly places Wyoming in a
class by itself.
There is no question that a majority of state courts, in
these "succession by death" cases, have refused to follow the
Tyler precedent.

Impeachment
Succession by impeachment is a completely different type
of situation from succession by death. The word "impeachment" itself is often misunderstood: it refers to the proceeding by which an executive is accused of wrongdoing and
brought to trial. At the federal and state levels, the actual
complaint is made by the House of Representatives, and the
trial is held in the Senate, with the Chief Justice presiding.
The senators act as the jury. The legal questions surrounding impeachment in the states involve the problem of
whether the governor is suspended from his duties at the
time of filing of the charges against him, or after his conviction. If he is suspended, what is the status of the person who
acts as governor during the interval? The leading case originates in Nebraska.
In the early 1870's Nebraska had a young Republican
governor, David Butler, who had overstepped the law in
encouraging land sales and pushing the building of the
state Capitol in the new town of Lincoln. The legislature
had been inclined to excuse technical irregularities in appreciation of his great services to the public, but Butler
continued to cut corners and play fast and loose, and a day
of reckoning finally came. When the Governor was unable
to account satisfactorily for funds collected from the sale of
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school lands, the house of representatives approved articles
of impeachment against him and he was subsequently convicted on the charge that he had appropriated the funds
collected from the federal government to his own use. At
the time the articles of impeachment were filed, the legislature addressed a letter to the state supreme court asking its
opinion regarding Butler's status pending his trial by the
senate. Justices Lake and Crounse held that in the case of
impeachment the functions of the governor are entirely
suspended until his acquittal, when they again become
operative, or until his conviction, when the suspension becomes permanent.a Butler was, of course, permanently removed from office, but the important aspect of the decision
is that the secretary of state became acting governor during
the proceedings against the chief executive. Similar holdings have been made in New York, North Dakota, and
Oklahoma.9 Thus, here again the Tyler trend has been disregarded and the precedent established from colonial times
recognized and applied by the states.

Resignation
If governors are not as reluctant as Presidents to relinquish office, the answer no doubt resides in the relative importance of their posts: a governor, unlike a President, may
be able to climb to a higher rung on the political ladder.
At any rate, political advancement seems to be most frequently the motivating factor in gubernatorial resignations.
One case in which it did not figure occurred in 1829
when Sam Houston resigned as Governor of Tennessee because of a quarrel with his wife. He had unjustly accused
her of infidelity, and Mrs. Houston-after verbally scalping
the old Indian fighter-packed up and left. When no
amount of pleading could induce her to return, Houston
felt that his domestic difficulties might undermine public
confidence in him. He wrote to his lieutenant governor:
. . . Although shielded by a perfect consciousness of undiminished claim to the confidence and support of my fellow
citizens, yet delicately circumstanced as I am and by my
own misfortunes, more than by the fault or contrivance of
anyone, overwhelmed by sudden calamities, it is certainly
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due to myself and respectful to the world, that I should retire from a position which, in the public judgment, I might
seem to occupy by questionable authority.10
In recent years a divorced man has twice been nominated
for the Presidency, and to us today Houston's statement
might seem overemotional and unnecessary, but his attitude
was wholly consistent with nineteenth-century morals.
Houston's case was unique. Most governors resign to
accept a federal appointment or to campaign for a higher
office. Martin Van Buren, for example, resigned as Governor
of New York to run for President. When the traditional
question arose as to the status of his successor, Lieutenant
Governor Enos T. Throop, the question was decided by
Silas Wright, then comptroller, in the same manner as his
predecessor had decided the Clinton-Pritcher case. Wright
said that Throop became acting governor, exercising the
powers and duties of the office.11
Five other court cases are reported concerning governors
who resigned. 12 In four cases the men involved quit the
governorship to advance their political careers: Governors
Joseph T. Robinson of Kansas and Francis E. Warren of
Wyoming resigned to take office as United States Senators,
while Governor John W. Griggs of New Jersey became Attorney General of the United States. Governor James H.
Peabody of Colorado resigned in favor of his lieutenant
governor, but remained in the political spotlight and later
became United States Senator. There have been other cases
of gubernatorial resignations, but they did not come before
the courts. While figures are not available, the trend evidenced in the court cases would probably be followed.
In sharp contrast to those situations in which incumbents voluntarily abandon the governor's chair are the
dramas enacted when men are either so hellbent to attain
the office or to hang onto it that they will resort to force.
Governor-elect Eugene Talmadge of Georgia died on December 1, 1946, before publication by the legislature of the
returns verifying his election; M. E. Thompson was the
lieutenant governor-elect. The Talmadge machine had controlled Georgia politics for years, so it came as no surprise
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when the legislature proceeded to name Herman Talmadge,
son of the late Governor-elect, for the office. However,
Georgia's laws provide that the legislature can select a governor only if the people fail to cast a majority of votes for
one candidate. The Georgia Supreme Court, where the contest was taken, decided that Eugene Talmadge, though dead
when the votes were counted, had received a majority, hence
the legislators' choice of Herman Talmadge was void.1B
Then who was governor? Thompson? But he had been
elected lieutenant governor. What about Ellis Arnall, the
incumbent governor? The supreme court said Arnall held
over as governor, not acting governor. On January 18, 1947,
Arnall resigned in favor of Thompson. Herman Talmadge
instantly declared war, establishing a beachhead on Arnall's
doorstep when the latter refused to surrender to the machine, and only quick action by the supreme court made a
peace treaty possible. The Georgia judges endorsed Thompson's right to the governor's chair, but-in a decision oddly
at variance with their earlier ruling-said that Thompson
was acting governor. The case illustrates what can happen
when the law is fuzzy and men are greedy.
An even more fantastic game of Musical Chairs occurred
in Louisiana in 1930 when Louisiana's "Kingfish"-Governor Huey P. Long-was elected to the United States Senate. Lieutenant Governor Paul Narcisse Cyr, a foe of Long's,
took the governor's oath before a notary public on the
theory that Long's election to the Senate vacated the governor's office. The Kingfish, having prevented Cyr's takeover
by calling out the National Guard, maintained that since
Cyr had taken the governor's oath he had deprived himself
of his rights to the office of lieutenant governor, and that
A. 0. King, president pro tern of the State Senate and third
in line to the governorship, automatically had become lieutenant governor. By a coincidence, King happened to be a
member of the Long organization. The whole situation
lapsed into low comedy when W. L. Aldrich, a private citizen with a sense of humor, also took the governor's oath.
"Since there are two governors," Aldrich said, "I see no reason why we shouldn't have threel" Less amusing-since it
demonstrated that Long's hold on the state extended even
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to the judiciary-was the decision of the Louisiana Supreme
Court. It ruled in favor of A. 0. King, adopting Long's
incredible theory which deprived Cyr of the lieutenant governorship on the ground that he had pressed an unconstitutional claim to the office of governor. Justice St. Paul said:
This court has no more authority to inquire into the title
of Huey P. Long . . . than would a court of the United
States be authorized to inquire into the title of Herbert
Hoover, to the office of President of the United States.14
President Hoover was not asked to comment on the case,
but it is doubtful that he would have appreciated either the
reasoning or the analogy.... Long postponed his move to
Washington until 1932 when 0. K. Allen, a Long protege,
was elected governor.

Disability
The reported cases on the problem of gubernatorial disability-there are only two-differ from the Garfield and
Wilson situations because the determination of inability
was made by the courts, not by a cabinet. The case of Governor David H. Goodall of New Hampshire, which deals
with the subject at some length, affords the better example.
Governor Goodall became ill early in 1890. By March 31
his condition was such that he wrote to his attorney general:
Please take such steps as you think necessary to cause
the president of the senate to exercise the powers of the
office of governor during the vacancy caused by my illness.
I am not able to perform the duties of the office, and public
service should not suffer from my inability. 111
Upon receipt of this letter the attorney general petitioned the Supreme Court of New Hampshire for a writ of
mandamus to compel the president of the senate to exercise
the executive powers and duties. Chief Justice Charles Doe's
opinion is the classic one in this field:
From 1784 to 1792 the governor (then styled President
of the State of New Hampshire) was president of the senate.
Instead of his present power of vetoing or approving bills
passed by the senate and house, he had "a vote equal with
any other member" of the senate and also "a casting vote in
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case of a tie," and when his office was vacant all his powers
were exercised by "the senior senator." When the constitution took effect and the legislature met for the inauguration
of the new government, June 2, 1784, Meshech Weare, the
governor-elect, was unable to be present. In brief periods of
his illness and absence, in June, 1784, and February, 1785,
his duties were performed by Woodbury Langdon, senior
senator, acting as governor pro tem. On both occasions
Langdon presided in the senate, by virtue of his provisional
tenure of the governor's office; and on the 8th of June, 1784,
as governor, he sat with the council, and exercised the governor's power (with the required advice and consent of the
council) of signing warrants for the payment of money ....
The authority of this precedent has not been shaken, and it
does not appear that the soundness of the contemporaneous
construction has ever been doubted. 16
The period of New Hampshire history to which Chief
Justice Doe referred coincided with the holding of the Federal Convention in 1787 and the ratification and operation
of the Constitution in 1789. The experience of Governor
Weare in New Hampshire in 1784 and what Doe calls "the
contemporaneous construction" of the state's disability
clause casts considerable light on the thinking of the statesmen of the period. The men who drafted the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 sought to avert the dangers of
an interregnum just as did the delegates to the Federal Convention. The Chief Justice wrote in this connection:
The mischief designed to be prevented was the suspension of executive government by the governor's death,
absence from the state, or disability. . . . The prescribed
remedy is the duty of a substitute to act in cases of necessity.
The services of a substitute may be necessary when the governor's absence or inability is temporary as well as when it
is permanent. . .. In article 49, "vacant by reason of his
death, absence from the state, or otherwise," has a broader
significance if due weight is given to the evidential force llf
the primary and leading purpose that the executive work
shall go on without interruption. An intermittent vacancy,
such as occurred in the time of Governor Weare, may occur
again; and the evils of an interregnum, which article 49 was
intended to prevent, are not to be introduced by technical
reasoning or arbitrary rules... .17
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Since Doe wrote this opinion a scant nine years after the
Garfield case, the use of the words "technical reasoning"
has special significance. By recognizing the difference between temporary and permanent inability, Doe relegated
the Tyler decision to the scrap heap so far as its application
to state succession laws was concerned.
It is apparent that the Chief Justice felt that politics
should not be the primary factor in determining inability,
for his opinion continues:
It is proved by medical testimony that the governor is still

in the physical condition stated in his letter to the attorney
general, and that his disability may be reasonably expected
to last a few weeks and perhaps a few months. It is proved
by the testimony of the secretary of state and the state treasurer that there is executive business demanding immediate
attention, and that the governor's duties should no longer
remain unperformed. The case being one of necessity, article
49 directs the president of the senate to exercise executive
powers until the governor resumes them.1s
Since Governor Goodall himself had declared his inability, the court was not faced with a decision regarding determination of that condition. But Chief Justice Doe also
considered the problem of the "reluctant chief executive":
There might be a case in which the attorney general
would intervene without such request. While a determination of the question of vacancy on a petition of this kind
is not legally requisite to call the president of the senate to
the executive chair, it may be a convenient mode of avoiding embarrassment that might sometimes arise from doubt
and controversy in regard to his authority, and the validity
of his acts. The existence of an executive vacancy is a question of law and fact within the judicial jurisdiction. If the
defendant exercised executive power without a previous
judgment on that question, the legality of his acts could be
contested and determined in subsequent litigation, and the
judicial character of the question does not depend upon the
time when it is brought into court. With adequate legal
process, the consideration and decision of such a question
may be prospective as well as retrospective. 19
In stressing that adequate legal process would insure the
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consideration and decision on disability in advance of the
acting governor's assuming power as well as afterward, the
Chief Justice probably had in mind two writs which are
known in legal language as "quo warranto" and "mandamus." A quo warranto action is brought against an officer of
the government to determine by what right (quo warranto)
he holds office. Mandamus, as the Latin implies, is in the
nature of an order to compel him to perform the functions
of his office. Either of these modes could be used to bring
about a determination of disability by the courts.
The second recorded case concerning gubernatorial disability occurred in Ohio in 1907. The situation here was
significantly different, for the governor had not relinquished
office voluntarily. In a superficial opinion, the Ohio court
showed its ignorance of constitutional law. Scholars are generally agreed that under most constitutional provisions the
alternate or substitute officer should determine disability.
Henry E. Davis wrote that
In the absence of any designation to the contrary, "it may
be taken to be axiomatic that when the Constitution imposes a duty on an officer, to be done by him, he must be
the sole judge when and how to do that duty, subject only
to his responsibility to the people and to the risk of impeachment if he act corruptly or improperly." ...20
Similarly, former Attorney General Herbert Brownell, in a
summary cited by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy,
stated that
By a well-known principle of law, whenever any official by
law or person by private contract is designated to perform
certain duties on the happening of certain contingencies,
unless otherwise specified, that person who bears the responsibility for performing the duties must also determine when
the contingency for the exercise of his powers arises....21
Nevertheless, the Ohio court held that the extreme illness of
the governor did not cause his powers and duties to devolve
upon the lieutenant governor because the governor
had not voluntarily relinquished the office. A self-contained
Lieutenant Governor could not be expected to assume the
function of the Governor upon his own initiative. 22
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Actual practice has given additional weight to Attorney
General v. Taggart, the New Hampshire decision. Governor
John S. Little of Arkansas suffered a nervous breakdown in
1907. Although Little did not resign and was considered
governor for the balance of the term, the president and
president pro tern of the senate exercised the powers and
duties of the office. Governor Chamberlain of Oregon died
in 1910 and was succeeded by Frank M. Benson, the secretary of state. When Benson became incapacitated, Jay Bowerman, president of the senate, acted as governor for the
remainder of the term.2s As late as 1935, the New Hampshire court indicated its support of the Taggart case: a
unanimous decision by the court made the distinction between temporary and permanent inability and permitted
the president pro tem of the senate to act as governor when
that officer was absent from the state.24
Perhaps the most extended case of gubernatorial disability occurred in Illinois in the late l 930's. Following a heart
attack in November, 1938, Governor Henry Homer spent
several months in Florida to regain his health. Despite his
illness he would not surrender his office. He returned to
Illinois in April, 1939. On April 8, just before the state primary, Lieutenant Governor Stelle proclaimed himself acting
governor and called for a special session of the legislature
to meet on the same day that Governor Horner had convened the lawmakers. However, the official seal was affixed
on Governor Horner's call but not on Lieutenant Governor
Stelle's proclamation, and when the legislature met, Stelle
took his seat as presiding officer of the senate. Subsequently
a private citizen brought a mandamus action to compel
Stelle to serve as acting governor. The court held that Governor Homer was a necessary party to the suit; he did not
reside in the county in which the action was brought, and
therefore the court had no jurisdiction. On October 5, 1939,
Homer's secretary signed a "disability certificate" an<i filed
it with the secretary of state. The next day Homer died, and
Stelle at last was able to step in. Illinois had been without a
governor for just a few weeks short of a year.25
Two dramatic cases of gubernatorial disability which
occurred in 1959 were alike only in that in each instance
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the incumbent clung grimly to his office. The case of Governor Earl K. Long made headlines the length and breadth
of the land for nearly a month. According to an impartial
summary of events:
After a week in which [Governor Long] had burst into
profanity on two occasions in the state legislature, he was
flown from Baton Rouge to Galveston, Texas, May 30 for
mental observation in John Sealy Hospital. After medical
testimony that Long was mentally ill and likely to injure
himself or others, Probate Judge Hugh Gibson of Galveston, at the request of the Governor's wife, Blanche, ordered
him held in protective custody at the hospital June 2 pending a court hearing. Long charged in a court petition in
Galveston June 12 that he had been drugged in Louisiana,
bound and taken to Galveston by force. He was released
from John Sealy Hospital June 17 and flown to New Orleans on his promise to enter Ochsner Foundation Hospital
there, which he did. Long stormed out of the hospital June
18 and headed for Baton Rouge in a car, but was intercepted
... by State Police armed with a court order requested by
his wife; he was committed to Southeast Louisiana State
Hospital at Mandeville. In a move that prevented his wife
from opposing his discharge from the hospital Long filed
suit June 19 for a legal separation. Prior to a court hearing
at Covington, La., June 26 Long discharged the director of
state hospitals and the superintendent of the Mandeville
institution and named two new officials, who declared him
sane and a free man. The court then dismissed the proceedings.26
During the period of Long's confinement, Lieutenant Governor Lether Frazer hesitantly took over the gubernatorial
duties-"until I learn something else." Attorney General
Jack Gremillion declared Frazer was acting governor until
Long could resume his job. After being "released" from
Mandeville, Long exercised the duties of governor, but his
physical and mental condition deteriorated. In September
he withdrew from the primary race for governor, ran for
lieutenant governor, and was defeated. The following year
he ran for Congress, won the nomination, and died nine
days later. While the affairs of the state of Louisiana, as well
as its prestige, suffered as a result of this unfortunate se-
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quence of events, the episode did at least dramatize luridly
the woeful state of our succession laws.
The second case occurred in Nebraska. On April 17,
1959, Governor Ralph G. Brooks suffered a stroke while en
route in a plane from Kansas City to Lincoln. The attack
was first characterized as "influenza," then as "diabetes and
complete exhaustion," then as a "slight stroke," and finally
on May l as "cerebral thrombosis." 2 7 Brooks's prolonged
absences because of ill health were toted up in an editorial
on April 28, 1960: during his seventeen months in office,
the Governor had "been hospitalized for 47 days and off the
job for health reasons for a total of about three months." 2 8
On August 24, 1960, Brooks was again hospitalized for treatment of a virus infection; it affected his heart and his condition was termed critical on August 30.29 At this time he was
a candidate for the United States Senate, but Brooks refused
to withdraw from the campaign. The deadline for withdrawal was 5:00 P.M., September 9. At 3:20 P.M. on that day,
in spite of the fact that his lungs were filling with fluid, the
Governor announced that he was "sticking in the Senate
race." He died twenty minutes after making the announcement.80
During Brooks's last illness there was no agreement on
the procedure for determining disability. The attorney general's office issued no official opinion, although that officer
commented to the press that "it was up to the Governor."
Lieutenant Governor Dwight Burney said that any citizen
could call a hearing before the attorney general; the attorney general denied this; the Governor's administrative assistant said that the whole problem was a medical question.
Lieutenant Governor Burney was advised informally that
he could determine the Governor's disability himself, but
he was afraid of the public reaction and the political consequences that would follow such a step, since he was a Republican and Brooks a Democrat.st
In 1961 the Nebraska Legislature passed a bill which
created a board of three men to determine disability. Two
members are to be doctors and the third is the state's chief
justice.82 Oregon recently passed a similar law creating a
disability board composed of the chief justice, the superin-
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tendent of the state hospital at Salem, and the dean of the
University of Oregon Medical College.33
The constitutions of only three states-Alabama, Missis·
sippi, and New Jersey-mention the method of determining
disability. In Alabama the supreme court makes the determination, but can act only in cases of "unsoundness of
mind." In Mississippi the secretary of state submits the
question to the supreme court, and in New Jersey the
supreme court decides, but the legislature instigates the
action. 84 Although the constitutions of Texas and Alaska
provide for the procedure to be prescribed by the legislature, to date these bodies have taken no action.
Commenting on the present practice of the states in his
1961 opinion, Attorney General Kennedy noted that
today with very few exceptions, State Constitutions expressly
or impliedly provide that where the governor is unable to
exercise the powers and duties of his office, the officer next
in line of succession shall discharge them, but only temporarily.•
The inferences to be drawn from this review of State
practice and experience relating to gubernatorial disability
and its bearing upon this problem of presidential inability
have been summarized forcefully by Professor Kallenbach:
" . . . State experience reinforces the point observable in
national experience that situations of various kinds can
and do arise involving inability of the Chief Executive to
exercise his powers and which require devolution of these
powers for an indefinite period of time upon the officer next
in line of succession. It shows that constitutional provisions
on this point are, in effect, self-executing. It shows that
devolution of power in these circumstances can be brought
about by simple acquiescence of the incumbent when he is
able to recognize his incapacity. He does not, by so doing,
remove himself from office, but merely acquiesces in the
operation of the constitutional rule that permits and requires the succeeding officer to exercise the powers of chief
executiveship. The officer named by the constitution or laws
as the one upon whom the authority to act as governor shall
•According to Joseph E. Kallenbach, Presidential Inability, House
Committee Print, 84th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1956), p. 40, forty-six states have
such provisions.
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devolve has no option but t-0 exercise the powers and duties
of that office, even though his doing so does not oust the incumbent from the office of governor permanently. His duty
to so act is an ancillary and conditional function of the
incumbent in the office next in line in the succession. When
and if the cause occasioning the temporary devolution of
power has ceased to be operative, there must be a resumption of his constitutional powers and duties by the temporarily displaced Chief Executive. His assertion of his right
and capacity to reassume the powers and duties of his office
is ordinarily regarded as sufficient to restore them to him." 35
The fact remains, however, that more than half the states
have no procedure for determining when disability exists,
and there is considerable confusion over the whole question.
Many of the state officials queried in a recent survey believed that the state supreme court could determine disability by mandamus or quo warranto proceeding; others felt
that such a procedure was inadequate.as
State court decisions on succession make it apparent
that the "melting pot" label is appropriate to describe our
legal growth as well as our social and genealogical development. The rulings reflect a variety of components, and the
words of the judges often provide clues to the disparate
personalities of the governors. In the Huey Long episode in
Louisiana, political pressure is manifest in the legal language, but such cases are indeed the exception.
An examination of state cases yields four general conclusions:
(1) Few men will voluntarily give up the office of
governor unless by so doing they improve their political
position. A sick executive will stay in office regardless of the
public interest, while the lieutenant governor stands helplessly by, waiting for death to determine disability.
(2) The state judiciary, on the other hand, repudiates
by implication such action by the governor. When a case
reaches court, the judges uniformly hold that there should
be no lapse of executive power-that vigor in the executive
is an essential of good government. If sometimes the judges
have done violence to the letter of state laws, or even the
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state constitution, it has been in order to uphold one of
the most ancient principles of Anglo-American law-the
public interest demands that there shall be no interregnum
in the executive.
(3) To implement this general purpose the courts have
interpreted the succession paragraph to affirm and reaffirm
precedents established as early as Jamestown. They have
adapted the old practice of deputizing the lieutenant governor, the successor now being designated "acting governor."
The Tyler precedent has a few adherents among the states'
judiciaries, but its existence is seldom recognized.
(4) By disregarding the Tyler precedent, the state courts
have been able to act freely in distinguishing between temporary and permanent inability. They have acted as our
forefathers looked to us to do, using experience and wisdom
to adapt the state constitutions to modern needs.

Chapter VII

A Basis for Action
Since the final solution to the problems of presidential
inability inevitably depends on congressional action, it may
not be amiss to review the record of congressional considerations of this matter. As summarized by Ruth Silva, it is not
very heartening:
The constitutional provision for the exercise of presidential power during periods of inability received practically
no attention until the serious and prolonged illness of President Garfield. The [Presidential SuccessionJ Act of 1792 did
not deal with inability; and the poorly reported debates do
not show that the Congress even discussed the matter at
the time the law was passed. In 1856, when the Senate Committee on the Judiciary was commissioned to study the
whole succession problem, the Committee did not consider
this particular aspect of the subject. At least, presidential
inability was not mentioned in the Committee's report. After
President Garfield's illness of eighty days, the Forty-seventh,
the Forty-eighth, and the Forty-ninth Congresses discussed
the meaning of "inability," its extent and duration, and
how it should be established. Instead of dealing with the
problem which had so recently alarmed the country, however, the Congress named a statutory successor to act as
President during periods of vacancy or inability in the
offices of both President and Vice President.
After the enactment of this law the subject of presidential inability was again neglected until the illness of President Wilson. During the eighteen months of his disability,
proposals for dealing with the situation were introduced in
the Congress, but all were killed in committee. When presidential succession was discussed in the Seventy-ninth and
the Eightieth Congresses, inability was presented as the real
problem. It was then urged that a joint committee be established to examine all aspects of presidential succession. But
the Congress created no such committee, ignored all questions connected with inability, and legislated without benefit of an extensive study.
In terms of actual occurrence inability is the most
pressing problem involved in presidential succession. Presi106
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dential power has never passed to a statutory successor; but
two cases of inability have jeopardized the public interest.
Yet Congress has enacted three laws establishing a statutory
line of succession and has done nothing to provide for cases
of disability....1
The unavailing efforts in more recent years to secure congressional action have been described in preceding chapters,
and as this book goes to press it appears unlikely that a bill
on presidential inability will be passed during the second
session of the Eighty-seventh Congress.
Apathy and indifference undoubtedly have been responsible in great part for a century of legislative inaction, but
it would be unfair to say that this is still the case. While it
is true that too many members of Congress are unaware of
the numerous ramifications of the problem, those who are
sincerely concerned and who have made a serious attempt
to explore it have felt, as Senator Kefauver points out, honest doubt as to the form which either a constitutional
amendment or a statute should take. Silva has stated that

"the principal reason for neglect of this subject seems

to

be

the difficulty of finding a solution which would be adequate,
constitutional, and desirable."2 It might be added that history, common sense, and the pressures of our time demand
that a sound legislative program provide a plan for determining presidential inability which is "swift, small, and uncomplicated" as well as trustworthy.3
The procedural and substantive difficulties inherent in
the problem can perhaps be stated most clearly in question
form: (1) Is a constitutional amendment necessary or can
the gap be filled by statute? and (2) What should be the content of either the amendment or the statute?
These were the questions to which the Nebraska Law
Review addressed itself in a research project which had its
inception in September, 1960, at a time when President
Eisenhower's illnesses, the carnival case of Governor Earl
Long, and the fatal illness of Governor Ralph Brooks were
very much in the foreground. During the course of this
nineteen-month study of presidential and gubernatorial disability, which was directed by the present writer, a detailed
investigation was undertaken of every disability case to
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reach the courts-and many which did not. The constitutions of all the states in the Union were scrutinized, and
colonial precedents were unearthed and carefully perused
for the first time. This study, the most comprehensive yet
made, led to several conclusions which may prove useful in
finding that much-needed "swift, small, and uncomplicated"
plan for determining presidential disability. 4
I. THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT

ls an Amendment Necessary1
The failure of attempts to enact inability legislation, as
Senator Kefauver has indicated, has resulted as much from
confusion over procedure as from disagreements on substantive provisions: the Congress has never been certain
whether the gap can be closed by a passage of a law, or
whether a constitutional amendment is required.
There is a natural reluctance to make changes in our
basic governmental blueprint. This was the feeling expressed by former President Hoover in a letter of March 15,
1962: "It seems to me that an amendment to the Constitution should be avoided." And he then asked: "Could not an
act of Congress duly signed by the President serve the purpose?"•5 Herbert Brownell's reasoning is relevant to this
query:
Ordinary legislation would only throw one more doubtful element into the picture, for the statute's validity could
not be tested until the occurrence of the presidential inability, the very time at which uncertainty must be precluded.
Most of the proposals involve a transfer or diminution of
the Vice President's constitutional power and no statute can
do this. Thus, a statute which contained the additional
measures needed-a designation of persons to share with the
Vice President the power to make the initial decision, or a
provision for a solution of disputes between the President
and Vice President-would alter the existing powers of the
President and Vice President. Even a statute which sought
•After studying the proposal by Cornelius W. Wickersham (see page
117), Mr. Hoover wrote to Mr. Wickersham that he felt the amendment
proposed is "the most interesting to date."
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to do nothing more than declare the original intent of the
framers would have to be construed in the light of previous
constitutional interpretations and the precedents based on
those interpretations, and would therefore be valueless in
resolving doubt and uncertainty. 6
A majority of scholars favor an amendment to the Constitution.• Their conclusion is reinforced by the review of
congressional considerations of inability which opens this
chapter: as Silva has pointed out, several federal succession
statutes have been enacted, not one of which has faced up to
the problem of disability. Moreover, the experience of the
states since 1789 indicates a reluctance to adopt a statutory solution in the absence of a clear-cut constitutional
authority.••
Those who assert that provision for presidential disability may be accomplished by statute would seem to find
support in some state constitutions. In the Nebraska Constitution, for example, the wording of the disability clause is
such that disability legislation could be enacted by the
legislature under the authority given it by the State Constitution to adopt "all laws necessary to carry into effect the
provisions of this Constitution" (Nebraska Constitution, Art.
XVII, Sec. VI). The Constitution of the United States has
a similar "necessary and proper" clause, but the disability
clause itself bars statutory action. According to Article II,
Section 1, Clause 5,
•"Among those who recently expressed themselves in favor of an
amendment to the Constitution upon the ground that it is either necessary or desirable are: Stephen K. Bailey, Hon. Peter Frelinghuysen,
Richard C. Huber, Joseph E. Kallenbach, Arthur Krock, Jack W. Peltason, C. Herman Pritchett, Arthur E. Sutherland, Hon. John S. Sparkman (Presidential Inability, House Committee Print, 84th Cong., 2nd
Sess., pp. 59-6'). Edgar Waugh, Charles S. Rhyne" (Hearing, Special
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Problem of Presidential Inability, 85th Cong., lst Sess., pp. 127, 191).
••The danger of premature enactment of a statute without exhaustive study of the Constitution involved was pointed out by the author
in "One Strike and You're Out," New Hampshire Bar journal, July,
1962. The Nebraska Legislature adopted a gubernatorial disability
statute without adequate consideration; subsequent study shows it is
subject to attack on at least two sound constitutional grounds.
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... Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal,
Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and
the Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as
President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. (Emphasis added).
Thus because of the peculiar wording of this section, Congress is excluded from the right to act in the case of
presidential disability only.
Nonetheless, the minority group supporting a statutory
solution continue to base their contention that no constitutional amendment is required on the "necessary and proper"
clause.• Cornelius W. Wickersham, past chairman of the
Committee on the Federal Constitution of the New York
State Bar Association, has commented on their stand in his
1962 article, "Presidential Inability: Procrastination, Apathy
and the Constitution":
Although some who have studied the problem feel that
Congress has power to deal with the problem under the
"necessary and proper" provisions of the Constitution, others are clearly of the opinion that only a constitutional
amendment would be satisfactory. The latter rely on the
fact that the "necessary and proper" clause applies only to
those matters to which basic policies are laid down in the
Constitution and does not authorize Congress to fill gaps in
the policies so laid down. The latter view seems to be supported by case law•• and furthermore, where a constitutional problem of such vital importance, involving not only
legal questions but widespread and national implications, is
concerned it would seem to be most unwise and probably
of small effect to leave the matter to legislation of doubtful
cons ti tu tionali ty. 7
•Among those who currently assert that proposed plans of presidential inability may be carried out by statute are Everett S. Brown,
Edward S. Corwin, William F. Crosskey, Charles Fairman, David Fellman, James Hart, Arthur N. Holcombe, Mark DeW. Howe. Opinions of
the Attorneys General, XLII, No. 5 (August 2, 1961), 31 n .
.. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U. S. 46 (1907); United States v.
Harris, 106 U. S. 629 (188!1). These cases state the general proposition
that Congress can legislate only on subjects where the power to legislate
has been granted by the Constitution.

A BASIS FOR ACTION

111

If a solution to the inability problem should be sought
through legislation, it is certain that a lawsuit would be
brought to test the validity of any statute passed. And the
chances are, as Wickersham and Brownell have pointed out,
that the action would be brought at a time when the President was disabled-a time when litigation, whether speedy
or prolonged, would be least desirable.
An impressive array of lawyers and political scientists is
on the record as favoring a constitutional amendment to
settle the inability question. But what are the feelings of
the men on Capitol Hill? How does Congress look upon
such a solution? What inferences might be drawn from
Eisenhower's attempts to secure congressional action?
For a time in 1958 members of the Eisenhower official
family were highly skeptical that any inability amendment
could be passed. Undoubtedly their thinking was influenced
by the shellacking which the administration had just taken
when President Eisenhower's proposed amendment was before the Congress. In retrospect, however, it appears that
there was nothing wrong with the procedural route; the
trouble was that in prescribing the method for determining
inability, the proposed amendment tried to accomplish too
much.
Congress, it is axiomatic, will not pass an amendment
which is too complicated or too controversial, and to emphasize method is to emphasize a major area of disagreement.• Moreover, method can be handled by statute at a
later date. Since Congress had not yet been sold on the procedure to be followed, the inclusion of the provision on
•In answers to questions posed by the House Committee on the
Judiciary in March, 1957, five of those polled thought Congress should
determine inability, six that the Vice President should be the sole
judge, and three that the Cabinet should decide (but then so qualified
their answers as to nullify them). A number of others thought that the
determination should be made by commissions and boards. See House
Committee Print, 85th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 26, 1957, pp. 11-12. The
men polled were political scientists whose knowledge of the problem
supposedly transcends that of the legislators who would be required
to make the final choice and pass a law on the method to be used.
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method not only made the measure unnecessarily controversial, but also put the cart before the horse.
Cornelius Wickersham's remarks on this "package deal"
kind of proposal bring out a further important point:
... some proposals for an amendment ... endeavor to prescribe the methods to be used for determination of the facts
relating to inability and to set up machinery for determination of that question both as to the commencement as well
as to its termination. But, the difficulty with this course is
that the freezing of any one method into the Constitution
would make any necessary future correction extremely difficult because it might require an additional constitutional
amendment. It is better constitutional practice to prescribe
the principles to govern action and to leave to the legislature the selection of methods by which those principles can
be best implemented under the "necessary and proper"
clause. This gives elasticity without imperiling the basic design. The danger of freezing a particular method is avoided
by giving to Congress the power to select the method. Correction or improvement can thus be made at any time by
the enactment of new legislation within the framework of
the amendment. 8
Wickersham has captured the spirit of the founding
fathers, who recognized that they were neither infallible nor
all-knowing and who strove to make the Constitution adaptable to future times. Former President Truman has expressed something of this same idea: "I have always felt that
there is great danger in writing too much into the Constitution. We must have a certain flexibility to meet changing
conditions." 9 A rigid amendment, incorporating a fixed
method, would make future changes unduly complicated
and would be out of harmony with the concept of flexibility
which pervades the entire Constitution.

What Should an Amendment Include?
Assuming that a constitutional amendment is the only
way to settle the inability question beyond any doubt, what
should be the scope of such a measure?
The foregoing discussion has provided some positive and
negative indications as to what might prudently be included.
The experience of the Eisenhower administration and the
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remarks of Wickersham and Truman demonstrate the desirability of removing from consideration the primary question
about the power of Congress to enact any method, of emphasizing areas of agreement, and of adhering to principles
inherent in our system of government. In the search for a
constitutional solution, the differences of opinion are more
procedural than substantive; the areas of agreement are
numerous and basic. The following listing of them will
serve as a guide in staking out the terrain the amendment
might cover as well as affording a convenient framework
for discussion.
l. In case of permanent inability-the death of the President, his resignation, his conviction by impeachment, or his
removal for other cause-the Vice President succeeds to the
Presidency.
Seven Presidents have established the custom that when
a President dies, the Vice President becomes President, not
Acting President. Few people seriously argue that when a
President dies the Vice President should be considered the
"servant or agent of the deceased President." Although it
was the essence of colonial practice that the alternate was a
deputy, no one suggested that he should become an agent
or deputy for a dead man. And although John Tyler's assumption of office in 1841 "might readily have been questioned had historical materials on the framers' intent been
on hand, the fact remains that it has been relied on for the
proposition that the Vice President becomes President when
the elected President dies-a proposition scarcely to be questioned today." 10
2. In case of temporary presidential inability, the Vice
President succeeds only to the powers and duties of the
office as the Acting President, and not to the office itself.
See pages 16-20. According to Attorney General Kennedy, "almost every student of the Constitution who was
recently canvassed to express an opinion" was in agreement
on this point.• 11 Wickersham, referring to the differences of
•Included in this group of distinguished scholars of the Constitution
were: Stephen K. Bailey, Princeton University; Everett S. Brown, University of Michigan; Edward S. Corwin, Princeton, N. J.; William W.
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opinion and confusion in the discussions during the series
of congressional hearings after President Eisenhower's illness, remarks that "it seems fair to say that the majority felt
that in any event the Vice President should not succeed to
the office of President but should only be an Acting President until the disability ended or until a new President was
elected ..." 12
3. Upon termination of the President's inability prior to
the election, he shall resume office.
See pages 79, 86, 103-104. In the opinion written for
President Kennedy, Attorney General Kennedy comments
on the minority position:
Unquestionably, those scholars who claim the Vice President becomes President upon the latter's inability would
assert that the Vice President may not be divested of his
authority by recovery of, or action thereafter by, the President. In my opinion, this view does violence to the letter
and spirit of the Constitution, and would defeat the will of
the people.
Former Attorneys General Brownell and Rogers were in
agreement that the President could reclaim the discharge of
the powers and duties of his office merely by announcing
that his inability had terminated, and that he is ready now
to execute his office. [See Brownell, "Presidential Disability," p. 204.] In my opinion this interpretation of the Constitution is clearly correct. The force of popular opinion,
the people's sense of constitutional propriety, and the cooperation of Congress could be counted on to support the
President's decision if he acted properly.1s
It should be noted, however, that former President TruCrosskey, University of Chicago Law School; Charles Fairman, Law
School of Harvard University; David Fellman, University of Wisconsin;
Thomas K. Finletter, Esq., New York, N. Y.; James Hart, University of
Virginia; Arthur N. Holcombe, Harvard University; Mark DeW. Howe,
Law School of Harvard University; Richard G . Huber, Tulane University; Joseph E. Kallenbach, University of Michigan; Jack W. Peltason,
University of Illinois; J. Roland Pennock, Swarthmore College; C. Herman Pritchett, University of Chicago; John H. Romani, the Brookings
Institute; and Arthur E. Sutherland, Law School of Harvard University.
Presidential Inability, House Committee Print, 85th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1957), pp. 49-52." Note appearing in Opinions of the Attorneys General, XLll, No. 5 (August 2, 1961), 19-20.
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man, in his disability proposal, specified that in the event
a President is unable to perform his duties and the Congress by a two-thirds vote designates the Vice President as
President, the stricken President would not be able to repossess the office during the remainder of the term, even
though he experiences a complete recovery.14 (See Appendix
V for the full text of the Truman proposal.)
4. The difference between permanent and temporary inability should be clearly stated, recognizing the Tyler precedent in the case of permanent inability and eliminating it
as a consideration in the case of temporary inability, which
would be governed by (2) above.
Making a clear-cut distinction between permanent and
temporary disability is mandatory before consideration can
be given to other aspects of the problem. This step, so long
urged, would remedy after nearly 175 years the mistake
made by the Committee on Style and restore the original
intent of the framers of the Constitution. The experience
of the states, as evidenced by the opinions of their courts,
has long since indicated the desirability of distinguishing
between the various situations. The states have been able
to accomplish this through judicial action, but presidential
disability, existing solely within the confines of the executive branch, is removed from determination by the courts
or Congress.
In view of the questions raised by the Garfield and Wilson Cabinets, it might be well to define the leg-al status of
a disabled President during the period a Vice President acts
as President. Such a rationale may not be necessary, but the
question of "how ... the duties can be separated from the
office" 111 has arisen many times in state and national history,
and it would be reassuring to have this dilemma concisely
resolved. The explanation given by Justice Alexander Anderson of California has been overlooked for many years
because the case dealt with the temporary disability (absence) of a justice, not a governor. However the same principle applies. Justice Anderson said:
... the vested rights of the term attaches to the person of
the elected incumbent, but ... the functions of the office,
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in certain contingencies, separate from him temporarily,
and adhere to a distinct class of powers within the department, for the use, benefit and protection of that great public
for which the government was created. 16

5. Commencement and termination of a disability shall
be determined by such method as Congress shall by law provide, so long as that method is compatible with the system
of checks and balances provided for in the Constitution for
the maintenance of the separate and coequal branches of
the government.
Students of the presidential disability problem will find
in the many and various proposals for its solution repeated
affirmations of the necessity for maintaining a balance between the three branches of the government, assuring continuation of the traditional checks which one has against
the other, and preventing the dominance of one over the
other. For examples, one needs only to look to the writings
of our living former Presidents. Truman's suggested method
for determining presidential disability involves "representatives of the three branches of government"; Hoover believes
that "the method of determining 'inability' or 'recovery' requires consideration of the spirit of the separation of powers
in the Government ..."; and Eisenhower's position in this
regard, which was made abundantly clear to the author in
a personal interview, has been well expressed by members
of his administration. His concern lest "a major shift in the
checks and balances among the three divisions of the government ... result" is stressed by former Attorney General
Brownell.17
Senator Kefauver, in the introduction to this book,
makes it clear that the legislative branch is no less interested
in preserving the separation of powers; and Chief Justice
Warren, speaking for the Supreme Court, gave this doctrine
as the primary reason why members of the Court should not
serve on any disability commission (see page 71).
The disability clause should be and must be harmonized
with the Twentieth Amendment. The so-called Lame Duck
amendment recognizes the distinction between temporary
and permanent disability by providing that if, at the time
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fixed for beginning the term of the President, the Presidentelect has died, then the Vice President-elect "shall become
President." The amendment further provides that if a President has not been chosen by the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if a President-elect fails to qualify, then
the Vice President-elect shall "act as President until the
President qualifies" (see page 19). As the Constitution now
stands, the disability clause, the interpretation put upon it
by seven Presidents, and the Twentieth Amendment are at
odds with each other.
These five areas of agreement are embodied in the following proposal for an amendment made by the Committee
on the Federal Constitution of the New York State Bar
Association:
In case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of
his Death or Resignation, the said Office shall devolve on
the Vice President. In Case of the Inability of the President
to Discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the
said Powers and Duties shall devolve on the Vice President,
until the Inability be Removed. The Congress may by law
provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring
what Officer shall then be President, or in case of Inability,
act as President, and such Officer shall be or act as President
accordingly, until a President shall be elected, or, in the case
of Inability, until the Inability shall earlier be removed.
The commencement and termination of any Inability shall
be determined by such method as Congress shall by law
provide.us
This proposal could be readily expanded to include the
proposed rationale for the distinction between temporary
and permanent disability. So that there would be no possibility for further confusion about the scope of the powers
given to Congress, it would seem wise to remove the word
"both"; and it would, of course, be essential to add a qualifying clause to the last sentence: "so long as that method is
compatible with the system of checks and balances and the
maintenance of the three separate and coequal branches of
government."
•See also Appendix III, Proposal of Nebraska Law Review.
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In such a form, the amendment would be logical and on
sound ground historically and legally. It would, in the
author's opinion find support from scholars, past and present Attorneys General, and the former Presidents. With
such support, the prospect of passage of the amendment
would be far more favorable than before. Once it had been
adopted by Congress, ratification by two-thirds of the states
could be anticipated within ten to twelve months.
Contrary to popular opinion, "amending the Constitution" need not be a process prolonged over a period of
years. The Seventeenth Amendment, providing for the election of senators by popular vote, took thirteen and a half
months; the Nineteenth (woman suffrage) fifteen months;
and the Twenty-first (repealing the Eighteenth Amendment)
less than ten months. The public's increasing awareness of
the urgency of inability legislation no doubt would expedite the process in the present case.
2. THE DETERMINATION OF INABILITY
After the amendment has been ratified, it would be up
to the Congress to choose a sound method for determining
inability. While passage of an amendment of the type discussed above would not automatically insure a quick agreement on the modus operandi, there would be a climate of
cooperation and accomplishment far more conducive to
productive action than the present rather competitive atmosphere.

Should Determination of Inability Remain
within the Executive Branch1
Most of the procedures proposed to date have suggested
that the determination of inability be made by the legislative branch, the Supreme Court, or a combination of the
two with officials from the executive branch.• In this con•The American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform has proposed a commission with representatives from all three branches. The proposal is questionable on several
counts, including possible violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
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nection the suggested constitutional provision requiring
compatibility with the doctrine of separation of powers becomes a paramount consideration. Which of these procedures is compatible with the maintenance of three separate,
coordinate, and coequal departments of government? Let us
consider the methods proposed in the light of this basic
requirement.
It has frequently been suggested that the Supreme Court
would offer an impartial forum of respected men who could
determine presidential inability. Study of proposals incorporating this view shows that they not only would violate
the doctrine of separation of powers, but would be eminently impractical. It will be remembered that two Chief
Jnstices, Roger B. Taney and Earl Warren, rejected suggestions that they take part in the succession procedure at
any stage (see pages 11 and 71 ). Taney, in refusing to confer on the question of whether or not Tyler was to take the
oath prescribed for the President, said in part that he
wanted to be careful lest it appear he was intruding in the
business of a coordinate branch of the government. Warren,
in his letter to Representative Keating, requested that the
members of the Supreme Court be excluded from participating in the determination of inability. The sound legal
basis for this request has been illustrated by Wickersham:
The policy of the federal courts to avoid political questions
was well expressed by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove
v. Green [328 U.S. 549, 553-54] as follows:
From the determination of such issues this Court has
traditionally held aloof. It is hostile to a democratic system to involve the judiciary in the politics of the people.
And it is not less pernicious if such judicial intervention
in an essentially political contest be dressed up in the
abstract phrases of the law.
Thus, it is safe to assume that neither quo warranto nor
mandamus is available in a federal court. Aside from the
basic question of the correct interpretation of the Constitution, solution by court action presumably cannot be relied
upon.
Even if the courts were willing to take jurisdiction it
might require months of litigation before a final decision
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was reached. During that time no officer of the Government
would be sure of his right to carry out the order given to
him by either of the claimants. The result could easily be a
complete paralysis of our Government and of its armed
forces in case of war, rebellion or invasion.19
Wickersham further points out that the disability question came before the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in
the Taggart case (see pages 96 ff.) because the attorney
general instigated the action at the request of the governor
himself. Wickersham's clear implication is that if the governor had been unconscious, or had not initiated the action
by his letter to the attorney general, or had in fact opposed
such action, the court would have hesitated to assume jurisdiction. That Wickersham's implication is justified by practical experience is shown by the Ohio case (see page 99)
in which the State Supreme Court refused jurisdiction because the action was not initiated by the governor. The
experience of the United States with its Presidents and governors is replete with examples which substantiate Wicker-

sham's argument that a chief executive may not step aside
voluntarily, and that failing such action by the incumbent
the courts may refuse to take jurisdiction.
Noel Dowling, Professor Emeritus of Constitutional Law
at Columbia University has put forward a second and even
more cogent reason £.or excluding the Supreme Court from
any statutory scheme of determining disability: the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court does not include such
matters. Under the present Constitution, the United States
Supreme Court would not issue a mandamus or quo warranto proceedings as was done in the Taggart case; a constitutional amendment would be required to give them that
power.2° Would such action be practical?
The wisdom of removing the justices from consideration
for any inability commission is supported historically by
the Hayes-Tilden election dispute of 1876. In the presidential election of that year, the balloting in several states and
the counting and tabulating of the vote, was so clearly characterized by fraud on both sides that it was impossible to
determine which of the nominees was entitled to the electoral votes of those states. Congress consequently created a
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special commission to pass judgment on the disputed votes.
The commission was composed of five senators (three Republicans and two Democrats), five members from the
House of Representatives (three Democrats and two Republicans), and five justices of the Supreme Court. It was intended that there be two Republicans and two Democrats
from the last-named body, and the deciding vote was to go
to Justice David Davis of Illinois, an Independent. But
Davis was unexpectedly elected to the Senate, and resigned
from the Court to accept the office. Since the remaining
justices were all Republicans, the commission decided the
election disputes in Hayes's favor by a straight eight-to-seven
party-line vote. Millions of Americans were infuriated at
this demonstration of partisan politics by supposedly nonpartisan Supreme Court justices, and for more than twenty
years the Court was criticized for taking part in the resolution of the question. No doubt the Warren Court had this
affair in mind when it pointed out the impropriety of its
members serving on a disability commission-and of course
the legal arguments presented by Warren have a basis which
no one has been able to refute.
Former President Truman has advocated deciding inability by a vote of the Congress. In 1957 he proposed that
when a President is stricken with an illness ... there should
come into being a Committee of Seven composed of representatives of the three branches of the Government. . . .
This Committee would select a board of leading medical
authorities drawn from top medical schools of the Nation.
This medical board, thus chosen, would then make the necessary examinations, presenting their findings to the Committee of Seven. Should the findings of the medical board
indicate that the President is unable to perform his duties,
and that he is, in fact, truly incapacitated and not merely
stricken with a transitory illness, then the Committee of
Seven would so inform the Congress. Congress would then
have the right to act, and by a two-thirds vote of the full
membership declare the Vice President as President. 21
This proposal would hardly assure swift and decisive action.
Nor would the public place confidence in a nonpolitical
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decision by a body which, by its very nature, is political.
After the experience with Congress during the Johnson impeachment trial, few scholars support the proposal.
The Federal Convention itself refused to enlarge the
powers of Congress over the executive. When the delegates
discussed impeachment procedure, it was suggested that the
practice of the states be followed: that, is, when impeachment charges are filed, the President (like the governors) be
suspended pending the outcome of the trial. James Madison,
the father of the Constitution, objected in these words:
The President is made too dependent already on the
Legislature, by the power of one branch to try him in consequence of an impeachment by the other. This intermediate
suspension will put him in the power of one branch only.
They can, at any moment, in order to make way for the
functions of another who will be more favorable to their
views, vote a temporary removal of the existing magistrate. 22
Madison won his point and the Convention refused to extend the power of Congress over the President. The vote
was three states to eight. The analogy to disability is clear:
temporary removal of an executive could be accomplished
as easily by letting Congress decide his disability. Congress
would not need to impeach a President; they could declare
him permanently disabled! The same principle is involved
and the same reasoning should apply in rejecting any such
proposal.
History, experience, and common sense dictate that, if
we are to preserve the doctrine of separation of powers and
maintain three separate and coequal departments of government, the determination of presidential inability must
remain within the executive branch. In Herbert Brownell's
words:

If the power of initial determination is diverted from
the executive branch, or even is shared in some fashion with
those outside the executive, a way is opened for harassment
of a President for political motives. A major shift in the
checks and balances among the three divisions of the federal
government could well result.2 3
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Should the Vice President Determine Inability?
The evolution which has taken place in the office of
Vice President is suggested by a comparison of the role of
Chester A. Arthur, who was excluded from the deliberations
of the Cabinet during Garfield's illness, and the part played
by Richard Nixon during Eisenhower's sicknesses. One
might even say there was a trend for the Vice President to
revert to the status of the "Deputie Governour" of the colonial period, and the Eisenhower and Kennedy agreements
could be characterized as an attempt by the President to
"deputize" the Vice President, even as the colonial governors deputized their alternates. Unless the legal procedure
for choosing our Vice Presidents is modified, or unless there
is a change which would eliminate his ties to Congress and
place him solely in the executive branch (Hoover's suggestion that he become an Assistant President), it is reasonable
to expect that modern Presidents will continue to delegate
as many duties as legally possible to the Vice President. He
will no doubt continue to sit in on Cabinet meetings, and
the trend toward deputization probably will increase rather
than diminish. Thus, the Vice President will be much better
trained to succeed to the Presidency than were his predecessors.
But if the office of Vice President has changed, the system of choosing the Vice President has not. Tyler, as we
have seen, became Vice President because of a political deal
with Clay; Arthur's nomination was an attempt to placate
the Stalwart faction; Marshall admittedly was Wilson's second choice. In recent times the President's potential successor too often has been chosen on the basis of geography,
and the presidential ticket is still too often a marriage of
convenience. It is by no means inconceivable that a personal or political antagonism could develop between some
future President and his running mate.
In planning for disability, how can the growth of the
Vice Presidency be recognized on the one hand, and its
static potential for disagreements on the other? Perhaps the
answer is indicated by the common denominator in the conduct of Vice Presidents during presidential disability. In
the three major instances of temporary inability, Vice Presi-
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dents Arthur, Marshall, and Nixon made no attempt to
determine disability, although at least Nixon had reason to
believe the legal right wa& his.
Since history has shown that the Vice President will not
initiate action for determining inability, why not remove
him completely from this determination? He would then
come into office, temporarily or permanently, not only well
versed in the business of the executive department but free
from the personal embarrassment and public criticism
which would attend his passing upon his own advancement.

What Should Be the Cabinet's Role?
In his letter to Senator Kefauver (the full text appears
in Appendix V), former President Hoover pointed out that
"the President and Vice President are elected as the chosen
leaders of a political party with declared mandates, principles, solutions of issues, and promises to the people." But an
opposition political party may-and frequently does-control one or both of the Houses of Congress, in which case
those in control "are, in practice, mostly opposed to the
mandates or promises upon which the President and Vice
President are elected by the people. All of which leads me
to the generalization that a President's inability to serve
. . . should be determined by the leading officials in the
executive branch, as they are of the party having the
responsibilities determined by the election." 24
Certainly the political consequences of presidential illnesses cannot be overlooked, but any method for determining disability must take into account that the issue is
primarily medical, not political. Election to the Presidency
of the United States does not change a man's anatomy or
physiology; he is still mortal, with lungs, heart, digestive
and nervous systems like the rest of us. The former Presidents themselves are the first to bear testimony to this fact.
Eisenhower has shown by his rigid adherence to the regimen
prescribed by his doctors that he recognizes the critical role
played by medical men in keeping a President fit. Truman
recommended that his "Committee of Seven" select "a board
of leading medical authorities drawn from the top medical
schools of the nation"; 2 ~ and Hoover in his letter suggested
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that a commission made up of chief officials of departments
or agencies within the executive branch "should seek the
advice of a panel of experienced physicians or surgeons" in
determining inability.26
During the illnesses of Garfield and Eisenhower it was
the Cabinet which ran the government of the United States,
and it was the Cabinet, along with Dr. Grayson and Mrs.
Wilson, which presided over the operations of the executive
during Wilson's long incapacity. During Wilson's illness two
bills were introduced to give the Cabinet the power to determine inability.• According to Silva,
Hearings on these bills disclosed the belief that the
Cabinet is the safest body in which to vest the power. Determination by the Cabinet would cause the least friction
because the decision would be made by the President's own
appointees. Cabinet members presumably are his friends
and are not eager to displace him. Moreover, the Cabinet is
in the best position to know whether a President is really
disabled or not.27
But the Wilson case reminds us that there is always the possibility that the palace guard can play a "house game" and
fail to brief the Cabinet fully on the President's condition.
Nor can we forget that Wilson's Secretary of State was compelled to resign because he had convened the Cabinet.
The historical difficulties in leaving the determination
of inability to the Cabinet could be obviated if an impartial
medical board were to be established (see below). The board
•H.R. 12629, introduced by Martin B. Madden of Illinois, and H.R.
12647, introduced by Clifton N. McArthur of Oregon, 66th Congress.
"The Madden bill provided that, whenever the President became unable to perform his duties for six consecutive weeks, the question of
his inability was to be made the subject of official inquiry by the
Cabinet. The bill empowered the Secretary of State to convene the
Cabinet for this purpose, and provided that the determination was to
be made by a majority vote. The removal of a disability was to be
established in the same manner. The McArthur bill contained similar
provisions. Madden thought his bill superior to McArthur's because it
made the Secretary of State legally responsible for calling the Cabinet
together in case of a President's inability. He objected to Wilson's
ruling that a President's inability prevented the Cabinet from functioning" (Silva, Presidential Succession, p. 108 n.).
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would inform the Cabinet and the public of the President's
condition, and the Cabinet, e"<:lusive of the Vice President,
would make the final determination of disability or recovery, using the report of the board as a guide to both instances.

Is a Medical Board Necessary? How Would It Operate?
Evidence of the increasingly large part doctors play in
relation to the Presidency can be found in the extralegal
physical examinations of present-day Chief Executives. That
such examinations take place is a tacit, if not express, admission that perhaps preventive medicine should apply to
a President as well as corporation executive. The trend for
presidential candidates to take physical examinations is also
indicative of the growing awareness on the part of both politicians and voters that the people of the United States have
an interest in the President's general health as well as his
condition if he should be ill.
But the fact remains that presidential physical examinations are still discretionary, and what the public is told of
the results of such examinations is still up to the President
and his official family. Moreover presidential physicians are
usually personal friends of the President, biased in his favor
to a greater or lesser extent. We have seen that Dr. Grayson
told a series of half-truths to Wilson's Cabinet; that the
initial diagnosis of a coronary thrombosis was overridden by
Harding's personal physician, General Sawyer; that Cleveland's cancer operation was concealed from all but one of
his Cabinet members, to say nothing of the public (Dr. John
F. Erdman later observed that at the time of the Cleveland
operation and convalescence "he did more lying than in all
the rest of his life put together"28); that at least two twentieth-century Presidents-Wilson and Franklin Rooseveltignored the advice of their physicians with disastrous consequences; and that Roosevelt, according to his own son, did
not inform Dr. Ross T. Mcintire of two seizures.
Surely these lessons of history and human nature point
to the necessity of enacting legislation requiring periodic
physical examinations of the President by a board of physicians. But how can such a procedure be kept within the
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executive branch and at the same time removed from presidential domination?
An answer is suggested in the example of the organization of the Secret Service, which protects the President from
outside threats to his life and well-being. The White House
Detail is responsible to the Secretary of the Treasury, who
in this regard is in turn responsible to the Congress, not to
the President. The Secret Service may veto presidential activities which might endanger the Chief Executive's life,
and though there are times when they resent the interference and inconvenient precautionary measures "Presidents
usually accept the laws of the land and follow Secret Service
advice with little or no question." 29 The organization of the
Secret Service could, by analogy, provide the rationale for
setting up an impartial board of physicians charged with the
responsibility of protecting the President from ills, including
that of overworking himself. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare could select the doctors on a rotating
basis from a list provided by the Civil Service Commission.
The board of physicians would be responsible to the Secretary, who in turn would be responsible to the Congress, not
the President, for the health of the Chief Executive-just as
the Secretary of the Treasury is responsible to the Congress
for his safety.
Doctors uniformly recommend at least one comprehensive physical a year for the average adult male. It would be
reasonable to require quarterly physicals for the President,
with the board automatically stepping in when there is a
major illness. "Major illness" could be determined by the
President's personal physician, his family, or the Cabinet.
Or, if the board felt there was sufficient question about the
President's health, it could determine by a majority vote to
conduct an examination. It is highly unlikely that the board
would act capriciously in conducting such an examination;
most people would consider it more disinterested than the
Cabinet or the President's family. Referring to the proposed
commission made up of high officials from the executive
branch which would determine inability, Hoover said that
he could not "conceive of any circumstance when such a defined body of leaders ... would act in these circumstances
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other than in the national interest." The traditions and
code of the medical profession are such that surely we
should be able to make the same statement about a responsible board of physicians.
It would not be necessary to make public the results of
every routine examination. Merriman Smith offers a suggestion, based on observation of four Presidents:
My essential feeling is that aside from recognizedly
minor involvements-a cold, a sprain, or something equally
trivial-when the illness of a President is sufficiently serious
to warrant public announcement, the White House then
should make available quite detailed medical information.
When a President has more than a minor ailment, I
think the public is entitled to know just how sick he is, entitled to know the basic medical facts in order to arrive at
independent judgment. The illness of a President has no
right whatever to be a private matter.3 o
Under the impartial medical board proposed, announcement could be made first to the Cabinet, then to the public.
The statement to the Cabinet could include a recommendation concerning temporary or permanent disability.

What Are the Objections to a Medical Board1
When the disability problem first came up for discussion
in the Eisenhower Cabinet, says Sherman Adams,
Eisenhower suggested that a special committee consisting
of the Chief Justice and representatives of the medical profession, among others, should decide.... I think that any
plan that attempts to prescribe physical examination and
reports from a standing group of physicians would be impractical and unwise. The sense of personal responsibility
which the President has in keeping fit is as implicit as his
feeling of responsibility for conducting the affairs of his
office.31
By this time-1958-there had been a number of suggestions for disability commissions. Only one of these proposals
placed emphasis on the role of the medical profession;• the

•see Presidential Inability: An Analysis of Replies to a Question·
naire and Testimony at a Hearing on Presidential Inability, Committee
on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, March 26, 1957, p. 21.
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others grouped together such diverse categories as Supreme
Court justices, inferior court judges, the President's wife,
the Cabinet, and party leaders.
Brownell says of these multi-member bodies:
Arguments for a group determination of presidential
inability overlook the fact that throughout American history, not merely in the Garfield and Wilson instances, the
problem has never been ascertaining presidential inability;
the stalemate in executive activity has proceeded from a
Vice President's reluctance to assume his superior's office
and a President's (or his personal advisers') reluctance to
turn over presidential duties with no assurance of their
return.
Not only would such a fact-finding commission have
been unnecessary and ineffective in every presidential inability problem so far encountered, but in the future it
could have very serious and unfortunate consequences. Any
law requiring complicated procedures, investigations, hearings, findings, and votes, would prevent immediate action
in case of emergency. Today's need is for unquestioned continuity of executive power and leadership. A law establishing a fact-finding body on this issue might completely thwart
that objective, to the nation's deadly peril.
Furthermore, it seems unwise to establish elaborate legal
machinery to provide for examinations of the President.
The question of the physical and mental capacity one needs
to serve as President is, of course, far more than a matter
of medical findings by a group of learned physicians. Providing for physical and mental examinations would, at the
least, be an affront to the President's personal dignity and
degrade the presidential office itself; more dangerously, it
would give a hostile group power to harass the President for
political purposes. s2
It is clear that Brownell's objections are addressed generally to the multi-member commissions proposed by various
groups; only in the last paragraph quoted does he discuss
doctors as the sole determinants of inability. Brownell's belief that "the stalemate in executive activity has proceeded
from a Vice President's reluctance to assume his superior's
office" and that "the problem has never been ascertaining
presidential disability" blandly overlooks that neither Vice
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Presidents Marshall nor Arthur were kept informed about
the condition of the Chief Executive. Moreover, the idea
that the Vice President is the sole person to determine disability was not seriously considered until Davis' article
(cited by Brownell, p. 190) was published in 1919, and it
was not generally recognized until after Silva's book was
published in 1951. Since Brownell was appointed by a President who made no secret of his physical condition it is understandable that the former Attorney General should feel
that "the problem has never been ascertaining presidential
disability"; but history belies his statement. A review of the
lives of our Presidents proves that "the sense of personal
responsibility which the President has in keeping fit" has
weighed more heavily with some than others. "Duty" has
too often been confused with compulsion and it would be
interesting to hear a psychiatrist's explanation of the reasons for the almost total disregard, in some cases, for the
sound advice of a physician.
Brownell assumes from the various prop9sals for commissions that they would necessarily require "complicated
procedures, investigations, hearings, findings, and votes,"
making an immediate decision impossible. This conclusion
is warranted when some of the proposals advanced are examined carefully. But it would be invalid in the case of an
impartial board of physicians, appointed by the Secretary
of Health, Education, and Welfare and working within the
framework of an organization patterned after that of the
Secret Service. Since Brownell's statements in the Yale Law
journal had been directed primarily at the hybrid commissions, he was queried regarding the use of doctors in determining disability. His answer was:
These proposals were deemed inadequate for several reasons. One was that if the decision-making power were given
exclusively to the medical panel we thought it would be
entrusting them with making a kind of decision which does
not lie fully within the competence of medical men. The
doctors could discover the facts relative to the actual physical or mental condition of the President but the judgment
as to whether the President is able to discharge his functions
and duties goes beyond medical knowledge and also in-
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volves practical governmental experience. Secondly, if the
panel were given merely advisory authority it was believed
that the particular physical or mental ailment of the President might not come within the competence of the preselected physicians; also that irresponsible demands would
be made from time to time by prejudiced persons to have
physical examinations made of the President, and doubts
could be raised either by refusing to have the examination
made or by disagreement among the members of the panel
or doubt as to the meaning of the panel's report.as
Brownell points out that the particular ailment might
not come within the competence of the medical board, but
this is a rather superficial objection. The board should not
be composed of specialists but of general practitioners with
authority to call in specialists as needed. Trying to anticipate every specific ill by putting specialists on the board
could result in a body so large it would be grossly impractical. A board of general practitioners should also have the
authority to call in the President's personal physician for
consultation and for his records.
The former Attorney General has expressed fear of irresponsible demands by prejudiced persons, leading to harassment of the President for political motives. If the board
were composed of doctors from private practice, political
pressures might prove irresistible. Politics is not foreign to
the medical associations, as the doctors are the first to admit. And an unpopular decision could finish a physician's
private practice. Political influence could be held to a minimum by providing that the board be chosen from the ranks
of the thousands of physicians presently in the Civil Service
of the United States-from the staffs of our veterans hospitals, for example. The doctors should be far enough removed from the top echelon to be free from direct pressure;
a double precaution would be to change the personnel of
the board after each examination, just as the members of
the Secret Service White House Detail are changed from
time to time, and always with each new administration. If
the organization were patterned after that of the Secret
Service, harassment would be unlikely. Brownell has never
asserted that the Secret Service men harass the President;

132

THE YEAR WE HAn No PRESIDENT

what they do is for his personal safety, and does not constitute "an affront to his personal dignity." In principle, such
an argument could be considered to put personal dignity before the public welfare: it smacks too much of Mrs. Wilson's
statement that she thought of her husband first and the
public good second. When one assumes the Presidency, it is
taken for granted that a large degree of privacy will be lost.
The political implications of a presidential illness, as
already mentioned, could be recognized by leaving the final
decision to the Cabinet; the political ties of that body to the
President could be acknowledged by requiring that the
medical report be made public at the time it was given to
the Cabinet. With the eyes of the nation on them, and the
medical facts known to all the parties and the public, a nonpolitical decision would be more likely, if not assured.

Summary: A Method for Determining Disability
The method summarized below is derived from the
Nebraska Law Review's investigation of executive disability.
While this study is the most comprehensive yet to be made,
the following proposal is offered with the full awareness
that no one person or organization can have the ideal answer to such a complex problem, and that compromise will
be essential to the passage of any legislation.
1. The determination of disability should remain within
the executive branch, recognizing that the separation of
powers doctrine, as originally expressed by Madison, upheld
by the Constitutional Convention and ratified by the states,
and perpetuated by subsequent case law proscribes per se
any plan that would place the determination of disability in
the hands of Congress, the Supreme Court, any combination
thereof, or any temporary commission composed of citizens
and government employees.
2. The Vice President should be removed from any participation in the process of determining presidential inability; the trend to inform him and prepare him for succession
should be recognized and implemented by insuring that if
he should be called upon to exercise the duties of President,
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he enters upon their execution free from any suspicion of
usurpation or precipitate action.
3. While the determination of disability should be kept
within the executive department, the necessary machinery
should not be under the direct supervision of the President.
The precedent existing in the structural composition and
organization of the White House Secret Service Detail suggests a very practical solution.
Under a similar plan, physicians from the government
service would be appointed to a medical board by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. The President's
personal physician could be an ex officio member of the
board, but with no authority to compose or supervise the
examination or report, though his records probably would
be voluntarily requested by the board and his opinion
would rightfully be solicited.
Examinations could be given at stated intervals (at least
quarterly) or in case of "major illness," and "major illness"
could be quickly determined by a simple majority vote of
the doctors, trusting in their professional experience to insure against premature or immature judgment. Following
the examination, the doctors could report to the public and
the Cabinet concerning the President's state of health.
The Cabinet-and excluding the Vice President or anyone else (the Tumultys of the future)-would have the legal
responsibility, with the eyes of an informed American public focused upon them, for making the final decision concerning the President's disability by a simple majority vote.
Current members of the health board could be assigned
to the staff of one of the government hospitals in Washington in order to be immediately available in case of a major
illness; possibly one of them, as a "Chairman," could be
detailed to accompany the President on any trips made; so
a report could be made immediately to the board regarding
any illness that occurred during the President's absence
from Washington.
4. To avoid charges that the legislation proposed is intended to harass or embarrass a President then in office, a
clause should be included making the law effective with the
President whose term begins following enactment.
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The Presidency as it was in the days of Tippecanoe and
Tyler is no more. Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and
Kennedy have said again and again that no one can comprehend the scope of the trust placed in the man in the White
House unless he himself takes up residence there. Speaking
of the need for modernizing the disability clause, Mr. Truman has written:
... who could fully foresee the role of the American Presidency in the kind of world in which we now live-a role
which also requires the President to be available in person
at any hour to make decisions which he alone can make and
which cannot be put off?H
The President's personal powers are startling, and his
exercise of them can affect directly every citizen of the
United States. For instance, the President by signing his
name can change the value of the dollar in your wallet or
purse; if you are a farmer or engaged in work subsidized in
some way by the government or if you should be in need of
federal disaster relief, the President's inability to sign his
name not only could keep money from your pocket but
might mean misery for you and your family; if you are a
laboring man, the President's action or inaction in a labor
dispute can decide whether or not you go to work in the
morning; if you are a businessman, the failure of a disabled
President to adjust imports at a critical time could ruin
your business overnight. But these matters seem trivial when
compared with international problems.
The President's powers and responsibilities in the field
of foreign affairs are such that the necessity for keeping the
President fit, physically and mentally, is synonymous with
national survival. The nature of these responsibilities is
symbolized by a large leather pouch, with a double lock.
Guarded by five United States Army warrant officers,
this pouch contains all the super-secret messages and codes
to put the nation's key emergency plans into effect. These
are the plans which only the President can initiate.
They are not plans for declaring war. They are plans to
meet any military challenge to the security of the United
States and its allies. The pouch contains the coded key to
unleash our retaliatory forces, if we are attacked.35
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On the President's desk sits a "crash" telephone. A President has only to reach for that telephone, speak a few words
in the mouthpiece, and our nuclear deterrent is unleashed.
The law as it now stands increases the risk that a sick President either might use that telephone prematurely or be
unable to use it at all. It would be a tragic irony if we con·
tinued to spend billions for defense but lost the final battle
because we chose to gamble with destiny on the wording of
one section of the Constitution.

Appendix I

Inability of the President
What Constitutes? and Who Decides?
MONOGRAPH BY HENRY E. DAVIS

Non.-The greater portion of the following article was prepared in
the summer and autumn of the year 1881, when its subject was of
lively interest owing to the attack upon President Garfield. The additions due to the discussion in Congress over the bill which subsequently
became law in the form of the act of January 19, 1886, respecting the
performance of the duties of the office of President in case of the removal, etc., of both the President and Vice President, will readily be
recognized. The reader of the act of January 19, 1886, and of the debates preceding the enactment of the same will observe that notwithstanding the fact that the question treated in the article was very fully
discussed, no attempt to settle it was made by Congress and that it is
accordingly as open as ever. The article is printed in the form in which
it was originally put in final shape, 30 years ago.

The severe and protracted illness of President Garfield
brought into prominence a provision of the Federal Constitution which, until that emergency, may be said to have
been practically out of sight since the organization of the
Government-the provision, namely, respecting the discharge
of the duties of the Executive during an inability of the
President. (Art. II, sec. 1, cl. 5: "In case of the removal of
the President from office, or his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office,
the same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the case of removal, death,
resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice
President, declaring what officer shall then act as President,
and such officer shall act accordingly until the disability be
removed or a President shall be elected.") The cognate provision as to the discharge of those duties on the death of the
President had three times been called into requisition-in the
cases of Vice Presidents Tyler, Fillmore, and Johnson; that
which refers to removal was, for a while, forcibly present
to the mind of President Johnson at least; and that respecting resignation was, in all probability, one of the few jests
which tempered the almost depressing earnestness of the
136
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Federal convention. But the inability provision slept a long
sleep, to be awakened at last by a second "shot heard round
the world."
What does that provision mean? was at once the anxious
general inquiry; and as the subject presented itself quite as
a nova questio, many and various were the replies. Of such
as found their way into print scarcely any two agreed; if
they seemed to agree in one particular they differed in at
least one other, and earnest as was the general discussion
represented by these replies no digest of them could approach a harmony.
The question is still as interesting and important as
when thus startlingly projected, for while the Congress is
even now seeking some solution of the problem of the order
of succession in case of inability of both President and Vice
President, no effort is making (and it is difficult to perceive
how any generally satisfactory effort could be made) by that
department of Government to solve the many other problems touching the character, extent, and ascertainment of
an inability, and the proper course of action by the officer
or officers most nearly concerned.
What the provision means is then of vital interest, and
in dealing with the question it is necessary to look closely
not only at the provision itself, but also into the object
which the framers of the Constitution thought they were
attaining by it. And manifestly there are two points of
view from which such examination may be made, the first
in natural order being that of the proceedings of the convention, the other that of the language of the provision as
it left the convention's hands-or, rather, as it now meets
the eye; for, as indicated below, there would seem to be
reason for this particularity in the form of the statement.
The general disposition has been to confine examination
to the language, such resort as has been had to the proceedings being almost exclusively spasmodic and for purposes of
illustration on some single point. Conforming for the present to that disposition, it is of interest to consider what may
fairly be deemed representative specimens of the varying
results of such examination.
The questions which, in this connection, suggest themselves upon the threshold are such as these: What is inability in the sense of the provision; and what its effect as
to the Executive and executive duties? Each of these questions includes others: Who shall decide when the inability
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occurs, whether it is continuing at a given date, when it has
ceased? And, in case of inability of the President, does the
Vice President become President or merely acting President
for the time being? And at the termination of the inability
shall the President and the Vice President resume their
normal functions?
The difficulties in the way of satisfactory answer to these
questions are sufficiently attested by the varying conclusions
already adverted to. As a general answer, some say that the
inability contemplated by the Constitution is one that shall
completely disable the President to discharge his duties during the remainder of his term, in fact, a quasi death; on
which the Vice President, on his own decision of the necessity, shall become President; and that any other case of
in ability is casus omissus (ex-Judge Dittenhoefer in New
York Herald, Sept. 13, 1881). Others find more difficulty in
the subject. One maintains that the character of the contemplated inability must be decided according to the law
sense of the term and must, therefore, be an intellectual
incapacity of the President, on the happening of which and
proof thereof in a manner to be prescribed by the Congress,
the office of President devolves on the Vice President (Prof.
Dwight, North American Review, Nov., 1881). Another
thinks that the Constitution intends to provide for the case
of an inability either physical or mental, which is to be
known to the Vice President when "so open, notorious, and
indisputable as to be recognized by all as existing" (exSenator Trumbull, Ibid.). Still another contends that a
temporary inability is not contemplated by the provision,
but that the inability intended to be provided for depends
upon its probable continuance and the condition of public
affairs, and that the Congress is to declare when such exists;
in other words, that "an inability, in the constitutional
sense, is one that not only exists presently, but, in the
opinion of Congress, is of such a nature and probable continuance that it causes or threatens inconvenience in public affairs"; on the happening of which, though the President may not again resume his powers, the Vice President is
only to act as President, for he can not become President,
the elected President still actually living Oudge Cooley,
Ibid.). And, again, it is said that any inability, of whatever
character and however transient, is what the Constitution
aims to provide for; that the Vice President, himself de-
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termining when such inability has arisen, shall thereupon
enter upon the discharge of the presidential duties; and that
when the inability ceases the President is to resume his functions and the Vice President to go back to his place in the
Senate (ex-Gov. Butler, Ibid.).
Perhaps the most natural explanation of these varying
opinions is to be found in the character of the subject and
its mode of treatment, above suggested; it is practically res
integra, than which nothing is more inviting, and at the
same time stimulating, to the human mind; and it has been
dealt with from the point of view of the language of the
provision. Did the solution of the problem depend upon
"authority" and the citation of precedents, diverse enough
would be the conclusions reached; and independence of
authority and precedent, setting the matter at large, does
not conduce to lessen the number of such conclusions or to
promise for them any nearer approach to similarity.
But another explanation suggests itself, to be found in
the constitutional nature of the provision; accounting as
well for the simplicity of its statement and the different conceptions of its scope and meaning, as for the comparative
absence of resort to authority or precedent in its consideration; not that much light may not be thrown on the inquiry by study of the origin and development of the provision, but the case almost wholly wants those direct declarations of intent and expressions of opinion which may be
brought forward in almost every other constitutional discussion. The provision in question is matter of detail purely; no principle is involved in it, and the debates of the
Federal convention, as also the States in considering the
Constitution, show an absence of any discussion of it whatever. Referred to it is, as a matter of course, but only by
the way, not to be dwelt upon or even stated in an argumentative or explanatory way, and of the many amendments
proposed by one State or another, no one makes any reference to the subject. The nearest approach to notice of the
question of inability to be found in the debates is the
amendment proposed by New York: "That all commissions
• • • shall • • • be tested in the name of the President of
the United States, or the person holding his place for the
time being" (2 Deb., 408). But this is far from touching the
questions in respect of which the provision is here under
consideration; those, nameh, above stated: What con-
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stitutes an inability, who shall decide its existence, and
what is the proper course of action on its happening and
cessation.
But this apparent want of attention to the provision
should not be misconceived; nor should it be overstated or
misstated, as, from imperfect consideration of the subject,
it not infrequently has been. Thus it has been repeatedly
said that the provision for a Vice President was conceived
in the closing days of the Federal Convention, when it was
not possible to give the subject deserved attention; which
statement, while apparently founded in fact, rests on a complete misconception. It is true that, in respect of succession
to the powers and duties of the Presidency, the Vice President was provided for at that late day; but he was conceived merely as a substitute in that behalf for the President
of the Senate for whom, as contemplated successor to those
powers and duties, provision had been made from the first.
Again, so experienced a statesman as ex-Senator Trumbull has used these words: "The original Constitution did
not prescribe the qualifications of age and citizenship of
Vice President as it did of President. Hence a Vice President
not eligible to the Presidency might, under the Constitution
as it existed prior to 1804, have had devolved upon him the
powers and duties of the presidential office" (N. Amer.
Rev., Nov., 1881, p. 419). And in debate in the Senate on
January 8, 1883, Senator Dawes held language to the same
effect: "So little considered was the provision in reference to
the Vice President that they did not even provide that the
Vice President should have the qualifications for office that
the President should have" (Cong. Rec., vol. 14, No. 29, p.
IO). But a glance at Article II, section 1, of the Constitution
as it originally stood will show that the third paragraph of
that section provides for a balloting by every elector for
two persons, and a list of all the persons voted for; of whom
the person receiving the highest number of votes should be
President, and in every case after the choice of the President the person having the next greatest number should
be Vice President; and the fifth paragraph prescribes the
qualifications for eligibility to the office of President. As
the electors in voting could not designate their choice for
President and Vice President, respectively, and as either of
the two persons voted for by each of them might be chosen
President, it followed as of course that the qualifications

APPENDIX

I:

DAVIS ON INABILITY

141

for eligibility must be had by all the persons voted for, of
whom one must be Vice President. Wherefore the qualifications of the Vice President were necessarily prescribed by
the method of his election; and those qualifications were
the same as in the case of the President.
While, then, the framers of the Constitution were not
remiss, yet the provision under consideration apparently
did not receive the same attention at their hands as did the
other provisions. But neither was this because of carelessness, nor is it strange. It is just what might be expected,
considering the object in view.
The main features to be provided for as to the Executive
were: First, the character of the office; second, the qualifications of the incumbent; third, the mode of his election;
fourth, his powers and duties; fifth, his tenure. Each of these
was the fruitful source of earnest, often confused, and at
times seemingly hopeless discussion. This was transferred,
after the preparation of the Constitution, to the State conventions and there gone over again and again. In all these
features the gravest principles were involved; but those
principles once settled, there was left to consider only a possible vacancy during the term for which a President might
be chosen. This was a matter wholly secondary to the main
consideration, that, namely, of providing an executive; and
it was disposed of by a provision wholly simple in its language and, doubtless to the minds of the Convention, also
in its meaning and operation.
How a vacancy might occur was evident. It might happen by act of God, as death; by act of another branch of
Government, as removal; or by act or condition of the incumbent himself. And this last might be either voluntary,
as resignation or absence, or involuntary, as inability.
The death of a President is a matter about which no
great doubt can exist; and the same is equally true of his
removal from office and his resignation, when either is
once a fact. But, it may be said, inability may exist as a fact
and yet grave doubt of its being a fact exist at the same
time. In turn, it may also be said and confidently that the
Convention was not blind to this; yet it saw fit to leave the
provision in its present shape. The questions, What is an
inability? Who shall decide its existence? were put, but not
answered or even discussed in the Convention, "What,"
asked Mr. Dickinson, "is the extent of the term 'disability'
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(that being the form originally), and who is to be the judge
of it?" (5 Deb., 481). Here the whole question was broached,
but nothing followed the inquiry; and in the State conventions the inquiry was not even put.
The care with which the Federal Convention worked out
every provision incorporated into the Constitution is yet
the theme of our wondering praise. Is the provision under
consideration an exception in this particular? We must
think not, but that the provision was left as it is, not
through carelessness, nor because it was not thought probable that in the brief term fixed for the office an inability
might occur; for the Constitution would, for either of those
reasons, have been wholly silent on the subject. In fact, the
Convention thought the provision as adopted self-explanatory, self-operative, and sufficient. Not only do the character of its members and the earnestness of its deliberations
compel us to this view, but also especially must the silence
on Dickinson's inquiry and its failure to reappear be
deemed conclusive of the point. And additional weight is
given this view by the amendment proposed by New York,
above mentioned; it is inconceivable that that amendment
could be suggested and not one providing for determination of the existence of an inability, etc., if the Constitution
was thought to leave any doubt on the point.
That this is the real explanation in the premises, and
that the provision was in fact not slighted in point of attention, will be made clearer by considering the question
from the other point of view, that, namely, of the proceedings of the Convention, and by reviewing its successive steps
on the way to the provision; and this consideration will
also aid much in arriving at the construction now to be put
upon its language.
The first provision touching the Executive was the
seventh of Randolph's resolutions, which, when originally
offered, on May 29, 1787, was wholly silent on the subject
of succession or substitution (1 Deb., 144; 5 do., 128).
The next in order was Charles Pinckney's draft, submitted the same day, Article VIII of which provided in
respect of the President thatHe shall be removed from his office on impeachment
by the House of Delegates, and conviction, in the Supreme
Court, of treason, bribery, or corruption. In case of his removal, death, resignation, or disability, the President of the
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Senate shall exercise the duties of his office until another
President be chosen. And in case of the death of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Delegates
shall do so (l Deb. 148; 5 do. 131).
On being read, Pinckney's draft was referred to the committee of the whole (1 Deb. 150).
On June 15 Mr. Patterson submitted his propositions, of
which the fourth provided for a plural executive, ineligible
for reelection, "and removable on impeachment and conviction for malpractices or neglect of duty by Congress on
application by a majority of the executives of the several
States" (1 Deb. 176; 5 do. 192); but these propositions also
were wholly silent as to succession or substitution of any
officer in the President's stead. The propositions, like Pinckney's draft, were at once referred to a Committee of the
Whole House (1 Deb. 177).
On June 18 Hamilton, in a speech, presented his plan of
government, Article V of which was as follows:
On the death, resignation, or removal of the governor
(Hamilton's title for the executive), his authority to be
exercised by the President of the Senate until a successor be
appointed (1 Deb. 179).
Hamilton's plan contemplated the continuance in office
of the executive during good beha-vior and made no pro.
vision for the case of inability (Cf. 5 Deb. 587).
No other general plans were proposed for the consideration of the convention. On May 30 the House resolved itself into a Committee of the Whole to consider the state of
the Union, and took up Randolph's resolutions (1 Deb.
150), which furnished the basis of consideration throughout
the convention. The resolution respecting the executive
was taken up on June 1 (1 Deb. 154), and, on June 2, postponed to the consideration of the resolution respecting the
second branch of the legislature (1 Deb. 156).
No definite action on Randolph's seventh resolution had
been taken when, on June 19, the committee disagreed to
Patterson's propositions, and a second time reported the
resolutions of Randolph (1 Deb. 180; Cf. pp. 174-175).
While in Committee of the Whole the convention had left
Pinckney's draft untouched; and though in Randolph's
resolutions as now reported it was provided by that touching the executive (now numbered 9), that the President
should "be removable on impeachment and conviction of
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malpractice or neglect of duty," the resolutions were still
silent on the subject of succession or substitution (1 Deb.
182). So the matter of a disability or an inability was still
unprovided for.
The executive continued for a long time a stumbling
block, and when, on July 23, the proceedings were referred
to a committee for the purpose of reporting a Constitution,
"what respects the supreme executive" was expressly excepted (1 Deb. 216). On the next day, July 24, the subject of
the executive was taken up by the House, but almost immediately again postponed (1 Deb. 217). At the same time,
the committee of the whole was discharged from acting on
the propositions of Pinckney and Patterson, and the propositions were referred to the committee to whom the proceedings of the convention had already been referred, viz,
Rutledge, Randolph, Gorham, Ellsworth, and Wilson (l
Deb. 217-218; 5 do. 357-358, 363).
Finally, on July 26, the resolution respecting the executive, as reported on June 19, was adopted and referred to
the committee already provided (I Deb. 219-220). So this
committee now had before it the resolutions of Randolph
as altered by the Convention, the draft of Pinckney, and the
propositions of Patterson (l Deb. 221; 5 do. 363, 374-376).
The Convention adjourned from July 26 to August 6,
during the interval between which dates the committee did
its work. We have no record of its proceedings, but when on
the latter date it reported to the House the draft prepared
by it, the article respecting the President (Art. X) contained,
in section 2, the following:
He shall be removed from his office on impeachment by
the House of Representatives, and conviction in the Supreme Court, of treason, bribery, or corruption. In case
of his removal as aforesaid, death, resignation, or disability
to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the President of the Senate shall discharge those powers and duties
until another President of the United States be chosen, or
until the disability of the President be removed (l Deb.,
228; 5 do., 380).
The draft reported by the committee was then taken up
and considered from day to day in Committee of the Whole.
Article X was not reached until August 24 (I Deb., 262),
and on August 27, the last clause of that article being
reached, its consideration was postponed (I Deb., 267). On
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August 31 such portions of the draft as had been postponed,
including this clause, were referred to a committee of a
Member from each State, 11 in number (1 Deb., 280). This
committee reported September 4, and in their report occur
for the first time provisions respecting a Vice President, as
distinguished from the President of the Senate. Among these
was the following:
The Vice President shall be, ex officio, President of the
Senate except when they sit to try the impeachment of the
President, in which case the Chief Justice shall preside, and
excepting, also, when he shall exercise the powers and
duties of President, in which case, and in case of his absence, the Senate shall choose a President pro tempore (1
Deb., 284; 5 do., 507).
And the committee recommended the following as the
latter part of the second section of Article X:
(The President) shall be removed from his office, on
impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by the Senate, for treason or bribery; and, in case of
his removal as aforesaid, death, absence, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the
Vice President shall exercise those powers and duties until
another President be chosen or until the inability of the
President be removed. (Ibid.)
On September 7 that portion of the committee's report
touching the election of President and Vice President was
amended by adopting the following:
The Legislature may declare by law what officer of the
United States shall act as President in case of the death,
resignation, or disability of the President and Vice President, and such officer shall act accordingly until such disability be removed or a President shall be elected (1 Deb.,
291; 5 do, 220-221 ).
On the following day the last clause of section 2, Article
X, as repotted by the committee (supra) was agreed to (l
Deb., 294), and a committee of five, viz, Johnston, Hamilton, G. Morris, Madison, and King, appointed "to revise the
style of and arrange the articles agreed to by the House"
(l Deb., 295; 5 do, 530). To this committee went the provisions touching inability in the shape in which they are
last above given; that is to say, in terms prescribing that in
case of inability the Vice President or other officer of the
United States exercising the powers and duties of President
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(or acting as President) should do so until such inability
were removed.
The committee reported September 12; the clause providing for the case of removal, etc., as reported being, according to the Journal, as follows:
In case of the removal of the President from office, or of
his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers
and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the
Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for the
case of removal, death, resignation, or inability both of the
President and Vice President, declaring what officer shall
then act as President; and such officer shall act accordingly
until the disability be removed or the period for choosing
another President arrive (I Deb., 302).
On September 15 this clause was amended by striking
out the words "the period for choosing another President
arrive" and inserting in place thereof the words "a President shall be elected" (l Deb., 313). As thus amended the
clause was written into the final draft of the Constitution,
with this difference, according to Madison's Minutes: Instead of the two semicolons were two commas (5 Deb., 562),
although in the Constitution as now frequently printed the
semicolons appear (e. g., see Porter's Outlines U. S. Const.
Hist., 81).
In view of the stress which has been laid on these semicolons by some in discussing the provision (who could not,
however, have examined the clause as it stands in the Revised Statutes, for there the commas are found and not the
semicolons), this difference in the punctuation is of no
slight significance; and Mr. Madison's form is entitled to be
deemed correct, in preference to the other, not only because
he found frequent occasion to note errors in the printed
journal (in 17 instances at least, of which samples may be
found at 5 Deb. 506, 543), but also, and especially, because
he was himself a member of the committee on style which
prepared the last draft submitted to the Convention. He says
specifically that the copy given by him is the copy "as
signed," himself italicizing the words (5 Deb. 536), and
though the Convention compared "the report from the
committee of revision with the articles which were agreed
to by the House, and to them referred for arrangement"
(the comparison being made paragraph by paragraph), "no
entry of the corrections and amendments adopted or proposed appears upon the journals," resort being had to the
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written interlineations, Mr. Madison's minutes, and the
tally sheets to complete the journal (1 Deb. 307).
The exact effect of the committee's action in the
premises may be perfectly seen from the following arrangement, side by side, of the clauses as they were adopted by
the Convention and their consolidation as effected by the
committee:
In case of (the President's) re·
moval as aforesaid, death, absence,
resignation, or inability to discharge the powers or duties of his
office, the Vice President shall exercise thOBe powers and duties until another President be chosen,
or until the inability of the President be removed.
The Legislature may declare by
law what officer of the United
States shall act as President, in
case of the death, resignation or
disability of the President and
Vice President; and such officer
shall act accordingly, until such
disability be removed, or a Presi·
dent shall be elected.

In case of the removal of the
President from office, or of his
death, resignation, or inability to
discharge the powers and duties
of the said office, the same shall
devolve on the Vice President;
and the Congress may by law pro·
vide for the case of removal,
death, resignation, or inability,
both of the President and Vice
President, declaring what officer
shall then act as President; and
such officer shall act accordingly,
until the disability be removed,
or (the period for choosing an·
other President arrive) a President
shall be elected.

However much the outcome of the committee's efforts
may cause us to doubt its qualifications in respect of style,
this chronological examination of the Convention's proceedings in the premises would seem to make clear several
things:
1. The Vice President was not, as some have thought, intended to sit in the Senate and act as president at the same
time. Even the language of Article I, section 3, as it now
stands, manifests this. ("The Senate shall choose their other
officers, and also a president pro tempore in the absence of
the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the office of
President of the United States.'')
2. When the provision under consideration left the hands
of the Convention, to be put into shape by the committee on
style and arrangement, it was distinctly provided that, in
case of an inability of the President, the Vice President was
not to become President, but to exercise the powers and
duties of the President, which exercise was to cease with the
inability of the President.
3. The officer intended to be designated by the Congress
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in case of the double inability was an officer of the United
States.
4. The committee on style and arrangement regarded it·
self as merely bringing together and combining into one,
without alteration of sense or intent, two cognate provisions
found lying apart, by each of which provisions exercise of
the presidential duties by a substitute was restricted to the
period of actual inability. The committee had no authority
to alter or amend; no objection was taken to their union
of these provisions, which fact indicates that the revised
form was not regarded as in any particular altering or
amending "the articles agreed to by the House"; and Mr.
Madison's punctuation (which is that actually adopted)
makes the clause "until the disability be removed" part of
a continuous sentence and therefore constructively, if not
strictly, referable alike to the case of the Vice President and
the "officer" to be designated by the Congress. And this is
a complete answer to Prof. Dwight's assertion that "the
specific reference to powers and duties was deliberately rejected, as well as the words 'until the disability be removed,' " so far as that assertion intends to imply that the
new form imports alteration or amendment of the Convention's determinations.
These conclusions are not in any sense antagonized by
the language of the provision as we now find it. The language is, "in case of • • • inability to discharge the powers
and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the
Vice President." "The same" has reference to the object of
the verb "discharge,'' which is not "said office,'' for that is
the object of the preposition "of," but "the powers and
duties of the said office": and the expression "in case of in·
ability" may fairly be construed as equivalent to "during an
inability," which would involve return of the executive
duties to the President on cessation of the inability.
Nor are Prof. Dwight's citations from Munroe and Martin inconsistent with this view. Munroe was objecting to
the Vice President as an unnecessary officer and noting his
dangerous influence from the standpoint of "advantage to
the State he comes from" (3 Deb., 489-490) . "He is," said
Munroe, "to succeed the President in case of removal, disability, etc., and to have the casting vote in the Senate." In
the connection in which Prof. Dwight cites the former part
of this remark the word "succeed," as used by Munroe, is
absolutely colorless. The same remark is applicable to the
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extract from Martin's letter. Martin was writing in almost
the identical vein in which Munroe spoke, and in stating his
objections to the Vice President he spoke of him as the
officer "to supply (the President's) place" (1 Deb., 378). In
neither instance was the question of inability under consideration; each used the quoted expression in the run of
argument and by way of recital of features deemed objectionable. It would be as fair to cite against Prof. Dwight's
contention that the "office" devolves Madison's assertion
(in the same debate in which Munroe was arguing) that "the
power will devolve on the Vice President" (3 Deb., 498);
notwithstanding the remark, being made by Madison while
arguing in favor of the provision touching the Executive,
has no sort of reference to the point of view from which the
provision is now being considered. Indeed, Madison might
more justly be cited, for his exact language was, "(the House
of Representatives) can impeach (the President); they can
remove him if found guilty; they can suspend him when
suspected, and the power will devolve on the Vice President." But such remarks, made in such connections, are no
more to the point than are the dicta of judges' law.
Reverting now, with the aid of this review of the Convention's proceedings, to the several views of the meaning
and intent of the provision above noticed, that taken by
ex-Gov. Butler would seem to be the correct one. He
thinks that the inability may be of any kind, and that when
it ceases both officers, President and Vice President, should
return to their proper places. The "articles as agreed to by
the House" incontestably manifest this, and "this view is in
consonance with the whole theory of an alternative officer
in all parliamentary bodies and in executive offices" (North
Amer. Rev., Nov., 1881, p. 434).
And the Vice President is the person to decide when the
inability has arisen. In the absence of any designation to
the contrary, "it may be taken to be axiomatic that when
the Constitution imposes a duty on an officer, to be done
by him, he must be the sole judge when and how to do that
duty, subject only to his responsibility to the people and to
the risk of impeachment if he act improperly or corruptly"
(ibid, 433); a remark which gains weight from consideration
of the complete isolation respectively of the executive,
judicial, and legislative branches of our Governmeent; than
which no feature of our system was more in contemplation
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by its framers or has been more rigidly respected. The best
judgments now agree even that the Supreme Court can not
(except by mandamus in those cases of nonfeasance wholly
independent of discretion), lay down law for the Executive;
the function of that court being only to decide "cases arising" under the prescribed conditions. And the legislature
can interfere with the Executive only by impeachment for
malfeasance of a specific sort, so that neither the judiciary
nor the legislature being either capable of affecting or
responsible for the performance of the executive duties, the
discharge of those duties is properly left where the responsibility belongs.
Of course, save in the exceptional case of an insane President, no Vice President would assume to insist to a President against his judgment that he was under an inability;
and so long as a sane President would resist such intimation
there would be no inability. The President may safely be
trusted to help out the Vice President in the necessity of
deciding to assume the functions of the office, save only in
the case of insanity, as suggested; but the Constitution could
not go into every exceptional case. Section 675 of the Revised Statutes provides that "in case of a vacancy in the
office of Chief Justice, or of his inability to perform the
duties and powers of his office, they shall devolve upon the
associate justice who is first in precedence." What is an
inability in this case, and who decides it? Section 10 of the
act of March l, 1792 (l Stat., 239; R. S., sec. 147) provides
"that whenever the office of President and Vice President
shall both become vacant the Secretary of State shall forthwith cause a notification thereof to be made to the executive of every State." Who decides when the two offices are
vacant? In the one case the senior associate takes the seat
of the Chief Justice because the latter is not in it, and in the
other the Secretary of State, being charged with the duty,
would discharge it when he himself deemed the occasion to
have arisen. And, as Senator Ingalls said in the debate of
January 8, 1883, already noticed, "By the Constitution itself, if the Constitution is self-operative or could be selfoperative, the powers and duties of (the presidential) office
did devolve upon Vice President Arthur on the 2d day of
July, 1881."
The determination of the question of inability is an
Executive affair altogether. The only other power said to be
concerned in it is the Congress, but that body is under a
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limitation in the premises confining its participation to
quite another matter. The Constiution has provided that
when an inability exists in one case the Vice President shall
act, and that the Congress may-do what? Determine when
an inability has arisen in any case? No; but provide what
officer shall act when such inability exists in another case.
This merely gives the Congress the right to designate an
officer to succeed to the discharge of the Executive duties
when the double disability exists; it does not even give that
body the right to say under what circumstances such disability shall be deemed to have arisen, much less to determine when a wholly different di5ability occurs. Inclusio
unius exclusio alterius; and the Congress recognized this by
the act of 1792, which act is a distinct interpretation by that
body of its constiutional rights and duties in the premises.
That interpretation is perfectly expressed by the language
of Senator Morgan (Dec. 29, 1882): "Whenever we proceed
further than to declare what officer shall act as President,
we transgress the bounds of our constitutional authority."
And immediately in this connection there at once presents itself a question, which, even without its answer, not
only indicates that the Constitution did not intend to vest
the Congress with the power to determine when or under
what circumstances an inabilty exists, but also suggests the
reason for the shape in which we find that subject left by
the Constitution: How could the Congress decide an inability to exist? Only in one of two ways: First, by special
decision in each case as it arises; or, second, by a general
provision prescribing a method in advance or conferring the
power of decision upon some person or body, to be exercised
in a prescribed manner and under prescribed conditions.
It may safely be said that the first of these methods needs
no serious consideration. All that is urged against the
power of the Congress to interfere at all in the determining
the existence of an inability applies with more than double
force to its interference without previous provision therefor,
and the difficulties in the way of its acting at all in such case
are apparent. The alleged or possible existence of an inability is a matter calling for instant consideration and
decision, not a matter to be left to the consideration, discussion, perhaps wrangling, of a great number of variously
disposed and diverse-minded men. Besides, suppose an inability to appear during a recess of the Congress, what is to
be the proceeding?
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And here is presented still another important consideration. The very fact that the Constitution contains no provision for summoning the Congress by any other than the
President is almost proof conclusive that that branch was
intended to have no part in determining the existence of
an inability; for to say that the Vice President might so summon that body is to yield the whole question; the very act
by the Vice President would determine the inability to
exist. If provision were made or to be made for summoning the Congress by any other than the President to consider a supposed disability how would the body be summoned? Clearly some one person would be compelled to
take the initiative; and how delicate would be his task, practically deciding the question in advance. Would such task
be much less delicate than that of the Vice President assuming to declare an inability to exist and acting accordingly? And whom could the Congress choose so agreeable to
the people as the second man in power, he who was distinctively put into his place to assume ·its great responsibilities?
Putting aside the constitutional objection, the second
method of action by the Congress would be little, if any,
more feasible or satisfactory than the first; and if the Congress should assume to regulate the subject at all, this
second method, delegating power to a person or body, would
be indispensable to provide for the case of an inability
occurring during a recess.
If the Congress should confer the power of decision upon
any one person the matter would be left just where the Constitution leaves it; with this difference in favor of the Constitution-save in the rare instance of the want of a Vice
President, that instrument (if the view herein contended for
be the proper one), confers the power upon one elected to
his office by the people. On the other hand, if the power
were committed to a body, the initiative would necessarily
be taken by some one person; in any aspect of the matter,
the necessity of beginning with some one person constantly
meets us.
Is not this fact practically the explanation of the whole
matter as we find it in the Constitution? The beginning, in
every conceivable view of the case, must always be by some
individual; whether the Vice President is to decide of himself, whether the Congress is to be called, whether any given
person is to exercise the power or any designated body is to
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be convened for the purpose, that necessity can not be
escaped. And why not leave the matter to the man chosen
of the people as their possible ruler? nay, as the Constitution
then stood, to the man possibly to be chosen as their ruler;
for any one of the men voted for by the electors might be
President, and some one of those voted for as President
would be the Vice President.
The decision of such a question as the existence of an
inability must be prompt and immediately effective; of all
questions in the world this should be free from everything
approaching delay or halting. There should in such case be
no interregnum, be it of how short duration soever; a thing
abhorred of all and repugnant to every system of government. A plural tribunal of any sort would involve danger
of this great evil, and it needs no inspiration to conceive
circumstances under which, with a tribunal of several to
consider it, an inability of the President would be almost as
great a calamity as an outbreak of treasonable hostilities.
A single mind is the best conceivable tribunal for such a
question and that tribunal may safely enough he the mind
of him who is practically the choice of the whole people.
For his right doing in so trying an emergency the Constitution rests its hope, as our entire governmental system rests
its life, upon the earnest and patriotic intelligence of the
American people and of each and every of them. He would
he a rare man, indeed, who, in so responsible a moment,
should misconceive, or, worse still, should intentionally
disregard his high duty and the inconcealable public sentiment.

Appendix II

Disability Clauses in Colonial Charters
The charters were usually granted to a person or persons
and their "heires, deputyes, agents, commissioners and assigns." So executive power in early America transferred
automatically by descent. As democracy grew, the lieutenant governor emerged as a "deputie" rather than "heire."
Pertinent sections of the charters and constitutions of the
thirteen Colonies and the states of the Confederation follow:
All page citations are to Francis N. Thorpe, American Charters, Constitutions and Organic Laws (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1909). Emphasis supplied.

CONNECTICUT:
Council for New England, 1620: "unto which President, or in his Absence, to any such Person as by the
Order of said Councill shall be thereunto appointed,
Wee do give Authority to give Orders...... p. 1831.
Commission to Andros, 1688: "and upon your death
or absence out of our said Territory unto our Leut. Governor, to whom we do therefore by these presents give
and grant all and singular the powers and authorityes
aforesaid to be exercised and enjoyed by .kim in case of
your death or absence during "our pleasure, or untill
your arrival within our said Territory and Dominion; as
Wee do further hereby give and grant full power and
authority to our Leut. Governor to do and execute whatsoever he shall be by you authorized and appointed to
do and execute in pursuance of and according to the
powers grante to you by this Commission." p. 1869.
Government of New Haven Colony, 1643: "the Governor, or in his absence, the Deputy Governor, shall
have power to summon a General! Court at any other
time." p. 528.
Charter of Connecticut, 1662: "That the Governor of
the said Company for the Time being, or in his Absence
by occasion of sickness, or otherwise by his Leave or
Permission, the Deputy Governor, for the Time being,
shall and may from time to Time upon an Occasions
give Order for the assembling of the said Company, and
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calling them together to consult and advise of the Business and Affairs of the said Company...." p. 531.
DELAWARE:
Dutch West India Company's Patent, 1621: "governor in chief, as well as other deputy governors. ..."
p. 60.
Grant to William Penn, 1681: "Governor, or his
Deputy." p. 3045.
Frames of Government, 1682: Notice of council meeting to be given by "the Governor or his Deputy" and
". . . in this provincial Council the Governor or his
Deputy, shall or may, always preside...." p. 3055.
Constitution of 1776: "And on his [the president's]
death, inability, or absence from the State, the speaker
of the house of assembly shall have the powers of a president, until a new nomination is made by the general
assembly." p. 563.
GEORGIA:
Proprietary Proposals, 1663: "the Governor or his
Deputy to be one, to govern for the time aforesaid...."
p. 2754.
Fundamental Constitutions, Carolina, 1669: "One
The eldest of the lords proprietors shall be palatine; and
upon the decease of the palatine, the eldest of the seven
surviving proprietors shall always succeed him.... The
palatine shall. . . . have power ... to make a deputy,
who shall have the same power to all intents and purposes as he himself who deputizes him. . . ." pp. 2772,
2779.
Constitution of Georgia, 1777: "Article XXIX. The
president of the executive council, in the absence or
sickness of the governor, shall exercise all the powers of
the governor." p. 777.
MARYLAND :
Constitution of Maryland, 1776: XXXII. That upon
the death, resignation, or removal out of this State, of
the Governor, the first named of the Council, "for the
time being, shall act as Governor, and qualify in the
same manner; and shall immediately call a meeting of
the General Assembly, giving not less than fourteen
days notice of the meeting, at which meeting, a Governor
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shall be appointed, in manner aforesaid, for the residue
of the year." p. 1686.

MASSACHUSETTS:
Charter of Massachusetts Bay, 1629: "There shalbe
one Governor, one Deputy Governor ... That the Governor of the saide Company for the tyme being, or in his
Absence by Occasion of Sicknes or otherwise, the Deputie Governor for the tyme being, shall have A uthoritie
from time to time upon all Occasions, to give order for
the assembling of the saide Company.... (etc.)" p. 1852.
Charter of Massachusetts Bay, 1691: " ... there shall
be one Governour One Leivtent or Deputy Governour
. . . when and as often as the Governour "of our said
Province for the time being shall happen to dye or be
displaced by us ... or be absent from his Government
That then and in any of the said Cases the Lievtenant
or Deputy Governour of Our said Province for the time
being shall have full power and authority to doe and
execute all and every sue Acts Matters and things which
our Governour of Our said Province for the time being
might or could by vertue of these Our Letters Patents
lawfully doe or execute if he were personally present
untill the returne of the Governour soe absent or Arrivall or Constitucon of such other Governour as shall
or may be appointed ... ."pp. 1877, 1884.
Constitution of Massachusetts, 1780: "Whenever the
chair of the governor shall be vacant, by reason of his
death, or absence from the commonwealth, or otherwise,
the lieutenant-governor, for the time being, shall, during
such vacancy, perform all the duties incumbent upon
the governor, and shall have and exercise all the powers
and authorities, which by this "constitution the governor
is vested with, when personally present." p. 1888.
NEW HAMPSHIRE:
Constitution of 1776: "that such Council appoint
their President, and in his absence that the senior counsellor preside.'' p. 2451.
Constitution of 1784: "Whenever the chair of the
president shall be vacant, by reason of death, absence
for the state, or otherwise, the senior senator for the
time being, shall, during such vacancy, have and exercise
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all the powers and authorities which by this constitution
the president is vested with when personally present."
p. 245S.
NEW JERSEY:
Constitution of 1776: The Council shall choose a
"Vice President, who shall act as such in the absence of
the Governor." p. 2596.
NEW YORK:
Constitution of 1777: "And in the case of the impeachment of the governor, or his removal from office,
death, resignation, or absence from the State, the lieutenant governor shall exercise all the power and authority appertaining to the office of the governor until
another be chosen, or the governor absent or impeached
shall return or be acquitted...."

NORTH CAROLINA:
Constitution of 1776: " ... And on his death, inability, or absence from the State, the Speaker of the Senate,
for the time being (and in case of this death, inability,
or absence from the State, the Speaker of the House of
Commons) shall exercise the powers of government after
such death, or during such absence or inability of the
Governor (or Speaker of the Senate) or until a new nomination is made by the General Assembly." p. 2792.

PENNSYLVANIA:
Constitution of 1776: "The president, and in his absence, the vice president with the council" shall exercise
the executive power. p. 3087.
See also comment under DELAWARE concerning
the 1681 grant to William Penn, and the Frames of
Government of 1682.

RHODE ISLAND:
Charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations,
1663: "there shall bee one Governour, one DeputieGovernour and ten Assistants ... the Governour of the
sayd Company, for the tyme being, or in his absence,
by occasion of sicknesse, or otherwise, by his leave and
permission, the Deputy-Govemour for the tyme being
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shall and may, from tyme to tyme, upon all occasions,
give order for the assemblyings of the sayd Company.
. . . (etc.)" p. 3214.
SOUTH CAROLINA:
See the Fundamental Constitutions, Carolina, 1669
under GEORGIA.
Constitution of 1776: "That in the case of the death
of the president and commander-in-chief, or his absence
from the colony, the vice-president of the colony shall
succeed to his office. ..." p. 3245.
Constitution of 1778: "That in case of the impeachment of the governor and commander-in-chief, or his
removal from office, death, resignation, or absence from
the state, the lieutenant governor shall succeed to his
office." p. 3249.
VIRGINIA:
Constitution of 1776: "The Privy Council ... shall
annually choose, out of their own members, a President,
who, iR case of death, inability, or absence of the Governor from the Government, shall act as LieutenantGovernor." p. 3817.

Appendix Ill

Amendment Proposed

by the Nebraska

Law Review
ArticleSection l. If the President dies, resigns or is removed
from office, the Vice President shall become President for
the remainder of the term to which the President was
elected.
Section 2. If the President becomes unable for any reason to discharge the powers and duties of his office, they
shall devolve upon the Vice President, who shall then act as
President until the disability of the President be removed,
or the term of office of the President shall expire. Congress
shall have the power to establish a procedure to determine
the inability of the President to discharge the powers and
duties of his office; but such procedure must be compatible
with the maintenance of the three distinct departments of
government, the legislative, the executive and the judicial
and the preservation of the checks and balances between the
coordinate branches. Congress shall provide by law for the
case of the removal, death, resignation or inability of both
the President and Vice President, declaring what officer
shall then act as President; and such officer shall act accordingly, until the inability be removed, or the expiration of
the term for which both officers had been elected.
Section 3. Article II, section 1, paragraph 6 is hereby
repealed.
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American Bar Association
Resolution Adopted by the House of Delegates,
February 22, 1960
Resolved, That the American Bar Association approves
the adoption of an amendment to the Constitution of the
United States on the subject of presidential inability, whereby the fifth clause of Section 1 of Article II of the Constitution would be amended to read as follows:
"In case of the removal of the President from office, or
his death or resignation, the said office shall devolve on the
Vice President. In case of the inability of the President to
discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the said
powers and duties shall devolve on the Vice President, until
the inability be removed. The Congress may by law provide
for the case of removal, death, resignation or inability, both
of the President and Vice President, declaring what officer
shall then be President, or in the case of inability, act as
President, and such officer shall be or act as President accordingly, until a President shall be elected or, in case of
inability, until the inability shall be earlier removed. The
commencement and termination of any inability shall be determined by such method as Congress shall by law provide."
Amendments with virtually identical wording were subsequently adopted by the New York State Bar Association
and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.
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Appendix V
A. Former President Hoover's Suggestions on a
Method of Determining Inability
THE KEY LARGO ANGLERS CLUB
Homestead, Fla., January 20, I 958
Hon. Estes Kefauver,
Chairman, Standing Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments, United States Senate, Washington, D. C.
MY DEAR SENATOR: I have received your kind note requesting my views on the proposed bills you send me.
I assume that the question is solely the method of determining the "inability" of the President "to discharge the
powers and duties of his office," and contained in it also the
method of determining the "removal of disability."
All questions of succession seem covered by article II,
section I, paragraph 5 of the Constitution, and therefore
legislation on this subject seems to me unnecessary.
I. There seems to be some question as to whether remedy can be found by statutory law or must be through
constitutional amendment. The Congress will need decide
whether the above-mentioned section in the Constitution
would be sufficient authority for a statutory solution.
2. It seems to me that the method of determining "inability" or "recovery" requires consideration of the spirit
of the separation of powers in the Government and certain
traditional practices which have become fixed in our national life during the past 150 years.
3. The President and the Vice President are elected as
the chosen leaders of a political party with declared mandates, principles, solutions of issues, and promises to the
people.
4. The Congress, in one or both Houses, is often controlled by an opposition political party, and thus by those
who are, in practice, mostly opposed to the mandates or
promises upon which the President and Vice President are
elected by the people.
5. All of which leads me to the generalization that a
President's inability to serve or his possible restoration to
office should be determined by the leading officials in the
executive branch, as they are of the party having the responsibilities determined by the election.
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6. I believe that a simple amendment to the Constitution
(or possibly statutory law) could provide for a commission
made up from the executive branch to make the determinations required. I do not suggest that the individual persons
be named but that the departments or agencies be enumerated, whose chief official or head should be a member of
such a commission. The number could well be limited to
not less than 7 and not more than 15 such heads of departments or agencies. There could be a further provision that
they should seek the advice of a panel of experienced physicians or surgeons.
I cannot conceive of any circumstance when such a defined body of leaders from the executive branch would act
in these circumstances otherwise than in the national interest.
Yours faithfully,
(Signed) HERBERT HOOVER

B. Former President Truman's Proposal
INDEPENDENCE, Mo.
January 16, 1958
Hon. Estes Kefauver,
United States Senate,
Washington, D. C.
DEAR EsTEs: In reply to your letter of the l 0th, I am sending you a copy of an article of mine, written for the North
American Newspaper Alliance, which covers the subject of
a President's inability to carry on his duties.
These are my views, and if you want to make use of the
article, you are at liberty to do so.
Sincerely yours,
(Signed) HARRY TRUMAN
(Copyright by Harry S. Truman, 1957)

There has been an understandable reluctance to deal
with the delicate and sensitive problem of what we are to
do when any President becomes incapacitated and is unable to perform his duties.
Our Founding Fathers did not provide for such an eventuality. During the 168 years of our history under the
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Constitution, there have been only two occasions when the
question arose of a President's ability to serve. I refer to
James A. Garfield and Woodrow Wilson. We have been fortunate, indeed, that we have not had to face such a crisis
more often.
But the job of the President is getting to be an almost
unendurable mental and physical burden, and we ought not
to go on trusting to luck to see us through.
We may find that we have waited too long to provide a
way of meeting the situation in the event a President becomes incapacitated. There have been suggestions to deal
with the matter through legislation. Others have proposed
amending the Constitution.
However we deal with it eventually, this is too vital a
matter to be acted on hastily without the widest discussion
and study. I have felt that there is always great danger in
writing too much into the Constitution. We must have certain flexibility to meet changing conditions. We have already experienced the consequences of hastily amending the
Constitution without adequate public discussion, as in the
cases of the 18th and the 22d amendments.

In response to the many letters I have received on the
subject from all parts of the country, and the world, I am
taking the liberty of suggesting a way to meet this problem.
I would like to make it perfectly clear that it is not my
intention to cast reflections on anyone, or to raise any
doubts about the health or condition of the President. Along
with all of our citizens, I wish him good health and a long
life.
But there is a growing concern about our needs to provide against the danger of a lapse in the functioning of the
Presidency and the crises that might ensue.
The power of the President of the United States and
his influence on the world today have grown so great that
his well-being is of paramount interest to people everywhere. It is no longer a matter to be decided by political
leaders and constitutional authority.
Even a minor indisposition of the President will set into
motion unexpected and often unreasoning fears, such as we
have recently witnessed.
The framers of our Constitution drafted a brilliant and
inspired document in which they anticipated and provided
for nearly all of the basic developments of our democracy.
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But who could fully foresee the role of the American Presidency in the kind of a world in which we now live-a role
which also requires the President to be available in person
at any hour to make decisions which he alone can make and
which cannot be put off?
As Vice President, I found myself acutely conscious of
this problem in a personal way when I met President Roosevelt upon his return from Yalta. Up to that time I regarded
the circumstances of an incapacitated President as an academic problem in history, such as was posed by Presidents
Garfield and Wilson.
After the first shock of seeing President Roosevelt, I
tried to dismiss from my mind the ominous thoughts of a
possible breakdown, counting on his ability to bounce back
from the strains and stress of office. After Yalta, President
Roosevelt continued to carry on with sustained energy and
alertness-until suddenly called by death.
From the day I succeeded to the Presidency, I have been
thinking about the needs of an act of legislation to provide
machinery to meet the emergency of a President's disability.
Shortly after taking office, I considered setting up a commission to study the problem and make recommendations.
But in the midst of war and during the period of postwar
reconstruction we were preoccupied with more immediate
and urgent matters.
I therefore chose instead to recommend to the Congress
a change by statute of succession to the Presidency from the
Cabinet to the Congress in the event the Nation was without a Vice President. Up to that time the Secretary of State
was next in order of succession. I did not think that a Cabinet officer-who is not elected by the people-should succeed to the Presidency, which is an elective office. The
Speaker of the House, who is, in fact, the top-ranking elected
public official after the President and the Vice President, is
now under the new law next in succession.
This, however, does not meet the problem when a President is unable to perform the duties of his office.
I suggest, therefore, that the following proposal may
provide us with a workable solution:
1. When a President is stricken with an illness, raising
the question of his ability to carry out the duties of his
office, there should come into being a Committee of Seven
composed of representatives of the three branches of the
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Government. This Committee should consist of the Vice
President, the Chief Justice of the United States, the Speaker
of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of both
the House of Representatives and the Senate. This Committee would select a board of leading medical authorities
drawn from top medical schools of the Nation. This medical board, thus chosen, would then make the necessary examinations presenting their findings to the Committee of
Seven. Should the findings of the medical board indicate
that the President is unable to perform his duties, and that
he is, in fact, truly incapacitated and not merely stricken
with a transitory illness, then the Committee of Seven
would so inform the Congress. Congress then would have
the right to act, and by a two-thirds vote of the full membership declare the Vice President as President.
The Vice President, designated as President, would
thereupon serve out the full term of his predecessor. Should
the stricken President, thus relieved, experience during this
term a complete recovery, he would not be entitled to re·
possess the office.
Should the Congress be in adjournment or recess when
a President is incapacitated, the Vice President, the Speaker,
and Chief Justice should call a meeting of the Committee
of Seven. This Committee, after receiving the medical find·
ings, would have authority to call Congress into special ses·
sion for the purpose of declaring the Vice President as
President.
2. When a Vice President succeeds to the Presidency and
leaves the office of the Vice President vacant, the last electoral college should be called into session by the new Presi·
dent for the purpose of selecting and declaring a new Vice
President. I would recommend that in every instance where
a Vice President succeeds to an unexpired term of a President the electoral college be convened to choose a new Vice
President.
By this procedure I think we would be able to ensure
the proper continuance of the functioning of the Presidency
and, at the same time, protect the Nation's paramount interests through the full exercise of the checks and balances
of our free democratic institutions.
I suggest procedure along these broad general lines could
be enacted into law by statute. If necessary, these provisions
could be framed into a constitutional amendment.
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Cleveland, Wilson, Harding, Roosevelt
and Eisenhower; and the stopgap measures taken by Presidents Eisenhower and
Kennedy in an attempt to insure continuity of leadership are described in
detail.
Part 11 considers such questions as: Is
a constitutional amendment necessary?
What should it encompass? In determining presidential inability what should be
the role of the medical profession? the
Cabinet? the Vice President? How much
publicity should be given to presidential
illness? In suggesting answers, the author
has drawn on the results of a nineteenmonth study of the problem by the Nebraska Law Review and on data derived
from personal interviews and correspondence with former Presidents Hoover,
Truman, ·and Eisenhower and more than
300 lawyers, political scientists, members
of Congress, and other federal and state
officials.
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